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This thesis is a critical analysis of the incorporation and role of international human
rights law in the municipal laws of Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe. It adopts a
comparative approach. This approach is predicated on the following similarities between the
three countries. These countries have inherited the same Roman-Dutch common law from the
erstwhile colonial Powers, they have entrenched Bills of Rights in their respective national
Constitutions and there is an emerging judicial practice of invoking and relying upon
international human rights law in interpreting national law.
The areas examined are: the dominant theories on the relationship between
international law and national law, colonial legal legacy, the reception and status of
international human rights law in the pre-independence era, the domestic status of
international law at independence and new departures, if any, from the colonial legacy, and
the practice of each of these countries in relation to these theories in the post-independence
legal order. As regards the latter, the study examines the extent to which Namibian monist
theory adopted at independence and the monist-dualist inherited legacy of Botswana and
Zimbabwe have been applied since independence in national law particularly by the judiciary
in the enforcement of human rights law.
A comparison is made between the countries in question in order to assess the
relevance of classical monism and dualism in the domestic application of international human
rights law. In particular, the thesis examines the extent to which the common theoretical
approach inherited by these countries towards international law, customary and conventional,
has been retained or departed from in the enforcement of national human rights law.
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Theoretical Issues: Monism and Dualism
This chapter examines the theoretical standpoints that have been advanced with an
endeavour to explain and clarify the relationship between international law and municipal
law. These are monism and dualism. Treatises on these theories are copious and such an
analysis can only be brief.1 These theories provide the background of, and philosophical
clarity to, the analysis. They help to articulate the precise status and role of international
human rights law in municipal law. The study, however, demonstrates that, in reality, an
examination of the inter-relation of international law to municipal law purely on the basis of
these theories is an over-simplification. It does not accord with actual State practice.
1. Dualist Theory.
In its general form, dualism, also known as the transformation or adoption theory,
perceives international law and municipal law as two distinct and independent legal orders
each having an intrinsically and structurally distinct character.2 The two legal orders are two
separate and self-contained spheres of legal action, and theoretically there should be no point
of conflict between them. Because the two are separate systems, international law would not
as such form part ofmunicipal law of the state: to the extent that in particular instances rules
of international law may apply within a state they do so by virtue of their adoption by the
internal law of the state and apply as part of the internal law and not as international law.3
The dualist school begins its argument with the proposition that law is an act of state
will. Thus municipal law can be differentiated from international law in that it is a
manifestation of this will internally directed, as distinct from the participation in a collective
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act of will by which the sovereign powers undertake obligations with respect to other
sovereign powers.4 By emphasising the sovereignty of state will, dualism reveals the
influence of the rise in modern states of legislatures with complete internal sovereignty.
Dualism has benefited from the influence of several positivist theorists. The foremost
exponents of this theory were Hegel, Anzilotti and Triepel.5 These theorists adopted the
notion of consent as an important factor in investigating the relation of international law to
municipal law. Because they held the view that international law was based on the consent of
sovereign states, it was as such a distinct and independent legal system from municipal law.
Triepel, for instance, treats the two legal systems of municipal law and international law as
entirely distinct in nature. He asserts firstly, that the two legal systems differ in the particular
social relations they govern; state law deals with the social relations between individuals and
international law regulates the social relations between states, who alone are subject to it.6 In
the second sense, Triepel argues, a view widely held by other dualists, that the two systems
have different juridical origins. The source ofmunicipal law is the will of the state itself and
the source of international law is the common will of states (gemeinwille).7
Thirdly, according to Anzilotti, the two legal systems are differentiated by the
fundamental principles by which each system is conditioned. Municipal law is conditioned by
the norm that legislation is to be obeyed whereas international law is conditioned by the pacta
sunt servanda principle.8 The latter principle commands that agreements between states are to
be respected. This principle is at the heart of modern international law especially
conventional international law and underlies the basis for performance of treaty obligations.9
Because of this conditioning factor, Anzilotti concludes that the two systems are so distinct
that no conflict between them is possible.
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The Hegelians therefore stress that international law and municipal law exist
separately and each is supreme in its own sphere. In cases of conflict, the Hegelians view
international law as inferior to and hence weaker than municipal law. The predominance of
municipal law is predicated on the notion that a state has a sovereign right to determine which
rules of international law are to have effect in municipal sphere. Consequently, international
law, including international human rights law, may create rights for individual citizens and be
applied by municipal courts only if it has been adopted by such courts or transformed into
municipal law through a legislative process. Thus the internal validity and application of
international human rights norms is conditioned by a positive legislative enactment or judicial
adoption.
2. Monist Theory.
Monism, or alternatively the doctrine of automatic incorporation, maintains that
international law and municipal law constitute aspects of a single universal system. This
school of thought posits that all rules of law ultimately regulate the behaviour of the
individual. The only difference is that in the international sphere the consequences of such
behaviour are attributed to the state and in the municipal law sphere they are attributed to the
individual citizen.10
Proponents of monistic construction of the relation of international law to municipal
law view all law as a single system composed of binding rules, whether those rules are
obligatory on states or entities other than states. The two systems, as systems of legal rules,
are inter-related parts of one single legal structure and the various national systems of law are
derived by way of delegation from the international legal system." They are manifestations of
one single concept of law binding human beings.
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Monism is a feature of the natural law school. One of its leading theorists was Hugo
Grotius, a Dutch scholar and diplomat, and the father of the rationalist school of natural law.
In Prolegomenon 16 of his De jure Belli ac Pacis (1625) Grotius constructs a kind of a
"geneacological tree with human nature as the mother of natural law at the head."12 He
proceeded to represent consent as the mother of the ius civile and the jus gentium, adding that
consent itself derives its force from natural law, so that human nature turns out to be the great
grandmother of the ius civile and the ius gentium. In its origins the monist doctrine owed
much to this rationalist construction of a universal legal order.
The main exponents of monism are Kelsen and Lauterpacht. The former, at least,
before later aligning himself towards positivism in his later writings,13 argued that the
international legal order is significant only as part of a universal legal order which comprises
also the national legal orders of various states.14 Starke has articulated Kelsen's position thus:
For him, (Kelsen) jurisprudence is a science, and the object of a science is formed by
a cognition and its unity. Unity of cognition connotes unity of object, and this unity
must be found in the relation between municipal law and international law. Dualism is
inconsistent with the axiomatic unity of science. Any construction other than monism
is bound to constitute a denial of the legal character of international law.1:1
Kelsen predicates his argument on what he calls the "basic norm" or the grundnorm and
argues that both systems of law derive their legal validity from the basic norm and as such
they belong to the same system of legal norms.16
Lauterpacht asserts that it is ultimately the conduct of the individuals which is
regulated by law, whether international or national, the only difference being that in the
international sphere the consequences of such conduct are attributed to the State. The fact that
municipal courts may be bound by the law of their States to enforce statutes which are
contrary to international law merely shows that because of the weakness of international law,
States admit and tolerate what is actually a conflict of duties within the same legal system, a
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phenomenon not altogether unknown in other spheres of national law. In any case, from the
viewpoint of international law the validity of a pronouncement of a national court is in such
cases purely provisional. It leaves intact the international responsibility of a state since it is a
well recognised rule that a state is internationally responsible for the decisions of its courts,
even if in conformity with the law of the state concerned, whenever that law happens to be
contrary to international law.17
The monists argue that not only do international legal rules and various national legal
orders constitute a single universal system but in cases of conflict national legal orders take
subordinate position.18 A domestic tribunal faced with a problem involving a rule of
international law is obliged to apply a rule of international law. In fact, according to monism,
the international legal order determines the territorial and temporal spheres of validity of the
national legal orders, thus, making possible for the co-existence of a multitude of states.19
However, inverted monism concedes primacy to municipal law.20
The naturalists, and also modern monists, believe that individual citizens, not states,
are the real subjects of international law. International law is not by its nature inapplicable to
individuals. It recognises individuals as bearers of legal rights and duties of the international
legal system. According to Morgenstern:
The essence of the monist view of the relation of international law and national law is
that rules of law, international and municipal law alike, are applicable to individuals,
and that international law can thus be directly operative in the municipal sphere.
Modern decisions have affirmed that individuals can derive rights directly from
treaties.21
Thus, a specific act of transformation of each individual rule of international law is
not required before it can be applied to legal relations within the state.22 Municipal courts can
invoke and apply rules of international law directly even in matters affecting individual
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citizens. In its advisory opinion on the Jurisdiction of the Courts ofDanzig, the Permanent
Court of International Justice held:
It may be readily admitted that, according to a well established principle of
international law, the Beamtenabkommen, being an international agreement, cannot, as
such, create direct rights and obligations for the private individuals. But it cannot be
disputed that the very object of an international agreement, according to the intention
of the contracting parties, may be the adoption by the parties of some rules creating
individual rights and obligations and enforceable by the national courts.23
The naturalist approach is mainly posited on a strong ethical position and a sense of moral
purpose and justice founded upon respect for human rights norms and the general welfare of
individuals.
3. Harmonisation approach.
Despite the merits of monism and dualism, these theories need to be approached with
caution. In practical terms, the relationship between international law and municipal law of
States may not be purely determinable by these theories. This is posited on a number of
reasons. First, the internal applicability of international law in general and particularly treaties
will always be conditioned by a rule of municipal law. The basic principle in most legal
systems is that the internal application of treaties is governed by domestic constitutional law.
Secondly, a neat distinction between monist and dualist systems may conceal the practice of
courts. Even in monistic countries, courts sometimes fail to effectuate treaties which are
binding under international law, for instance, non-self-executing treaties in United States law.
Conversely, in dualist systems the courts may sometimes give limited effect even to
unincorporated treaties, for example, British courts' use of the European Convention on
Human Rights (hereafter the ECHR) before its incorporation into United Kingdom municipal
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law. In these countries courts rely on the principle that legislation should, wherever possible,
be so construed as not to conflict with the international obligations of the state.24
Lastly, between the two extreme versions of monism and dualism there lies a whole
range of intermediate relationships which do not easily recommend themselves to
classification. This means that alternative doctrines have to be proposed to describe these
intermediate positions.25 In the final analysis, the theories are relevant only in the specific
context of customary, and not conventional, international law.
The real concern is how international law standards can be infused, or rather
incorporated into municipal law to reinforce the effectiveness of the national legal system.
This is particularly significant in the general area of human rights protection where rules are
sometimes not well defined and inadequate to address practical questions. But this is not to
say that these theories are insignificant. They continue to illuminate the interaction between
international law and municipal law. Most significantly, they will increasingly have some
impact on efforts to find practical solutions on the role of international law in municipal legal
sphere.
The problem with invoking the monist-dualist arguments to address the relationship
between municipal law and international law has therefore resulted in the emergence of the
harmonisation or co-ordination approach. This approach posits that, if contradictory rules
exist, it does not follow that one of them must necessarily be void. Nor does it follow that the
systems which give rise to them are mutually incompatible. One of the functions of juristic
reasoning is to eliminate the contradiction by harmonising the points of collision, not by
pretending that they do not exist, nor by crushing the one with the other. The harmonisation
approach endeavours to avoid situations whereby one system is treated as a derivation of, or
superior to, the other, and ignoring the social realities which detach the two legal orders.26 It
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is based on the assumption that each system is superior in its own sphere of operation thereby
making it possible to treat both systems in the same way.
The harmonisation approach postulates that rules of international law and municipal
law should be treated as concordant bodies of doctrine, each autonomous in the sense that it is
directed to a specific area and, to some extent, an exclusive area of human conduct, but
harmonious in that in their entirety the various rules aim at a basic human good.27 Both
systems derive from the social good and are not pure whim. They are an expression of human
need and conviction. In other words, legal rules should be made well-suited to the solution of
practical human problems whether emanating from the international or municipal level.
This approach further assumes that a rule of international law, as a body of rules of
human behaviour, forms part of municipal law. It enjoins the municipal judge to exercise a
judicial choice and apply international law as part of municipal law. In cases of conflict
between the two regimes, the judge should harmonise the two conflicting legal prescriptions
so as to avoid a clash of obligations. He should aim at harmonising rules which have different
points of formal origins but overlap in operation. At the practical level, the harmonisation or
co-ordination approach assists to infuse international standards, couched in general terms,
into municipal legal orders by a process of adaptation to local cultures, institutions and laws,
including human rights law.28
In sum, at a theoretical level, the invocation and application of a particular rule of
international law in a given case may depend on whether a State adheres to classical monist
or dualist theory. In practice, however, the legal position is different for even under a monist
system, an express and unambiguous legislation may prevail over a rule of international law.
Conversely, a court operating under a dualist system may rely on unincorporated international
law rule in order to fulfil the international obligation of the state. Clearly, the status and role
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of international law in municipal law depends, by and large, on the legal system and practice
of each State especially the approach of its courts towards international law. Thus municipal
courts in particular have a significant role to play in adapting international law to the national
legal system.
This study aims at applying these concepts and ideas to the particular experience of
the three countries under consideration especially with regard to the domestic application of
international human rights law. It examines the extent to which the place and role of
international law (including international human rights law) in national laws of these
countries can adequately be discussed with the aid of the traditional theories ofmonism and
dualism. It demonstrates that the treatment of international law in these countries is
increasingly becoming autochthonous. In particular, there is an emerging judicial trend of
relying on and drawing inspiration from international law especially international human
rights law in interpreting ambiguous, uncertain and unreasonable national human rights law
even in the absence of express constitutional or legislative mandate or without relying on
monism or dualism.
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Legal Legacy of Colonialism
This chapter examines the status of international human rights law in Botswana,
Namibia and Zimbabwe before independence. Although the three countries emerged from
different colonial Administrations and circumstances, they have a common unifying factor.
They all received the same legal system: the Roman-Dutch law. This law provides the basis
and context within which the reception and place of international human rights law in the
municipal law of these countries should be analysed. The chapter examines the process of
colonial legal imposition, the actual reception of international human rights law, customary
and conventional, in these countries, the extent to which the legal position was informed by
classical monist and dualist theories, and the influence of the legal position in the former
colonial Powers. The aim is to determine whether international law was accorded a
categorical place and role in municipal law of the countries under consideration.
1. Colonial legacy.
A legal legacy common to the Developing World has been the introduction of changes
in the institutions and norms governing the local people. Colonialism brought fundamental
change and the application of norms that were external to society or alien in origins.1 It
resulted, for example, in the creation of surrogate native governments, the domination and
weakening of traditional authorities through the systems of treaties, courts and civil service.2
It led to the resocialisation of the entire native population to the acceptance of the authority of
these institutions as well as the authority of the colonial and native bureaucrats. It aimed at
eliminating traditional and local group identities in deference to individualistic identification
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with the goals and life-styles of the colonial State. Most importantly, the colonial legal legacy
weakened indigenous authority and radically altered the normative content of key legal areas
of the local communities.3
Generally, the process that led to the imposition of law in Namibia and Zimbabwe
was not very different. It involved armed struggles against the former colonial Powers. By
contrast, the process in Botswana involved a relatively peaceful transition.4 As a result,
Namibia and Zimbabwe have been more involved with international law issues than
Botswana. The struggle for independence of both countries attracted the attention of the
international community especially the United Nations. In particular, principles such as the
right of colonised peoples to self-determination, recognition and non-discrimination were
partly developed and clearly articulated within the context of the struggle for independence of
both countries. It is not the aim here to recount the historical evolution of these countries.
Rather, the objective is to trace the legal developments with a view to providing the legal
basis and background for analysing the treatment of international law in general and
international human rights law in particular in the municipal law of these countries.5
a. "Sacred Trust of Civilisation": South West Africa.
1. Reception clause.
Before the Republic ofNamibia, formerly South West Africa,6 attained independence
on 21 March, 1990,7 it first went through German colonial rule8 which lasted only from 1884
to 1915 when the territory was occupied by the Union of South Africa at the beginning of
World War One. Consequently, Germany's contribution to the development of South West
African legal system was very insignificant, if at all.
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In 1919, the Allied powers decided at the Paris Peace Conference that since the
Namibian peoples were not sufficiently advanced to govern themselves,9 they had to be
placed under an international mandate through the mandate system.10 South West Africa was
placed under "C" mandate. This meant that it had to be administered under the laws of the
mandatory as an integral part of its territory.11 The mandate for South West Africa was
conferred on His Britannic Majesty but to be exercised on his behalf by the government of the
Union of South Africa, as a mandatory. A Mandate agreement was concluded between the
Union of South Africa and the Council of the League of Nations. Article 2 thereof
empowered the mandatory to, inter alia, apply its laws to South West Africa, subject to the
mandate and such local modifications as the circumstances may require.
The Union of South Africa then issued the 1919 Proclamation which introduced a
formal legal order into South West Africa.12 This marked an important watershed in the legal
system of South West Africa by explicitly and clearly transposing the Roman-Dutch law of
the Cape Colony of Good Hope into South West Africa.13 The proclamation also made
provision for the establishment of courts to administer the imposed Cape colonial law.14
It is generally acknowledged that the Roman-Dutch law reception instrument also
introduced, albeit implicitly, the English common law into South West Africa. In R v. Goseb,
Claassen, J. P., as he then was, authoritatively confirmed:
If the Learned Judge by his remark intended to convey that the common law of the
Cape of Good Hope was by this section excluded, then I must respectfully differ, for
in my opinion it was the intention of the legislature to introduce also the common law
of that Province into the territory, otherwise the state of the law would be uncertain.
[The] law has been continuously developed and improved by the courts as well as by
legislation. Other systems of law have had a marked influence, particularly English
law. Much of our practice, procedure and mercantile law comes from English law.15
The English common law was introduced into the Cape of Good Hope following
Britain's occupation of the territory in 1795. Dutch rule was restored in 1803, but only
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briefly, for in 1806 the Cape passed again to the British. The British, through legislation,
introduced English common law into the Cape colony particularly with a view to bringing the
general law in line with the English public in areas such as commercial law, administrative
law and the law of procedure.16 This law greatly influenced the Roman-Dutch law until the
Dutch regained the territory. The influence resulted in the "Roman-Dutch common law"
which became the basic law of South West Africa. Consequently, an examination of the
transmutation of international law into the pre-existing Namibian legal order on the basis of
the Roman-Dutch law should also take cognisance of the relationship between international
law and the English common law. The English common law also influenced, albeit indirectly,
the treatment of international law in the pre-independence Namibian municipal law.
2. Status of international law.
a. Customary international law.
The reception instrument embodied in the 1919 Proclamation which superimposed
external Roman-Dutch law, with its English common law influence, on South West Africa
did not make any specific reference to general international law. It merely referred to Roman-
Dutch law in a general sense. Thus there was no legislation in the form of a Proclamation
explicitly and specifically assigning customary international law (including customary
international human rights law) a place and role in South West African municipal law.17
Consequently, the domestic status of customary international law in South West Africa had to
be examined on the basis of the superimposed external Roman-Dutch common law. Put
differently, in determining the position of customary international law in municipal law, the
South West African judiciary had to look to the practice of its South African counterpart.
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Judicial practice in South Africa, at least, before the adoption of the new Constitution
of South Africa in 199618 was that customary international law formed part of South African
municipal law.19 Rules of customary international law were directly and automatically
applicable in the municipal law of South Africa. The locus classicus of this legal position was
Nduli and Another v. Minister ofJustice and Another in which Rumpff, C.J., observed:
It is too obvious that international law is to be regarded as part of our law, though the
fans et origo of this proposition must be found in Roman-Dutch law. [Only] such
rules of customary international law are to be regarded as part of South Africa law as
are either universally recognised or have received the assent of this country.20
According to Rumpff, C.J., once a particular rule crystallised into a rule of customary
international law and South Africa consented to be bound by it, such a rule automatically
became part of South African municipal law binding upon its municipal institutions. It
conferred direct rights and obligations on individuals in municipal law. Moreover, the
domestic courts could directly invoke and rely on such a rule in municipal court proceedings.
Significantly, the South African legal position derived from, and was largely based
upon, the English common law. As Erasmus has poignantly remarked:
The South African Constitutions have never contained any provisions on the
application of international law. The matter is determined by common law principles
and the rulings of English courts are often referred to and followed.21
In essence, according to Erasmus, before the adoption of the new 1996 South African
Constitution, South Africa did not have clearly defined legal rules regarding the treatment of
international law in municipal law. Its legal position was, for a variety of reasons, largely
based on English common law rather than Roman-Dutch law. First, both countries share a
common law tradition. Secondly, the South African governmental structure is derived from
the English model and is accordingly characterised by a balance of power between the three
branches of government similar to the English one. Thirdly and most significantly, a close
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scrutiny of the legal systems of both countries displays a common approach to the
relationship between municipal law and international law especially customary international
law.22
Similarly, under English common law, customary international law is, as a general
rule, treated as part of municipal law of the United kingdom. This rule was authoritatively
confirmed in Trendtex Trading Corporation Ltd v. Central Bank ofNigeria.23 The question
for determination by the Court was whether or not the Central Bank of Nigeria, as a
department of the State ofNigeria, could successfully claim sovereign immunity on a suit by
the plaintiffs before the English courts on the letters of credit. The plaintiffs argued that the
transaction was of a commercial nature to which sovereign immunity does not apply. The
Court accepted the plaintiffs' argument. It held that sovereign immunity, as a rule of
international law, does not apply to commercial transactions. According to the Court, this rule
forms part and parcel of English common law. It is directly and automatically integrated into
English common law.
This principle received judicial imprimatur from the House of Lords in Alcorn Limited
v. Republic of Colombia and Othersf The Court held that the accounts of the Colombian
Embassy enjoyed restrictive immunity, which principle has been absorbed into the United
Kingdom law. Additionally, the Court noted that a rule of customary international law in
question must be the "existing law, English common law and public international law alike."
This added dimension enjoins the courts to give effect to the changes and developments that
take place in international law.
The approach of South African and United kingdom courts towards customary
international law was adopted by the Namibian courts. The issue arose mainly in cases where
the administration of South West Africa by the Union of South Africa was being challenged.
19
It was one of the sticking points in Bingci v. Administrator-General, South West Africa and
Othersf Erick Binga, a South West African citizen, lodged an application with the South
West Africa Supreme Court challenging an order made by the Administrator-General of the
territory requiring him, Erick Binga, to render national service at Walvis Bay in South Africa.
The order was made pursuant to Proclamation 198 of 1980 which required "non-white"
inhabitants of South West Africa to render military service in South West Africa. In exercise
of the powers transferred to him by the South African State President under Proclamation 131
of 1980 to administer the Defence Act No. 44 of 1957, the Administrator-General registered
and enrolled Erick Binga to undertake national service at Walvis Bay.
In his founding affidavit, Erick Binga averred that the South African Parliament had
no power to make laws for South West Africa. As a corollary, the South African State
President had no power to issue a proclamation over the territory authorising the
Administrator-General to conscript citizens of South West Africa to serve in national service.
Moreover, Walvis Bay, where he was ordered to render national service, was not part of the
mandated territory. Erick Binga based his argument on the fact that the League of Nations
Mandate, being part of the "grundnorm" by which the South African government derives its
authority and hence the power to legislate for the territory, had been revoked by the General
Assembly Resolution 2145 of 1966 as confirmed by Security Council Resolution 276 of
1970. Alternatively, if the Mandate was still in existence, it was part of the municipal law of
the land and all legislation applicable to the territory had to be subject to its provisions
particularly Article 4. This clause prohibited any military training of the natives, otherwise
than for purposes of internal police and the local defence of the territory. It also prohibited
any establishment or erection of fortifications ofmilitary or naval bases in Namibia.
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The applicant contended that the military conscription for national service in Walvis
Bay, an area then outside and beyond the territorial limit of South West Africa, violated the
South African undertaking under the Mandate, as a treaty, not to enlist natives for military
training outside the territory.
The Court did not dispute the fact that the Mandate was a treaty binding on the Union
of South Africa. It also did not contest its place in South West African municipal law. In
making a determination regarding the latter point, the Court made the following remark
respecting the place and effect of customary international law in South West African
municipal law:
Although it was accepted by Rumpff CJ in Nduli and Another v Minister of Justice
and Another (supra at 906) that the rules of customary international law are to be
regarded as part of our law "as are either universally recognised or have received
the assent of this country," it follows that decisions of the United Nations, of the
nature here under discussion, are not part of customary international law.26
This dictum marked a first judicial proclamation that rules of customary international
law that are either universally recognised or have received the assent of South West Africa
were automatically applicable in South West African legal order. They were governed by the
monist theory. It is clear that Justice Strydom's approach was partly based on the Roman-
Dutch law reception formula which bequeathed, implicitly, to South West Africa the manner
in which the South African judiciary treated customary international law in South African
municipal law.
The Namibian courts were furthermore inclined to look at the South African position
because South Africa and Namibia applied the same legal system and common law,
organisationally the legal profession of Namibia formed part of the South African legal
profession, South African judges were appointed to the Supreme Court in Windhoek,
Namibia's final court of appeal was the South African Appellate Division in Bloemfontein.
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Essentially, there was no separate Namibian legal order. Namibian law formed part of the
South African system.27 Thus, because of the exceptional position in which Namibian courts
found themselves, it meant that they closely followed the practice of courts in South Africa in
the way they treated rules of customary international law in South African municipal legal
order.
The question that arises is whether this approach also applied to customary
international human rights law such as the principle of non discrimination or equality before
the law? This issue has never been specifically decided by the Namibian courts. But, it can be
argued, at least analogically, that the position of customary international human rights law in
pre-independence Namibian law was not different from general rules of customary
international law. Customary international human rights law was also, in the absence of any
express position to the contrary, governed by the incorporation, or rather the monist theory.
This law was part of the pre-independence Namibian law notwithstanding its non-observance
in practice. As in the Union of South Africa, it could only be excluded from operating directly
in municipal law by clear and unambiguous legislation, the act of state doctrine and the stare
decisis rule.28
b. Treaties: The Mandate Agreement.
As with customary international law, the Roman-Dutch law reception clause was
silent on the legal position and role of treaties in general in the pre-independence Namibian
municipal law. Consequently, it meant that the domestic status of treaties in South West
Africa had to be examined on the basis of the superimposed external Roman-Dutch common
law. In other words, the South West African judiciary had to look to the practice of its South
African counterpart dealing with the status of treaties in South African municipal law.
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The legal position in South Africa before the adoption of the present South African
Constitution29 was that provisions of international conventions to which South Africa was a
party were not automatically part of the South African municipal law unless explicitly
translated into municipal law.30 To become part of municipal law, treaties in general required
legislative incorporation. They could not in themselves create subjective rights and duties for
individuals in the absence of legislation. According to Dugard, the South African legal
position was influenced by the English common law practice. Both countries share a common
law tradition.31 Under British law, according to the Parlement Beige case,32 although the
Crown retains the prerogative to negotiate and sign treaties externally, for treaties to have
internal effect especially those requiring changes in municipal law they require parliamentary
approval.33
Adopting the South African and British approach, the South West African courts
articulated the legal position of treaties especially in relation to the status of the Mandate
Agreement in South West African municipal law. In the fore-discussed Binga v.
Administrator-General, South West Africa and Others Justice Strydom, as he then was,
observed:
Obligations incurred by international treaty and resolutions by international
organisations such as the United Nations stand on a different footing from customary
international law and generally speaking a court in South Africa, and for that matter a
court in this country, will only give effect thereto if such a treaty or resolution was
incorporated by legislative act into the laws of the land.34
This legal position was further confirmed in S v. Tuhadeleni in which Justice Ludorf, as he
then was, remarked:
In Act 49 of 1919 the Union Parliament enshrined the terms of the Mandate in our
legislation. The courts must enforce the mandate and are not bound by the terms of
any treaty which has not been embodied in our municipal law.35
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Thus international conventions were not automatically part of the pre-existing
Namibian municipal law. For these conventions to have internal effect, they required
legislative approval. Rights and obligations in these conventions were not of themselves part
of the Namibian municipal law. It is clear that Namibia observed the classical dualist or
transformation theory as far as the position of international conventions in municipal law
were concerned whose tenet is that, for treaty rules to have domestic application and thus
confer rights and obligations on individuals, they should be transformed by legislation into
municipal law. This approach was authorised by the imposed Roman-Dutch common law.
The question that recommends itself is whether this practice also applied to human
rights treaties? This question is particularly pertinent with respect to the Mandate agreement
because, strictly, it was not per se a human rights treaty. Nevertheless, its primary aim was
the realisation of the right to self-determination, a right securely established in international
law, for the Namibian people. Moreover, it provided for basic minimum standards of
treatment of the inhabitants of South West Africa. In particular, the mandatory undertook to
promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the
inhabitants of the territory.36 Needless to say that the Mandate expressly outlawed slavery,
slave trade and forced labour.37 But, these standards were not protected in the municipal
sphere of South West Africa. Therefore, while the Mandate did not relate specifically and
exclusively to human rights norms, but to the extent that it contained some internationally
recognised human rights norms, in a broader sense, it can appropriately be treated under
human rights instruments within the context ofNamibia and thus required legislation to make
it part ofmunicipal law.
From the fore-going, it is clear that Namibia inherited a monist approach from the
Union of South Africa in its treatment of customary international law in municipal law and
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dualism with respect to treaties. Customary international human rights law was directly
applicable in Namibian law and human rights treaties required legislation to become part of
municipal law. The legal position was essentially the same as under the South African legal
system. This legacy was also inspired by the United Kingdom approach.
b. Self-governing colony: Southern Rhodesia.
1. Reception instruments.
The present day Zimbabwe, formerly Southern Rhodesia, was brought under British
colonial rule in 1889.38 Pursuant to the Royal Charter (hereinafter the Charter) of 1889,39 Her
Majesty Queen Victoria authorised the British South Africa Company (hereinafter the BSA
Company),40 under Cecil John Rhodes, to administer the territory. The Charter empowered
the BSA Company to preserve peace and order in the territory and establish a judiciary for the
administration of justice.41 It, however, did not prescribe the law which the company was to
utilise for the administration of justice.42
In May 1891 Britain issued an Order in Council declaring Southern Rhodesia a
protectorate.43 The protectorate status enabled Britain to assume control of important external
affairs of the territory. It also necessitated the establishment of an administration and legal
system for Southern Rhodesia. In terms of this Order in Council, the British High
Commissioner in South Africa was appointed the High Commissioner for Southern
Rhodesia.44 He was empowered to legislate for the territory subject to the proviso that he had
to respect native laws and customs, the so-called repugnancy clause.45
In pursuance of the powers conferred upon him by Proclamation of the 9 May, 1891,
the High Commissioner issued the Order in Council of 10 June 1891 which introduced the
law in force in the Cape Colony of Good Hope into Southern Rhodesia.46 However, this Order
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in Council, as with the BSA Company Proclamation, did not indicate precisely the nature of
the law operating in the Cape Colony of Good Hope that was transmuted into Southern
Rhodesia. Furthermore, the Order in Council of 18 July 189447 which extended the Crown's
full and unfettered powers of administration over the territory did not, as with earlier
reception instruments, clearly and precisely indicate the nature of Cape law that was
transposed into Southern Rhodesia. It continued to employ the phraseology "the law in force
in the Colony of the Cape ofGood Hope."48
The imposition of the external Cape law continued to be effected through the various
constitutional instruments issued by the High Commissioner for the territory. The first
Constitution was adopted following the annexation of the territory by an Order in Council in
1923 and the creation of a Colony.49 By Letters Patent of the 1 September 1923, Southern
Rhodesia was provided with a responsible government Constitution, which came into force
on 1 October 1923. The 1923 Constitution established an elected Legislative Assembly and
the Governor as the executive authority.30 This Constitution left unaffected the judiciary that
existed before 1923 and most significantly, reinstated the original provisions for the
application of the Cape law. The reception provision in the 1923 Constitution was re-enacted
as section 13 of the High Court Act, 1939.51
In 1953 the constitutional structure of the Colony was changed by the creation of the
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.52 Before its dissolution in 1963, Southern Rhodesia
was given a new constitution in 1961.53 The 1961 Southern Rhodesia Constitution first,
introduced the concept of British parliamentary democracy into the territory.54 Secondly, in
terms of section 56(d) of this Constitution, the applicability of Cape law was now accorded
constitutional status.33 This reception provision was re-enacted in subsequent Southern
Rhodesian Constitutions: in Section 57 of the 1965 Constitution which was adopted
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following the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (the UDI) by Prime Minister Ian
Smith;56 in Section 87 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Rhodesia of 197957 and Section 89 of
the Zimbabwe Constitution Order, 1979.58
A common feature of these reception instruments is that, unlike in Namibia, they did
not clarify the exact nature of the law operating at the Cape of Good Hope that was being
transmuted into Southern Rhodesia. The question is, did Britain bequeath to Southern
Rhodesia its own common law or the Cape law commonly called the Roman-Dutch law? The
predominant view, however, is that the various reception instruments imposed the Roman-
Dutch law on Southern Rhodesia subject to changes introduced by statute and the
preservation in certain spheres of African customary law.59 As in Namibia, this law was
influenced by English common law concepts and principles.60 Consequently, an examination
of the place of international human rights law in the old Zimbabwean legal order should take
account of not only the South African legal position and practice, but also of practice in the
United Kingdom.
2. Status of international law.
a. Customary international law.
As in Namibia, the reception instrument that imposed the Roman-Dutch law on
Zimbabwe did not make any express and specific reference to the place of customary
international law in pre-independence Zimbabwean municipal law. However, unlike in
Namibia, the courts have never been seized with the question whether or not customary
international law was part of Zimbabwean municipal law. This means that the status of
customary international law in pre-independence Zimbabwean municipal law was not
altogether clear and certain.
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It is important to note that pre-independence Zimbabwe had a constitutional schema
for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The various Constitutions
adopted for the territory contained entrenched Declarations of Rights.61 These Declarations of
Rights recognised and protected human rights norms found in major human rights treaties and
instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereafter UDHR),
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereafter ICCPR) and the ECHR. They
recognised rights such as the right to life, personal liberty, fair trial, freedom of association
and non-discrimination. The question that arises is, did the constitutional recognition of
human rights norms amount to an assignment, explicitly or implicitly, of international human
rights law a place in pre-independence Zimbabwean municipal law?
It is submitted that, according to the monist-dualist debate, the constitutional
recognition of human rights norms in pre-independence Zimbabwean law fell short of
assigning customary international human rights law a specific and categorical place in
municipal law in the sense that they could be disregarded without breaching a rule in national
law. Their non-observance did not, in a legal sense, amount to a breach of national law. The
intention to accord customary international law (including customary international human
rights law) a place in municipal law could have been made more clearer, categorical and
unequivocal by an insertion of a clause in these Constitutions or similar national law to that
effect.
Consequently, it meant that, in ascertaining the place of customary international
human right law in municipal law Zimbabwean courts were obliged to fall back to the South
African Roman-Dutch law position, with its English common law influence, in terms of
which, unless excluded by legislation, the act of state doctrine or judicial decisions,
customary international law was, as a general rule, treated as part of municipal law.62 Thus
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Zimbabwe inherited the South African monist approach through the Roman-Dutch law
reception instrument.
b. Treaties.
The pre-independence Zimbabwean law did not have an express constitutional or
legislative stipulations on the status of treaties in municipal law. Moreover, as in Namibia, the
Roman-Dutch law reception instrument was silent on the matter. The only provision
concerning conventional international law was contained in the 1953 Constitution of the
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The Constitution assigned the Federal Parliament the
exclusive right to legislate, inter alia, on the implementation of treaties and agreements with,
and other obligations towards, countries or organisations outside the Federation affecting the
federation as a whole or any of the territories whether entered into by Her Majesty's
Government in the United Kingdom on behalf of the Federation or any of the territories; by
the federation with the authority ofHer Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom; or by
any of the territories with the said territory.63
Clearly, the Federation did not enjoy any international personality. Its international
affairs were conducted by the United Kingdom. Moreover, although the federal Constitution
made reference to international conventions, it nevertheless did not assign them any place and
role in the Federation municipal law. It merely dealt with the power of the federal parliament
to honour or implement obligations assumed under these treaties towards other countries and
organisations outside the Federation, that is, externally. In any case, the dissolution of the
Federation in 1963 resulted in each territory adopting its national constitution providing an
opportunity for each country to clarify the domestic status of treaties.
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The position of treaties in pre-independence Zimbabwean municipal law was to a
limited extent determined by the judiciary. It was discussed in R v. Muirhead.64 The accused,
Muirhead, was indicted on several counts of contravening certain provisions of the Customs
and Excise Management Act and the regulations thereunder concerning the import and export
of goods manufactured from the Union of South Africa into Southern Rhodesia. He was
alleged to have made a false representation to an officer of the Customs and Excise
Department that certain goods, plastic toys, were produced in Southern Rhodesia while, as a
matter of fact, they were not for purposes of importing them into the Union. In terms of the
Customs and Excise Management Act, the goods had to conform to the definition provided in
Article 21 of the Customs Union Agreement between the Union of South Africa and the
Colony of Southern Rhodesia. The relevant Article 21 of the Agreement provided:
An article shall not be deemed to have been manufactured in the territory of either of
the parties to this agreement unless it was wholly manufactured in such territory, or, if
partially manufactured therein, unless at least 25 per cent of the factory cost of such
article in its finished condition is represented by the products and labour of such
territory or unless 50 per cent of such factory cost is represented by the combined
products and labour of that territory and of any other part of the British
Commonwealth.
Counsel for the accused objected to the invocation and use by the Court of the
Customs Union Agreement particularly Article 21 and regulations thereunder on the basis
that its terms had not been incorporated into the municipal law of Southern Rhodesia. This
meant that it could not impose any rights and obligations on the subjects of the territory. In
upholding the objection, Justice Hathorn, as he then was, observed:
the terms of a Customs Union Agreement do not bind the subject unless they are made
binding by virtue of some statutory provision. That such is the case appears to me
upon general principle to be beyond question.65
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Justice Hathorn's dictum invites several comments. First, for the Customs Union
Agreement to bind individual subjects of Southern Rhodesia it required legislative approval.
It is not by its very nature internally applicable until parliament has enacted it into law.
Secondly, by requiring parliament approval of the terms of the Customs Union Agreement, as
a treaty, the court was endorsing an established principle of international law that treaties, as a
general rule, require statutory enactment for them to create rights and obligations for
individuals in municipal law. It was a judicial affirmation of the classical dualist theory which
requires legislation to accord treaties internal force. Thirdly, the judge's intimation that for
him the theory that treaties require domestic legislation to bind subjects was a "general
principle to be beyond question," merely amounted to a judicial recognition of the common
law principle observed in Zimbabwe and South Africa, and judicial practice in Britain and
other Commonwealth countries on the relationship of treaties to municipal law.
Thus, during the pre-independence Zimbabwean era, at least on the authority of
Muirhead case, treaties including those dealing with human rights were not, generally
speaking, automatically applicable in municipal law. Clearly, Muirhead's case confirmed
Zimbabwe's adherence to the dualistic theory according to which treaties were not in
themselves capable of creating rights and obligations for individuals without the necessary
assent of the legislature. However, this principle was not acted upon by the Southern
Rhodesian judiciary so as to secure it firmly in domestic law and jurisprudence.
As in Namibia, the pre-existing Zimbabwean national law inherited the monist and
dualistic approach towards the treatment of custom and treaties in municipal law respectively.
The status and function of international law in municipal law was a direct legacy of the South
African practice with the English common law influence.
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c. Protectorate: Bechuanaland.
1. The imposition clauses.
The present day Botswana was declared a Bechuanaland Protectorate66 by Great
Britain in 1885.67 The declaration of a protectorate meant that Britain assumed full and
complete control over external affairs of Bechuanaland Protectorate, while internal matters
were left to the government of the territory.68 However, the absence of a government with
effective control over Bechuanaland Protectorate at the material time and the desire to
incorporate the territory into the Union of South Africa prevailed over the United Kingdom
Government to assume complete control of both external and internal affairs of Bechuanaland
Protectorate. This policy was largely followed in British protected territories.69 It was amply
illustrated by R v. Earl Crewe., Ex parte Sekgome.70 The case concerned the validity of the
High Commissioners' Proclamation authorising the detention and ultimate deportation of
Sekgome, a chief of Batawana tribe in Bechuanaland Protectorate, who was considered to be
a threat to peace in the Protectorate following a dispute over chieftainship which he lost. The
Court of Appeal upheld the validity of the Proclamation holding that the Crown had
unfettered jurisdiction over the Protectorate and could expect obedience to a practically
unlimited extent. According to the Court, the Crown exercised complete unrestricted
authority over Bechuanaland Protectorate.
Consequently, by an Order in Council of 9 May, 1891,71 the British government
established a High Commissioner for the territory and enjoined him to, inter alia, legislate for
Bechuanaland Protectorate from time to time by proclamations provided the High
Commissioner respected any native law and customs.72 The High Commissioner issued a
Proclamation on the 10th June, 189173 section 19 of which provided that, the law to be
administered was, as nearly as circumstances of the country will permit, to be the same as the
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law for the time being in force in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope.74 As in Zimbabwe,
this clause radically departed from the English practice in the sense that in other colonial
territories in which British rule was imposed, it was normal to provide for the reception of
English common law and the doctrines of equity, and statutes of general application.75 But the
proximity of Bechuanaland to the Cape Colony and Britain's vision that the whole of
Southern African including Bechuanaland would be a white dominion administered from the
Cape Colony led instead to the introduction of the Cape colonial law.76
There is divergence of opinion regarding the exact nature of law that Section 19
transposed into Bechuanaland Protectorate.77 However, the dominant view is that this clause
introduced the Roman-Dutch Law instead of the English common law into the territory.78
But, at the same time, as in Namibia and Zimbabwe, the said Roman-Dutch law was greatly
influenced by English common law principles and concepts. By 1909 Proclamation, the High
Commissioner was empowered to continue legislating for the territory.79 As a result, the High
Commissioner issued a series of proclamations which, directly or indirectly, introduced some
English common law principles into the territory.80 Moreover, the Protectorate courts were
staffed by judges having an English common law background. In applying Roman-Dutch law
which they were enjoined to enforce, English common law doctrines and precedent filtered in
their decisions. These doctrines and principles profoundly impacted upon the legal system of
Bechuanaland Protectorate.81 The influence resulted in the "Roman-Dutch common law."82
This law became the basic law of the Bechuanaland Protectorate. It was administered and
applied by the courts as the common law of the Protectorate until independence in 1966 and
beyond.
Thus, as in Namibia and Zimbabwe, in tracing the reception of rules of international
law (including international human rights law) into Bechuanaland Protectorate through the
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Roman-Dutch law reception formula and background regard should be had to the impact of
the English common law principles, rules and concepts on the Roman-Dutch law.
2. Status of international law.
a. Customary international law.
The legal position of customary international law in the pre-independence Botswana
domestic law was never clarified. As in Namibia and Zimbabwe, the Roman-Dutch law
reception instrument did not contain any express provision on the position of customary
international law in domestic law. Moreover, the subject has never attracted any judicial or
legislative articulation. There were no clear rules guiding national institutions particularly the
courts on how to handle questions involving international law.
The position could, however, be examined from two possible approaches. First, the
common law approach. As a British protectorate, Botswana did not exist as an independent
entity and was not a subject of international law. It lacked international personality. It means
that, legally speaking, the question of the relationship between international law and the
"municipal law" of Bechuanaland Protectorate did not arise. At the same time, according to
British constitutional law, the colonial territories, at least, in terms of the 1931 Statute of
Westminster, were regarded as part of the United Kingdom. Consequently, it meant that rules
and principles which governed the status of customary international law in these territories,
including Bechuanaland Protectorate, were the same as those governing the relationship
between customary international law and the municipal law of the United Kingdom.83
Secondly, the Roman-Dutch law approach. As indicated above, instead of introducing
its own legal system in the territory the United Kingdom opted for the Roman-Dutch law
operating in the Union of South Africa. This legal system became the common law of
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Bechuanaland Protectorate. It, among other things, constituted the background and legal basis
for examining the position of customary international law in pre-independence period of
Botswana. Significantly, as it has been amply demonstrated above in relation to South West
Africa and Southern Rhodesia, the Roman-Dutch legal system did not treat customary
international law differently from the English common law. The latter had a tremendous
influence on the former. In both legal systems, customary international law is deemed to be
automatically applicable in municipal law.
Thus, whether the position of customary international law in pre-independence
Botswana is examined on the basis of the Roman-Dutch law reception formula or the English
common law, the position is the same. The status of customary international law in Botswana
was regulated by the monist theory. According to this theory, customary international law
(including customary international human rights law) formed part of the legal system of
Bechuanaland Protectorate unless excluded by legislation, the act of state doctrine or stare
decisis rule.84 This position was a legacy of the erstwhile colonial Powers. However, the legal
position was never clearly articulated and largely remained blurred and uncertain.
b. Treaties.
The legal position of treaties (including human rights treaties) in pre-independence
Botswana, unlike in Namibia and Zimbabwe, was also never clarified. There was no express
reference to the place and role of treaties in the Roman-Dutch law reception instrument in
local law. Moreover, the position did not receive any express judicial or legislative
affirmation.
However, as with customary international law, the legal position could be tackled
from two perspectives. First, the common law perspective. As a British protected territory,
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Botswana's rules concerning the treatment of treaties were, in principle, the same as those
governing the place of treaties in the United Kingdom common law. Botswana constitutional
principle including the attendant division of powers and functions between the various organs
of government derived from the English constitutional model. Thus treaties such as the
ECHR, which were extended to the Protectorate, did not become part of the local law until
legislated according to the constitutional stmcture of the Protectorate.85
The question regarding which body exercised legislative powers during the
Protectorate period would be answered by the constitutional structure in existence in the
territory at the time. This was a period where the separation and distribution of power among
the three branches of government: the executive, legislature and judiciary were not clear cut.
However, the High Commissioner, in terms of the 9th May, 1891, Proclamation exercised the
overall jurisdiction over the territory, although he was empowered to, and did, establish the
judiciary for the administration of justice. The proclamation also assigned the High
Commissioner the power to legislate for the territory by proclamations. This meant that
treaties duly entered into by the United Kingdom and extended to the Protectorate in view of
its incapacity to conduct external relations especially those relating to entering into treaties
under the protectorate regime had, theoretically speaking, to be legislated into municipal law
by the High Commissioner.
Secondly, the legal position of conventional international law during the pre-
independence era could be determined by the principles and concepts of the Roman-Dutch
law imposed on the territory during colonial rule. This law formed the foundation of the
South African legal system. The practice under this legal system was that, as a general rule,
treaties needed legislative action to be internally applicable. But the crucial fact is that the
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South African courts borrowed from, and depended heavily upon, the English common law
on their domestic treatment of treaties.
Viewed from either the English common law or Roman-Dutch law perspective,
treaties (including human rights treaties) did not have automatic application in Bechuanaland
Protectorate. They required legislation to be part of the local law. Thus the status of treaties in
the pre-existing Botswana municipal law was regulated by dualism inherited from Britain.
2. Conclusion.
It is abundantly clear that despite differences in historical experiences and
circumstances, Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe inherited the same legal system from the
former colonial Powers; Britain with respect to Botswana and Zimbabwe, and the Union of
South Africa in relation to Namibia. They all received the Roman-Dutch law. This law
became the basic and common law of the three countries.
It is also clear that the Roman-Dutch law was influenced by the English common law
due to the interaction between both legal systems at the Cape Colony in the Union of South
Africa at the height of colonialism. The influence was reflected, among other things, in the
way South Africa, at least before the adoption of the new Constitution in 1996, and United
Kingdom treat international law in municipal law. Thus both legal systems provide a
background to the absorption of international human rights law in the local law of the three
countries. In both countries, customary international law is automatically applicable in
municipal law. It does not require legislative transformation. But treaties require legislation to
be part ofmunicipal law. Both countries adhere to monist theory with respect to the domestic
status of customary international law and dualism in relation to treaties.
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These theories were bequeathed to Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe through the
Roman-Dutch law reception formulae notwithstanding the fact that the reception instruments
were silent on the subject and that no constitutional or legislative provisions, that is, the
various proclamations and Orders in Council issued for these territories, provided any
guidance on how international law ought to have been treated in domestic law. In all the three
countries, customary international law (including customary international human rights law)
was automatically applicable in pre-independence municipal law and treaties were not.
Treaties required legislation to be interacted into municipal law. Thus the three countries
inherited from the former colonial Powers the classical monist theory in the way they treated
international customary rules in domestic law and the dualist theory with respect to treaties.
The domestic absorption and treatment of international law was greatly influenced by the
external legal systems. It was not autochthonous. Rather, it was a legacy of colonial rule.
In Namibia, but not Botswana, the legal position of both treaties and customary rules
was articulated and confirmed by the courts. In Zimbabwe, only the legal position of treaties
was confirmed by the courts. In Namibia, the subject attracted most attention mainly where
the mandate of the Union of South Africa to administer South West Africa was being
challenged. In the process, Namibian courts declared that the Mandate, as a treaty, required
legislation to be part of pre-independence Namibian national law. They also declared that
customary international law had direct domestic application. It effectively means that in
Botswana, the legal position remained very unclear and uncertain. However, in all the three
countries the place of international law in municipal law was not acted upon in a consistent,
uniform and categorical way in order to firmly secure it in municipal law.
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Independence - New Departures
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Chapter Three
Colonial Heritage Retained: Botswana and Zimbabwe
The preceding chapter has analysed the status of international law (including
international human rights law), conventional and customary, in the pre-existing municipal
legal orders of the countries under consideration. This chapter analyses the extant status of
that law in the municipal laws of independent Botswana and Zimbabwe in order to find out
whether its legal position in both countries has underwent any changes at independence and
whether and how the judiciary has handled the subject.
1. Zimbabwe.
a. The legal framework: an overview.
The Zimbabwean post-colonial Constitution did not clarify the legal position and role
of international law, customary and conventional, in municipal law. The 1980 Independence
Constitution of Zimbabwe' has an entrenched Bill of Rights protecting human rights norms
similar to those recognised under major international human rights treaties and instruments.2
However, the Constitution does not have an express provision categorically and
unambiguously according international law (including international human rights law) a place
and role in Zimbabwean municipal law. The entrenchment of a Bill of Rights does not in
itself ipso facto make international human rights law part of municipal law. Significantly,
Section 89 of the Constitution retains the Roman-Dutch common law. This law provides the
basis for assessing the inter-relation between international law and Zimbabwean municipal
law.
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b. Customary international law.
Judicial practice under both the Roman-Dutch law and English common law is that
rules of customary international law are deemed to be self-operative in municipal law.3 These
rules are automatically applicable in national law. They confer rights and obligations directly
on individuals at the national level. Thus viewed either from the common law position or the
Roman-Dutch law customary international law is part of Zimbabwean municipal law. The
inherited monist theory continues to regulate the inter-relationship between customary
international law (including customary international human rights law) and Zimbabwean
municipal law.
The uncertainty and lack of clarity inherited from the colonial era concerning the
place of customary international law in the municipal legal dispensation of Zimbabwe has to
some extent been addressed by the judiciary since independence. This has, however, occurred
in relatively few and isolated cases.
The subject was discussed in Barker McCormac (Pvt) Ltd v. The Government of
Kenya* A detailed analysis of this case is in order, for it is one of the first few judicial
pronouncements that laid down quite unambiguously the principle concerning the place and
function of customary international law in Zimbabwean municipal law although it deals with
state immunity rather than international human rights law. The appellant company, Barker
McCormac (Pvt) Ltd, had been lessee of certain premises in Harare, Zimbabwe, under a lease
agreement containing an option to renew the lease in respect of which the respondent, the
Government ofKenya, had acquired the lessor's interest, with a view to using the premises as
its High Commission. The respondent refused to renew the lease arguing, inter aha, that the
appellant's occupation of part of the premises created unacceptable security concerns. The
upshot of the case was that the appellant claimed that it was forced to move to other premises
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at a higher rental and decided to commence legal proceedings against the respondent
Government of Kenya to recover damages arising from the alleged wrongful repudiation of
the lease. The respondent having refused service of the summons, the appellant applied to the
High Court of Zimbabwe for a substituted service under Order 6, Rule 4(6) of the High Court
Rules. The High Court, per Justice Waddington, dismissed the application on the ground that
the lease of the premises by the respondent was an act jure imperii and it could not therefore
against its will be made party to legal proceedings in municipal courts ofZimbabwe.
On appeal to the Supreme Court against the ruling of the High Court, the respondent
raised a special plea in bar, arguing, inter alia, that according to the doctrine of absolute
sovereign immunity which applies in Zimbabwe legal proceedings could not be instituted
against it. The respondent also argued that the earlier decision was given per incuriam and
that even if the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity was adopted the defendant's plea of
jurisdictional immunity was still valid as its actions in the matter at issue were acta jure
imperii.
After examining the issues and points raised by the parties, the Court held that the
doctrine of sovereign immunity generally applied in international law is restrictive immunity.
Significantly, the Court also held that there being no judicial pronouncements in Zimbabwe
on the matter the restrictive sovereign immunity doctrine should be incorporated as part of the
law ofZimbabwe. In particular, Justice Georges aptly noted that:
The major issue as to the nature of the doctrine of sovereign immunity is a question of
international law. Although there appears to be no pronouncements on the matter in
our courts until now, there is no doubt that international law is part of the law of this
country. In so far as the common law of Zimbabwe is Roman-Dutch law there is
support for the proposition in Nduli and Another v Minister of Justice and Others
1978 (l)S.A 893 (a).5
The Judge continued to emphasise that he was:
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completely satisfied therefore that the doctrine of sovereign immunity generally
applied in international law is that of restrictive immunity. There are no decisions of
courts of this country and no legislation inconsistent with that doctrine and it should
be incorporated as part of our law.6
The legal battle in the case continued. After the Supreme Court's ruling allowing an
appeal on the procedural point, the case was referred back to the High Court for arguments on
the merits.7 The High Court endorsed the Supreme Court ruling that the nature of the doctrine
of sovereign immunity was a question of international law to be applied as part and parcel of
the municipal law of Zimbabwe. Justice Samatta traced the development of the concept of
sovereign immunity and on the question of its status and role in Zimbabwean municipal law
specifically observed:
I have held that it is the restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity which forms part
of the law ofthis country.8
This case unequivocally endorses the principle that international law forms part of the
domestic law of Zimbabwe. As Justice Georges acknowledged in his judgment, the case is a
first judicial recognition and affirmation of the principle that international law forms part of
the domestic law of Zimbabwe.9 Until this decision the matter has never entertained the
Zimbabwean courts and has as a result remained blurred, unclear and uncertain.
The decision raises two important issues. First, in arriving at the conclusion that
international law is part of the law of Zimbabwe the Court relied partly on Roman-Dutch law
superimposed on Zimbabwe prior to independence. As indicated above, this law continues to
apply in Zimbabwe and constitutes a significant component of the common law of the
country. Moreover, the Court reinforced its conclusion by relying on the South African
decisions dealing with the status and function of international law in South African municipal
49
law.10 This evidences the influence and inspiration of the South African Roman-Dutch law on
the Zimbabwean courts.
Secondly, the Zimbabwean courts (the High Court and the Supreme Court), also relied
on the English decisions on the subject. They proceeded to examine how English courts have
applied the common law principles on the relationship of customary international law with
British law. By relying on authorities from both jurisdictions, the Zimbabwean courts
underscored the impact of the trend in both countries on the way the Zimbabwean courts treat
and ought to treat international law in municipal law.
It is, however, significant to note that the judges in Barker McCormac's case referred
generally to the fact that international law is part of the law of Zimbabwe and did not
specifically mention customary international law or use the language to that effect or even
any applicable treaty. They consistently used the phrases 'international law is part of our
law,' 'international law should be incorporated as part of our law' and 'the doctrine of
sovereign immunity forms part of the law of this country.' The use of these phrases has been
construed to refer to customary international law but not treaty law.11 They refer to general
rules of international law recognised by a vast majority of states.
Another case in which the place of customary international law in Zimbabwean
municipal law was discussed is Mharapara v. The State}2 Also, this case did not deal with
human rights law. Rather, it concerned exterritorial jurisdiction of Zimbabwean courts. The
appellant, an Executive Officer in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, appeared before the
Zimbabwean High Court charged with stealing money, the property of the Government of
Zimbabwe, at the Zimbabwean Embassy in Brussels, Belgium while working as Zimbabwean
consul. He raised an exception to the indictment that the court had no jurisdiction to try him
as the crime had been committed in Belgium. The Court, per Justice Mfalila, dismissed the
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exception holding that the Court had jurisdiction in accordance with the nationality or active
personality principle of international law. An appeal to the Supreme Court was also dismissed
on almost the same grounds.
In determining whether the Court could exercise jurisdiction over cases governed by
international law, Justice Gubbay noted that:
As I perceive the position, there is no rule of international law directing or obliging
states to exercise criminal jurisdiction over their nationals for offences committed
abroad... Thus the fact that customary international law is part of the municipal law of
a state does not assist, because there is only a permissive principle involved and not a
mandatory rule.13
This dictum firmly endorses the decision in Barker McCormac's case that customary
international law is part of Zimbabwean municipal law. It is an affirmation of the automatic
incorporation principle. Although the two cases did not deal with international human rights
law per se, their ratio applies with equal force to that regime. International human rights law
is subsumed under general international law.
It is, however, significant to note that the courts in Zimbabwe have not consistently
and systematically acted upon the automatic incorporation principle as enunciated in Barker
McCormac's case. They have not internalised this principle. They seem to be doubtful or
even oblivious of the fact that rules of customary international law form part of the domestic
law of the country and should be enforced as such.14
1. Exceptions to the automatic incorporation of customary rules,
a. Legislation.
The post independence Zimbabwean municipal law continues to recognise that the
automatic incorporation of customary international law is subject to the will of parliament.
The legislature can exclude direct operation of customary international law in Zimbabwe
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municipal law by statute. The operation of this exception in the extant Zimbabwean
municipal law was expressly confirmed in Barker McCormac (Pvt) Ltd v. Government of
Kenya. Justice Georges of the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe observed:
I am completely satisfied therefore that the doctrine of sovereign immunity generally
applied in international law is that of restrictive immunity. There is..no legislation
inconsistent with that doctrine and it should be incorporated as part of our law.15
An inconsistency occurs between legislation and a rule of customary international law
where Zimbabwean national law is in conflict, for instance, with obligations assumed by
Zimbabwe under international law or a general rule of international law. Under these
circumstances, national law prevails and the Zimbabwean courts are bound to apply a rule of
municipal law and not a customary international law rule. This exception does not relate to
legislation enacted prior to the emergence of a rule of customary international law. It applies
to later, or rather posterior legislation. The intention of the legislature to disregard a rule of
customary international law should be very clear and unambiguous. Where the intention of
parliament is clear and unequivocal, a posterior legislation will exclude the domestic
operation of customary international law. This limitation operates mainly to forestall the
unsupervised application of customary international law in Zimbabwean municipal law.
However, the Zimbabwean courts will seek to ensure that municipal law conforms to the
international law obligations of Zimbabwe. They will construe any legislation to ensure that
Zimbabwe complies with, rather than contravenes, its international legal obligations.
b. Judicial precedent.
Judicial precedent or stare decisis rule can also exclude the automatic application of
customary international law in the present Zimbabwean municipal law, as was confirmed in
the fore-cited Barker McCormac (Pvt) Ltd v. Government ofKenya.'6 According to this rule,
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lower courts are bound by decisions of higher courts even if those decisions were made in
disregard of customary international law. Its effect is to limit the automatic application of
customary international law in municipal law. However, in the United Kingdom, this rule is
overridden by the Trendtex case.
The rationale for the stare decisis rule is generally to ensure uniformity and
consistency in the application of rules of law. It also ensures predictability in their growth. It
has never been intended to mean stagnation in the rules.17 It is submitted, however, that in
cases dealing especially with international human rights law the courts should not be impeded
by the doctrine of stare decisis in applying such law. They should endeavour to limit its
application. Thus where the utilisation of international human rights law in a particular case
affords the individual maximum protection in fundamental justice, a divergent stare decisis
rule should be disregarded. This has the advantage of making international human rights
standards more effective in municipal law. It enhances the role of international law in
municipal law.
c. Justiciability.
In certain circumstances, the direct applicability of customary international human
rights law in municipal law may be excluded on the basis that it is not justiciable in domestic
courts.18 This may occur mainly where domestic courts are compelled to effectuate executive
decisions even if such decisions would be in conflict with a rule or rules of customary
international human rights law. These decisions would not be justiciable or reviewable in
courts.19 The principle precludes the courts from judging in accordance with what they
believe to be the rules of international law. It is mainly a judicial policy of restraints or
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abstention in matters within the domain of the executive. It signifies judicial deference to the
executive branch imposed by the doctrine of separation ofpowers.
The principle of justiciability has been judicially recognised in Zimbabwean
municipal law. It arose in Patriotic Front-ZAPU v. Minister of Justice, Legal and
Parliamentary Affairs.20 The appellant, a political party, sought an order from the High Court
of Zimbabwe declaring that Proclamation No. 2 of 1985 by which the President fixed the
nomination date for the general election was ultra vires Section 12 of the Electoral Act, 1979
as modified by Section 4 of the Electoral Act (Modification) Notice 1985 or else void for
unreasonableness. The basis of the claim was that the nomination date fixed, 10th June 1985,
did not allow the appellant's prospective candidates enough time to comply with the
requirements for submission of nominations papers. In essence, the appellants were asking
the Court to order that the declaration made by the President was void. The respondent, for
their part, argued that the nomination date fixed by the President was an executive act which
could not be questioned in a court of law even if it curtailed the constitutional right of the
members of the appellant party to participate in the elections.
The Court examined the powers of the President under the Constitution of Zimbabwe
and held, per Dumbutshena, C.J., that there are prerogatives exercisable by the President, and
which are conferred on the President by the Constitution, which the courts, all things being
equal, cannot inquire into because the President, acting on the advice of the Government, is
the best judge in those circumstances of matters of policy in those areas covered by the
prerogatives. These matters are not justiciable. Although the case does not deal per se with
the domestic status of customary international law but with constitutional rights, analogically,
it is submitted that it also applies with equal force to that regime. Matters falling within
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executive domain can operate to exclude the application of rules of customary international
human rights law in Zimbabwe.
The rationale for the principle ofjusticiability is to ensure that the courts do not hinder
the executive in the performance of its function. In fact, the executive has the responsibility of
ensuring that the court's decisions conform to international law. But at the same time, the rule
seeks to maintain a desirable harmony between the courts and the executive branch of
government.21
It is submitted that, while the courts should respect executive decisions under certain
circumstances, they should also not take a rigid and inflexible view in the application of the
justiciability principle. Cognisance should be taken not only of the executive's role of
handling issues relating to matters such as national security but also of the courts' own
function to uphold the law and, most significantly, to protect the fundamental rights and
freedoms of the individual. As Chief Justice Dumbutshena correctly observed in the fore-
cited Patriotic Front-ZAPU vMinister ofJustice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs:
such matters of executive prerogatives are now very few and far between because
whenever the exercise of executive prerogative affects the private rights, interests and
legitimate expectation of the subjects or citizens, the jurisdiction of the courts is not
ousted.22
The private rights, interests and legitimate expectations of the citizens subject to judicial
review acts of the executive which would otherwise oust the jurisdiction of the courts.
Because of the concerns of the private rights and legitimate expectation of the citizens of
Zimbabwe, the High Court was asked to look into and to find out whether by fixing 10th June
1985 as nomination day there would be sufficient time for interested parties to participate in
the general elections without any obstacles being placed in their way through the lack of
enough time to go through the procedures leading to nomination day.
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c. Treaties.
At independence, the status and role of treaties in Zimbabwean municipal law was
regulated by the 1980 Lancaster House Constitution. Section 11 lB(l)(b) thereof provided
that "except as otherwise provided by this Constitution or by an Act of Parliament, any
convention, treaty or agreement acceded to, concluded or executed by or under the authority
of the President with one or more foreign states or governments or international organisations
shall not form part of the law of Zimbabwe unless it has been incorporated into the law by or
under an Act ofParliament." According to this clause, subject to the Constitution or an Act of
Parliament, international agreements became part of the Zimbabwean municipal law only
when they have been specifically enacted into law.
Section 111B(1) has been amended by the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment
(No. 7) Act, 1987 and substituted with a new clause. Section 17 thereof briefly provides that
"any international convention, treaty or agreement which (a) has been entered into or
executed by or under the authority of the President; and (b) imposes fiscal obligations upon
Zimbabwe; shall be subject to ratification by the House of Assembly." This clause requires
any international treaties which impose fiscal responsibility on Zimbabwe to be approved by
parliament if they are to be binding on Zimbabwe.
Germane to this discussion is paragraph 17(b). This clause raises several issues. First,
not all treaties that have been executed by the president are subject to parliamentary
ratification. Only those treaties which impose fiscal obligation need parliamentary approval.
The question is, what about other treaties which do not impose fiscal obligation on Zimbabwe
such as human rights treaties? Do these treaties require parliamentary approval? Secondly,
what does ratification by the House of Assembly really mean? Does it mean ratification, or
rather expression of consent to be bound at the international level as envisaged by the Vienna
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Convention of Law on Treaties of 196923 whereby for a treaty that is signed by the competent
State official to be binding externally as against Zimbabwe and other States it needs
parliamentary approval? Or does it mean ratification at municipal level in the sense that a
duly executed treaty by the competent State official has to be approved by parliament for it to
be part of the Zimbabwean municipal law? Last but not least, does clause 7(b) encompass
both stages or processes?
Concerning the first issue, a reasonable and plausible interpretation of paragraph
17(b) is that it does not cover treaties which do not impose fiscal obligations on Zimbabwe.
Treaties falling under this category do not require parliamentary approval to be binding upon
Zimbabwe. The initial position in Section lllB(l)(a) of the Lancaster Constitution requiring
any convention, treaty or agreement binding on Zimbabwe to be approved by parliament has
been altered to relate narrowly and only to treaties imposing fiscal obligation. Paragraph (b)
thereof confines parliamentary ratification only to treaties imposing fiscal responsibility upon
Zimbabwe.24 It leaves the status of other treaties such as human rights treaties in Zimbabwe
unclear and uncertain.
With respect to the issue of whether paragraph (b) relates to either expression of
consent to be bound at the international level or ratification at municipal level, that is,
parliamentary approval, or both, it is submitted that it relates only to consent to be bound at
the international level. This is apparent from the phrase "entered into or executed by or under
the authority of the President." A treaty that is "entered into or executed" already becomes
binding externally and does not require parliamentary approval. Thus it is redundant to
require that subsequent parliament approval is necessary for such a treaty to be binding on
Zimbabwe vis-a-vis other States.
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Most importantly, even those international agreements covered by Section 17 are not
part of the municipal law of Zimbabwe. Section 17 is silent on the position and role of these
treaties in Zimbabwe. It does not incorporate these treaties into municipal law. This means
that their status in municipal law is not entirely clear. Clearly, the new legal position
embodied in Section 17(b) is a complete reversal of the initial Section 11 lB(l)(b) of the
Zimbabwean Constitution which provided that treaties shall not form part of the law of
Zimbabwe unless they have been incorporated into the law by or under an Act of Parliament.
This effectively means that the present status of treaties in Zimbabwean municipal
law should be examined on the basis of the inherited Roman-Dutch common law model
which, in terms of Section 89 of the Independence Constitution of Zimbabwe, continues to
operate in the country. According to the Roman-Dutch common law, treaties or international
agreements are not self-executing. They require legislation to be operative in Zimbabwean
municipal law. The classical dualist theory has been endorsed by the fore-cited R v.
Muirhead.25
Moreover, as a commonwealth country, Zimbabwe, adheres to the practice observed
by other common law and commonwealth countries whereby treaties are referred to the
legislature to translate them into municipal law and make them internally effective.26 This is
posited on the notion that within the general principle of state sovereignty, a State must,
through its legislature, agree, expressly or impliedly, to international law particularly
conventional international law in order for it to have force of municipal law. Thus on the
basis of the Roman-Dutch common law human rights treaties do not enjoy automatic
application in the extant Zimbabwean municipal law. They need legislative translation if they
are to be effective in domestic law and confer rights and duties on individuals. Thus
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Zimbabwe has retained the imposed classical dualist theory in the way it treats international
conventions in municipal law.
It is significant to observe in this regard that upon attaining independence in 1980, the
newly elected Government of Zimbabwe acceded to and ratified several treaties dealing with
a wide ranging universal or general, regional and specific human rights issues. As regards
universal or general treaties, Zimbabwe has acceded to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948, the Convention on the Suppression and
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid of 1973, the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women of 1979 and the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1966.27 Zimbabwe has similarly acceded to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989.28
Regional treaties that Zimbabwe is party to are the African Charter on Fluman and
People's Rights (hereafter the ACHPR), the Southern African Development Community
Treaty (hereafter the SADC Treaty) and the Charter of the Organisation of the African Unity
(hereafter the OAU Charter). These treaties deal with a wide variety of subjects and do not
specifically deal with human rights norms. But they have provisions that enjoin the
contracting parties to respect and protect human rights.29 Zimbabwe has also acceded to
conventions on the rights of refugees and people in like situations such as the 1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and the 1969 OAU
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.30
There are, however, other international human rights conventions which Zimbabwe is
yet to ratify. For instance, Zimbabwe is yet to be party to the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Punishment and Treatment of 10 December 1984, the
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 196631 and
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the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty of 15 December 1989 which entered into force
on 11 July 1991.32 According to the inherited dualist theory, these treaties are not part of
Zimbabwean municipal law. In order for them to be integrated into municipal law, they
require parliamentary approval in addition to ratification at the international level.
2. Botswana.
a. The legal framework: a general comment.
The 1966 Independence Constitution of Botswana does not have a clear and express
provision categorically and unambiguously according international law (including
international human rights law) a place and role in Botswana municipal law.33 Although the
Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution recognises and protects human rights norms
fashioned along the internationally recognised rights found in various human rights treaties
this in itself does not mean that international human rights norms are automatically part of
municipal law of Botswana. According to the monist-dualist controversy, there is need for an
express provision according international human rights law a specific place in municipal law.
Thus, as in Zimbabwe, Botswana post-colonial constitutional and municipal legal order has
not clarified the legal position of both conventional and customary international law in
municipal law.
Consequently, the legal position of international law in Botswana municipal law
should be analysed on the basis of the inherited Roman-Dutch common law approach. This
law should provide the basis for analysing the place of both customary and conventional
international human rights law in the existing municipal law of Botswana. The received
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Roman-Dutch law was not abrogated at independence. It continues to operate alongside the
general law ofBotswana found in statutes, subordinate legislation and judicial decisions.34
b. Rules of customary international law.
As amply demonstrated in relation to Zimbabwe, judicial practice under the Roman-
Dutch common law is that rules of customary international law are considered to be part of
the law of the land. Likewise, under the municipal law of Botswana customary international
law is deemed to be automatically applicable in national law. The inter-relationship between
customary international law (including customary international human rights law) and
municipal law ofBotswana continues to be regulated by the classical monist theory.
The inherited monist theory has been confirmed by Botswana courts.33 It was given
express judicial endorsement in Agnes Bojang v. The State.26 The Applicant was charged with
and convicted by a Magistrate Court on a plea of guilty of stealing by persons employed in
the public service contrary to Section 271 as read with Section 276 of the Penal Code of
Botswana. She was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. In an application to the High Court
for a judicial review, she argued, first and foremost, that the Magistrate Court had denied her
the right to legal representation by failing to ask her whether or not she wished to be
represented by a lawyer, a right to which she was entitled under municipal law ofBotswana.
The approach adopted by the High Court to the question of the right to legal
representation went far beyond the usual practice of the courts in the country when dealing
with issues involving human or constitutional rights. The Court noted that due to the paucity
of case law in the country to guide it in resolving the question before it, it had to seek
assistance not only from comparative judicial pronouncements but also from human rights
treaties protecting the right to legal representation.37 In the process, the Court found itself
61
having to deal with the status and role of human rights treaties in the municipal law of
Botswana. Justice Gyeke-Dako, the presiding Judge, recognised that the embodiment of
laudable human rights principles in various human rights instruments reflects a universal
acceptance of the right to legal representation as an important factor in the concept of a fair
trial. In particular, Justice Gyeke-Dako's reference to the domestic status of customary
international law took this form:
But, even assuming that the right to legal representation is part of customary
international law, can it be seriously contended that such right to legal representation
as embodied in international instruments, automatically forms part of the municipal
laws ofBotswana without any act of legislative incorporation. I doubt it.38
Two points emerge from this dictum. First, the Court can only assume that the right to
legal representation forms part of customary international law. It is not an express judicial
affirmation that this right has matured into customary international law. Secondly, the Court
pointed out that it doubted whether the right to legal representation forms part of municipal
law without having been incorporated by legislation. This demonstrates the uncertainty and
lack of clarity on the part of the judiciary concerning the rules governing the application and
function of international law in municipal law. In particular, the observation signifies that the
status of customary international law in general in the municipal law of Botswana is not yet
firmly anchored.
However, Justice Gyeke-Dako proceeded to say:
I find nothing in the laws of this country to the effect that international law or for that
matter provisions of international conventions can dispense with the theory of
incorporation to operate directly on individuals.39
This observation reveals two issues. In the first instance it clearly demonstrates the
fact that the Court assumed that the theory of automatic incorporation applies to both
international treaties and customary international law. This assumption and failure to clearly
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distinguish the circumstances under which the theory applies further makes the legal position
more blurred and uncertain.
The second issue is that the observation, despite its apparent imprecision, raises a
double-pronged inquiry. The first relates to the phrase "international law." The second
concerns the phrase "can dispense with the theory of incorporation to operate directly on
individuals." As regards the former, it is submitted that international law here refers to
customary international law. It is well settled that phrases such as "international is part of the
law of the land" or general reference to international law in this context does not include or
relate to international treaties since international treaties, generally speaking, require
legislation to make them part ofmunicipal law. They need legislative transformation in order
to be integrated into municipal legal sphere.
The statement is an immediate reminder of the well known observation made by Sir
William Blackstone that "the law of nations, whenever any question arises which is properly
the object of its jurisdiction, is here adopted in its full extent by the common law, and is held
to be part of the law of land." It is generally acknowledged that this observation relates to
customary international law but not treaties.40
The second point raised by Justice Gyeke-Dako's observation is that nothing in the
municipal law of Botswana can dispense with the "theory of incorporation to operate directly
on individuals." This remark is a judicial recognition and confirmation of a well settled
doctrine in international law regarding the receivability and absorption of customary
international law in domestic law. According to this doctrine, customary international law
(including customary international human rights law) is, as a general rule, considered or
deemed to be part ofmunicipal law.41 Thus, despite the imperfection in the language, the case
establishes that Botswana municipal law adheres to the automatic incorporation theory in its
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treatment of customary international law (including international human rights law). It
represents the first judicial proclamation of the incorporation theory in the municipal
normative order of Botswana.
The above analysis leads to several conclusions. First, cases in which the place and
role of customary international law in municipal law has arisen are comparatively few and
isolated. In fact, Agnes Bojang v. The State, a very low key case indeed, is the only case in
which the issue was expressly raised. But even in this case, the subject was raised just
incidentally. This explains why the judge expressed his avowed doubts as to its status in
Botswana domestic law. It also explains why the court gave the issue a brief and cursory
treatment. Moreover, the case shows lack of consistency and uniformity in handling the
subject.
Secondly, in most of the cases where the subject was discussed, either directly or
indirectly, the courts were primarily examining decisions on constitutional law especially
constitutional rights at points where it touches upon international interests. This does not
demonstrate the position the courts take on any question of international law. It clearly shows
that Botswana courts have not exhibited a positive approach towards international law in
general. Thus a firm and solid judicial internalisation of the automatic incorporation principle
in Botswana has not yet been established.
1. Limitations of the monist theory,
a. Legislation.
As under the pre-existing inherited municipal law ofBotswana, the present legal order
of Botswana recognises that an act of parliament, or rather legislative sovereignty may
operate to exclude the direct application of customary international law (including customary
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international human rights law) in municipal law. This exception was confirmed by Justice
Gyeke-Dako in the fore-discussed Agnes Bojang v. The State where he noted that even
assuming that the right to legal representation is part of customary international law, it does
not automatically form part of the municipal law of Botswana because it may be excluded by
legislation. Thus although Botswana courts are enjoined to directly apply customary
international human rights law as part of municipal law, they are nevertheless bound to
respect acts of parliament which derogate from such norms. Although the Court was not
explicit, the exception applies to legislation that is enacted subsequent, but not earlier in date,
to the customary rule in question.
The question that arises in the light of the authority of parliament to exclude the
automatic operation of customary international human rights law in municipal law is, does it
mean that national law is supreme to international law, at least in Botswana national law?
This question is indeed important because by qualifying the incorporation principle with the
will of parliament, it implies a cautious approach and a moderate submission to the will of the
international normative regime. This may also connote an implied opposition to international
law. Moreover, this ranking may have the negative effects of lessening the effectiveness of
international law in national law. On the other hand, an unqualified domestic application of
customary international law is not a preferable option. Rules of customary international law
need not be left to operate unregulated in domestic law.
Significantly, however, despite the limitation on the internal operation of customary
international human rights law by the will of the legislature, in practice parliament respects
and observes Botswana's international obligations. Domestic courts try as much as is
practicable possible to reconcile domestic legislation with a particular rule in question in
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order to ensure that the international obligation ofBotswana is fulfilled. This was emphasised
in Attorney General ofBotswana v. Unity Dow. Justice Aguda noted that he was:
bound to accept the position that this country will not deliberately enact laws in
contravention of its international undertakings... The courts must interpret domestic
statutory laws in a way as is compatible with the State's international responsibility.42
It effectively means that if legislation is explicitly clear and unambiguous that the
legislature wanted to disregard customary international law Botswana courts have no choice
but to apply the legislation. They would not want to substitute legislative act with their own
will.
b. Stare decisis rule.
As in Zimbabwe, the independence municipal law of Botswana recognises that the
stare decisis rule, or rather the doctrine of judicial precedent can exclude the direct domestic
application of customary international human rights law. In applying customary international
law as part of municipal law Botswana courts are obliged to have regard to the doctrine of
stare decisis. Although this doctrine has not as yet received any express judicial endorsement,
at least in relation to the automatic incorporation principle, there is no doubt that on the basis
of the inherited Roman-Dutch common law approach, Botswana courts will be more readily
inclined to follow decisions of other higher courts. This notwithstanding the fact that in so
doing they will be limiting the direct application of international human rights law in
municipal law.
It is, however, submitted that Botswana courts should not rigidly apply the stare
decisis limitation in such a way that the effectiveness and role of international human rights
law in municipal law of Botswana is lessened. They should limit its application especially in
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human rights related cases in order to afford individuals maximum protection in fundamental
justice.
c. Justiciability.
The principle of justiciability has also not been judicially confirmed in municipal law
of Botswana. However, as in Zimbabwe, the automatic applicability of customary
international human rights law in municipal law may be excluded by the principle of
justiciability. As a common law country, Botswana courts are bound by statements from the
executive even where such statements are in conflict with an established rule of customary
international human rights law. Where, for instance, there is a matter which falls within the
prerogatives of the executive such as whether a particular conduct concerns national security,
the courts would have to follow the executive statement. The courts would be excluded from
making a determination with respect to such matter.
The rationale for this principle is to ensure that courts do not hinder the executive in
the performance of its function. In this regard the executive has the responsibility of ensuring
that judicial decisions conform to international law. But at the same time, the rule seeks to
maintain a desirable harmony between the courts and the executive branch of government.43
However, as argued above in relation to Zimbabwe, it is contended that the exception should
not be applied rigidly as to limit the protection of the fundamental human rights and interests
of individuals. Botswana courts should strictly construe the executive discretion especially
where they impinge upon individual human rights and liberties.
c. Treaties.
1. The legal framework.
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An attempt, albeit inconclusively, to assign international agreements a place and role
in municipal law ofBotswana has been made in the General Provisions and Interpretation Act
of 1984 (hereafter the Interpretation Act).44 The Act provides:
For the purposes of ensuring that which an enactment was made to correct and as an
aid to the construction of an enactment a court may have regard to any relevant
international treaty, agreement or convention and to any papers laid before the
National Assembly in reference to the enactment or to its subject matter, but not to the
debates in the Assembly.45
The Interpretation Act authorises courts in Botswana to construe domestic legislation
and law in general by reference to relevant international treaties, agreements or conventions.
This Act serves as a basis for invoking international conventions in any sphere of
international law to interpret and ascertain the meaning of ordinary domestic legislation.
Moreover, the Interpretation Act can also be used to interpret constitutional provisions
including those clauses dealing with fundamental human rights norms.46 Thus the domestic
law of Botswana empowers the judiciary to have regard to rules of international law
embodied in treaties (including human rights treaties) in discharging their role of interpreting
ordinary domestic law and the Constitution.
It is worth stressing that, although Section 24(1) of the Interpretation Act authorises
Botswana courts to construe national law by reference to international agreements, it clearly
does not of itself make international agreements part of municipal law. It only means that,
under certain circumstances, international conventions may be used to construe and ascertain
the meaning ofmunicipal law where that law is uncertain, unreasonable and vague or unclear
in order to fill in the gaps. Thus according to the monist-dualist debate, the Act does not make
international agreements part ofBotswanamunicipal law.
It essentially means that the legal position of treaties in Botswana continues to be
governed by the dualist theory which Botswana inherited from the United Kingdom through
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the Roman-Dutch common law reception instrument. According to classical dualist theory,
treaties, as a general, require legislation to have a role in, and be part of, domestic law.47 They
require a specific act of legislative translation in order to benefit individuals and be invoked
and relied upon by national institutions particularly the courts in municipal law.
2. Botswana courts and the dualist theory.
There have been very few cases in post-colonial Botswana where international
conventions have been a subject of discussion before domestic courts. This has occurred
mainly in relation to the human rights provisions of the Constitution. One of the first cases in
which human rights conventions were actively invoked is Unity Dow v. Attorney General of
Botswana,48 This case deserves a detailed consideration since it is one of the few cases in
Botswana municipal and constitutional legal order in which human rights treaties were
invoked and referred to at some considerable length. It is also in this case that for the first
time in the functioning of the judiciary ofBotswana that the question of the status and role of
human rights treaties and indeed treaties in general in the municipal law of Botswana was
specifically posed.
Unity Dow, a female citizen of Botswana, was married to Peter Nathan Dow on 7
March 1984, a citizen of the United States who had lived in Botswana for a period of fourteen
years. By that time, Unity Dow had already had a child born out of wedlock in 1979.
Subsequently, two children were born of the marriage, in 1985 and 1987 respectively. By
virtue of Section 21 of the Constitution every person born in Botswana on or after 30th
September 1966 shall become a citizen of Botswana at the date of his birth. The first child
became a citizen of Botswana. Meanwhile, earlier in 1984, a new Citizenship Act had been
enacted, which repealed Section 21 of the Constitution and Section 4(1) thereof provided,
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inter alia, that "A person born in Botswana shall be a citizen of Botswana by birth and
descent if, at the time of his birth - (a) his father was a citizen of Botswana; or (b) in the case
of a person born out ofwedlock, his mother was a citizen ofBotswana." The last two children
were therefore not citizens of Botswana because their father was not a citizen of Botswana.
Unity Dow applied to the High Court ofBotswana for an order declaring that Section 4 of the
Citizenship Act was ultra vires the Constitution of Botswana since it violated her
fundamental rights to pass her citizenship to her children. In a wider sense, the applicant was
arguing that the Citizenship Act was discriminatory against female citizens of Botswana
married to foreigners.
The Court examined the Citizenship Act against the constitutional clauses on non¬
discrimination, Sections 3 and 15, and came to the conclusion that by preventing female
citizens of Botswana married to foreigners from bequeathing their citizenship to their
children, the Citizenship Act was discriminatory. It held that the Act was indeed ultra vires
the Constitution of Botswana. The presiding judge, Horwitz, A.J., cited in support of his
judgment the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women of 1967, Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 and what he called
the "OAU Convention on non-discrimination" presumably referring to the ACHPR and
proceeded to observe that:
I bear in mind that signing a convention does not give it the power of law in
Botswanaf
In the Court's view, the mere fact of signing an international treaty does not give it the
force of law in Botswana. In other words, signature does not per se make treaties part of
Botswana municipal law.
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On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the State argued, among other things, that the trial
Court had no authority to invoke and rely upon the ACHPR and other human rights treaties
and instruments because although Botswana was a party to these conventions and
instruments, domestic courts could not use them because "none of them had been
incorporated into domestic law by legislation."50
On this question, the Judge President of the Court of Appeal, Austin Amissah,
accepted without hesitation that "treaties and conventions do not confer enforceable rights on
individuals within the State until Parliament has legislated their provisions into the law of the
land."51 According to Justice Amissah, treaties require legislation to transform them into
Botswana municipal law.
The view of Justice Amissah was shared by other members of the Court. Akinola
Aguda, J. A., opined that "if an international convention, agreement, treaty, protocol or
obligation has been incorporated into domestic law, there seems to me to be no problem since
such convention, agreement and so on will be treated as part of the domestic law for purposes
of adjudication in a domestic court."52
In sum, according to the Court of Appeal, international agreements do not have
automatic application within Botswana municipal law. They require legislation to assign
them a place and role in municipal law. This decision is significant for two major reasons.
Firstly, the decision confirms a well established principle observed in the Anglo-American
common law tradition and practice that international conventions are not automatically part
of, and cannot affect the liberties and behaviour of private citizens unless and until they have
been transmuted into municipal law.53 It also marks a firm judicial affirmation that Botswana
continues to adhere to the dualist approach inherited from the erstwhile colonial Power: the
United Kingdom.
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Second, the Unity Dow case is the first decision of its kind to categorically and
explicitly declare that the status and role of treaties in Botswana municipal law is governed
by the classical dualist theory. Subsequent judicial pronouncements have not, however,
actively and vigorously acted on this theory in order to securely confirm its place in
Botswana municipal law. Also, Botswana courts have not clarified the precise parameters of
the dualist theory.
It is significant to note in this regard that, unlike Zimbabwe, Botswana has ratified
only a few international human rights conventions. It has acceded to the International
Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1966, International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979,
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 and its 1967 Protocol, and the OAU
1969 Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. It has just
recently acceded to the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989.54 Further, Botswana
has succeeded to the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons of 1954.55 It has
also signed the ACHPR adopted at Banjul in Gambia in 198176 Significantly, most of these
treaties have not been enacted into law. This means that in terms of the inherited classical
dualist theory, they are not part of Botswana municipal law. They can only form part of
municipal law and thus confer rights and impose obligations on individuals after they have
been specifically translated into national law by a statutory enactment.
3. Conclusion.
It is evidently clear from the fore-going discussion that the status of international
human rights law, conventional and customary, in the municipal legal orders of Botswana and
Zimbabwe has not undergone any fundamental changes at independence. The national
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Constitutions of both countries do not accord international law (including international
human rights law) an express and categorical position and role in municipal law. Moreover,
there is no legislation specifically making international law part of municipal law of both
countries.
Clearly, both countries do not lay down a firm foundation for the operation of
international human rights law. Their legal systems do not stands out in law for compliance
with international law. They adopt a 'closed up' approach. It is submitted that Botswana and
Zimbabwe should adopt an approach that makes their municipal law international law
friendly. They should have provisions in their national Constitutions directly and expressly
incorporating international law in general in municipal law. Alternatively, the same objective
can be achieved by ordinary legislation. A reform of this nature will not only fill in the gaps
in the law but has the beneficial effect of ensuring certainty, uniformity and predictability
regarding the status and function of international law in municipal law. This mechanism also
ensures harmony between both legal regimes.
Attempts at clarifying the legal situation in both countries have mainly been made by
Courts. Judicial practice in both countries is that, subject to acceptable exceptions of stare
decisis, parliamentary supremacy and justiciability, existing customary international human
rights law has automatic application in the national law. Court decisions have also revealed
that treaties are not per se part of municipal law of the two countries. They require explicit
legislative translation into municipal law.
Thus judicial practice reveals that the legal position of the inter-relationship between
international law (including international human rights law) continues to be governed by the
inherited Roman-Dutch common law approach. The pre-existing legal position has been left
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unaffected. Both countries still adhere to the monist theory with respect to customary
international law and dualist conception in relation to treaties.
However, these theories have not been vigorously and positively, not in a positivist
sense, acted upon by the national institutions especially the judiciary so as to accord them a
definite place in municipal law and also to delimit their precise parameters. Both theories
have been discussed, albeit implicitly, in comparatively few and isolated cases mainly dealing
with human rights clauses of the constitution. National courts have not internalised these
theories. Thus until and unless judicial attitude sway in favour of international law, its
position in the national laws of both countries will continue to be blurred, unclear and
uncertain for sometime in the future.
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Chapter Four
A Monist Experiment: Namibia
It has been demonstrated in chapter two that the inter-relationship between
international law (including international human rights law) and pre-independence Namibian
municipal law was based on the inherited Roman-Dutch common law. This position
underwent fundamental changes after independence. The legal position of international law in
general and international human rights law in particular in the Namibian municipal legal
order is now regulated by the independence Constitution. This chapter analyses the extant
position of international human rights law, customary and conventional, in Namibian
municipal law. It also examines how and the extent to which the judiciary has dealt with the
subject.
1. Automatic Incorporation.
a. The legal framework: constitutional strategy.
The extant status and role of both customary and conventional international law in
municipal law of Namibia is now regulated by the 1990 Constitution. The Constitution
explicitly recognises international law and its role and function in Namibian municipal law.
The relevant Article 144 of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia explicitly and
unequivocally declares that:
Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or an Act of Parliament, the general
rules of public international law and international agreements binding upon Namibia
under this Constitution shall form part of the law ofNamibia.
The effect of this provision is to accord both the general rules of public international
law and international agreements or treaties direct and automatic application in Namibian
78
municipal law subject to two main qualifications. First, the general rules of international law
and treaties may be excluded from applying directly in municipal law by the Namibian
Constitution itself. Secondly, they may be excluded by an Act of Parliament.1 But for these
two qualifications, the general rules of international law and treaties are directly incorporated
into Namibian municipal law. These rules are directly enforceable by municipal institutions
particularly by the courts. Likewise, individuals can directly invoke and rely on these rules in
municipal legal proceedings.
The Namibian international law clause is a clear indicia of the proactiveness or
friendliness of the Constitution to international law.2 This approach is predicated on a variety
of factors. In the first instance, the experience of a long period of apartheid colonial rule in
total disregard of international law and defiance of the international community reminded the
architects of the Constitution that they had to ensure that the legal system of Namibia is
anchored on firm principles of international law. Moreover, the founding fathers of the
Constitution felt that the intent to introduce the minimum democratic values in the territory
long denied by the South African apartheid regime to the great majority of Namibian people
do not stop at the national boundaries, but should also be extended to Namibia's international
conduct; hence, the proclaimed adherence of the newly constituted Namibian State to the
general standards of behaviour agreed upon by the vast majority of members of the
international community.3
It is also worth-noting that in terms of Article 66(1) of the Constitution of Namibia,
the common law of Namibia in force on the date of independence shall remain valid to the
extent to which such common law does not conflict with the Namibian Constitution or any
other statutory enactment. This clause ensures continuity of legal rules from the period of
South African rule to the independence period and beyond. It introduces a possibility, it is
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submitted, of considering the status and role of international law in Namibian municipal law
on the same basis as it is under the South African Roman-Dutch common law.4 Thus Article
66(1) complements Article 144 of the Constitution. It also reinforces the status of
international law in Namibian municipal law.
Since general rules of public international law and international agreements are part of
municipal law, that is, they have direct and automatic application in Namibian national law,
the Namibian courts are obliged to take judicial notice of them. The Namibian courts are
enjoined to have recourse to these rules as a source of national law. In essence, the Namibian
Constitution has adopted a monist approach regarding the relationship between international
law and Namibian national law. It is thus important to distinguish between general rules of
international law and treaty rules.
b. General rules of international law.
The Namibian international clause: Article 144 directly incorporates "general rules of
public international law" into Namibian municipal law. It is significant to emphasise that this
provision is a constitutional confirmation of the previous Roman-Dutch common law position
that general rules of public international law binding upon the Republic of Namibia law have
always been part ofNamibian municipal law.5
However, the phrase "general rules of public international law" raises several
fundamental questions. First, what do these general rules of public international law really
entail? The reference in Article 144 to general rules of public international law should
obviously refer to customary international law. The term "general" in this context means rules
widely supported and accepted by the representatively large number of States. It denotes clear
and certain rules that have attracted widespread support from the international society. It
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effectively makes all kinds of rules of customary international law part of municipal law
except those specifically and expressly excluded by the Constitution or an Act ofParliament.6
This interpretation has been placed on similar provisions found in other national
Constitutions. The Basic Law of the German Federal Republic which provides at Article 25
that "the general rules of Public International Law are an integral part of the Federal law" is
widely understood to refer only to the rules of customary international law, not the rules
embodied in international treaties or agreements.7 Similarly, Article 10, paragraph 1, of the
Italian Constitution enacted in 1947 and brought into force on 1 January 1948 which provides
that "The Italian legal order shall conform with the generally recognised rules of international
law" has been interpreted to refer to customary international law.8
The second inquiry that emerges from Article 144 is whether reference to general
rules of public international law implies an automatic exclusion of regional or particular rules
of customary international law. This is because the rights and obligations of States in the
international plane may be of a general or particular character.9 In this regard, this provision
may be contrasted with Section 211(3) of the Constitution of Malawi which declares that,
"Customary international law, unless inconsistent with this Constitution or an Act of
Parliament, shall have continued application in Malawi." This clause ensures the
incorporation of customary international law in Malawian municipal law in its entirety.10
It is submitted that, in line with the general positive attitude of the extant Namibian
normative regime to international law, the local or regional customary rules, that is, rules
developed in a particular region should necessarily be included in the general rules of
international law. This means that local or particular custom based on a proven constant and
uniform practice should be captured under Article 144." Commenting on the new South
African Constitution which has similarly adopted rules of customary international law
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binding upon the Republic of South Africa as part of the South African municipal law,
Devine has argued that:
It does not matter what kind of international customary law is under consideration,
whether it be universal, general, local or particular. All kinds are in principle
incorporated. There is no distinction as to the types of international law. This is a
satisfactory provision.12
The necessity for the inclusion of regional (local) rules of international law in Article
144 serves the significant purpose of broadening the scope of this provision. It ensures that in
discharging their interpretative role, courts should be free to invoke and apply customary
international law in its totality. It avoids the adoption of a narrow construction ofArticle 144.
The basic objective of this clause is to incorporate customary international law in general
except that which is expressly excluded for being incompatible with the Constitution or an
Act ofParliament.
The Constitution of Namibia does not, however, make all general rules of
international law part of the national law. Only those rules which are "binding upon Namibia"
are deemed to be part of Namibian national law. It is submitted that any determination of
whether or not general rules of international law bind Namibia should meet the criteria set by
international law itself. Certain rules of customary international law may not bind Namibia in
international law where, for example, there is evidence that it has opted out of the rule during
its formation due to its persistent objection.'3
1. The Namibian courts and customary rules.
One of the first cases that came before the Namibian courts after the Independence
Constitution was adopted in which international human rights law and implicitly the monist
theory, or rather the incorporation principle emerged is Ex parte Attorney General, Namibia:
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In re Corporal Punishment by Organs ofStatef The case involved a petition by the Attorney
General to the Chief Justice of Namibia in terms of Section 15(2) of the Supreme Court Act
15 of 1990 in which he sought the consent of the Chief Justice, or such other Judge
designated for the purpose by the Chief Justice, for the Supreme Court to exercise its
jurisdiction to act as a Court of first instance in hearing and determining a constitutional
question which the Attorney-General sought to refer to the Supreme Court under the powers
vested in him by Article 87(c) read with Article 79(2) of the Namibian Constitution. The
relevant question was whether corporal punishment by or on the authority of the organ of
State contemplated in legislation is per se\ or in respect of certain categories of persons; or in
respect of certain offences or misbehaviours; or in respect of the procedure employed during
the infliction thereof in conflict with any provisions of Chapter 3 entitled "Fundamental
Human Rights and Freedoms" of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia particularly
Article 8 thereof and, if so, to deal with such laws as contemplated in Article 25(1) of the
Constitution. The latter clause deals with the enforcement of fundamental rights and
freedoms. The material Article 8(2)(b) of the Namibian Constitution provides that "No
persons shall be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment." Corporal punishment in question fell into two categories. First, legislation
permitting judicial and administrative corporal punishment. Secondly, corporal punishment in
schools.
In examining whether or not the institution of corporal punishment as embedded in
Namibian law was repugnant to the type of treatment or punishment outlawed by the
Constitution, the Court, per Mahomed, A. J. A, began by analysing Article 8(2)(b). The Court
interpreted this provision disjunctively in relation to seven distinct conditions: torture, cruel
treatment, cruel punishment, inhuman treatment, inhuman punishment, degrading treatment
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and degrading punishment, and held that the imposition of any corporal punishment by any
judicial or quasi-judicial authority, or directing any corporal punishment upon any person is
unlawful and in conflict with Article 8 of the Constitution of Namibia. In the process, the
Court had recourse to, and relied upon, international human rights norms embodied in treaties
such as the ECHR.'3 Finally, the Court held that whipping whether by organs of State or in
respect of certain offences or persons is a degrading and inhuman treatment.
However, the Court did not expressly affirm that the prohibition of whipping has
matured into customary international human rights law which forms part of Namibian
municipal law. It also did not make any specific and express reference to Article 144 of the
Namibian Constitution. It is submitted that this case presented the Court with an opportunity
to positively and expressly confirm the status of customary international law in Namibian
municipal law and give effect to, and define the exact parameters of, Article 144.
By contrast, specific and express reference to the Namibian international law clause
and international human rights norms in general as well as the importance of these norms in
Namibian municipal law was made in Government ofthe Republic ofNamibia and Another v.
Cultura 2000 and Another.16 The Namibian High Court had to determine the constitutionality
of domestic legislation in relation to Article 16 of the Namibian Constitution protecting the
right to culture. Cultura 2000, the first respondent, and the chairman of its board of directors,
the second respondent, brought an application against the appellants, the Government of the
Republic of Namibia and others for an order, inter alia, declaring the State Repudiation
(Cultura 2000) Act 32 of 1991 which authorised the repudiation of the loans granted to them,
the respondents, by the association called the "Administration for Whites," a body established
for the cultural activities of the "whites," and divesting them to the State to be
unconstitutional.
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The first respondent was an association incorporated under the Companies Act No. 61
of 1973 (Republic of South Africa) the main object of which was the preservation of the
culture of the Afrikaans, German, Portuguese, English and other communities of European
descent. In his founding affidavit, the second respondent, alleged that the main object in
forming the first respondent was the maintenance, development and promotion of the culture
of the west European cultural groups. In furtherance of its proclaimed objective the first
respondent solicited and obtained funds from the "Administration for Whites." In March,
1989, just one year before the independence of Namibia and during the transitional period
leading to such independence, the first respondent received valuable assets from the
"Administration for Whites." On 28 March, 1989 it also received a donation of four million
South African rands from the same authority. On the same date, a further sum of four million
South African rands was paid by the same authority to the first respondent as a loan carrying
interest of 1% per annum repayable in seventy six instalments half yearly. On 28 February,
1990 approximately three weeks prior to the formal independence of Namibia the four
million rands donated on 28 March, 1989 was converted into a loan by the then
Administrator-General appointed by the South African Government.
In court the appellants argued that the payments made to the first respondent were
made as a deliberate stratagem to support the operation of Cultura 2000 in order to frustrate
the anticipated results of the election and "because of the apprehension of a new democratic
society in which privilege on a racial basis would not be permitted." They further argued that
the funds were allocated in pursuance of a policy of compulsory, pseudo-ethnic and racial
classification. They argued, therefore, that it was perfectly in order for the Namibian
Parliament to pass legislation (the State Repudiation (Cultura 2000) Act 32 of 1991)
repudiating the loans and divesting them to the government.
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In holding that the State Repudiation (Cultura 2000) Act 32 of 1991 violated the
respondents cultural rights and as such unconstitutional, the Namibian High Court made the
following remark concerning Article 144 and particularly general rules of international
human rights law:
It is manifest that the constitutional jurisprudence of a free and independent Namibia
is premised on the values of a broad and universalist human rights culture which has
began to emerge in substantial areas of the world in recent times. Article 144 of the
Constitution sought to give expression to the intention of the Constitution to make
Namibia part of the international community. 17
This remark confirms the significance of universal human rights norms in Namibian
municipal law. The pronouncement represents a firm judicial recognition that universal
human rights norms and values are part of Namibia national law. This means that, as an
member of the international community, Namibia should abide by these norms. Most
importantly, the pronouncement underlines the fact that the effect of the Namibian
international law clause is to make these norms part of the national law. It creates unity
between these norms and Namibian legal order. The pronouncement clearly demonstrates
that, in line with the classical monist theory, the Namibian courts have began to explicitly act
upon the international law clause of the Namibian Constitution. This provision provides a
platform for the courts to give life, value and substance to the automatic incorporation of
customary international law.
It is submitted, however, that a more and regular judicial activity is necessary if these
norms are to be firmly secured and Article 144 given substantial effect to in Namibian
municipal law in so far as it domestically incorporates customary international law.
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c. International agreements.
According to Article 144 of the Constitution of Namibia "international agreements
binding upon Namibia., shall form part of the law of Namibia." This provision assigns all
international treaties that are binding upon Namibia automatic operation in Namibian
domestic law. It effectively means that national institutions and courts in particular can
directly apply and enforce international treaties that are binding on Namibia if they establish
subjective rights and duties for the individual without having been translated into municipal
law by legislative and other mechanisms to the same effect. It similarly means that such
treaties can be directly relied upon by individuals before national courts and other related
institutions.
The provision, however, raises two main questions. First, when do treaties become
binding on Namibia? Secondly, assuming a treaty becomes binding on Namibia, at what stage
does it become part of Namibian municipal law? These questions require Article 144 to be
reconciled with other provisions of the Constitution especially those concerning Namibia's
participation in international agreements.
As regards the first question, for a treaty to become binding on Namibia, that is, at
international level between Namibia and other states, it would have to comply with the
requirements laid down in the Namibian law particularly the Constitution. Article 32(3)(e) of
the Constitution empowers the President of Namibia to "negotiate and sign international
agreements, and to delegate such power." The meaning of this provision is not entirely clear.
Read in isolation, it conveys the impression that the president can, following negotiation, sign
treaties that enter into force upon signature and bind Namibia without the approval of
parliament. This, however, is not the case because according to Article 63(2)e) of the
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Constitution, the National Assembly of Namibia "shall agree to the ratification of or
accession to international agreements which have been negotiated and signed in terms of
Article 32(3)(e) hereof." Thus for treaties that have been negotiated by the president or his
delegate or representative in terms of Article 32(3)(e) to be binding on Namibia externally
they require parliamentary approval.18 These treaties can only be binding on Namibia
internationally once they have been ratified or acceded to by the Namibian parliament. It is
the Namibian parliament that expresses consent to be bound by treaties on the international
plane.19 In other words, signature of the president or his delegate alone is not sufficient for a
treaty to bind Namibia externally. Additional parliamentary approval is necessary for such a
treaty to bind Namibia in relation to other states which are parties to the treaty.
The second question, that is, regarding when international treaties really become part
of Namibian municipal law depends upon whether a treaty enters into force upon mere
signature or ratification. A treaty that enters into force upon ratification becomes part of
Namibian municipal law as soon as the legislature ratifies it or expresses its consent to be
bound thereby by a resolution in parliament. However, a treaty that enters into force on mere
signature is not automatically part ofNamibian law unless an enabling legislation is passed to
enable it to become part and parcel of Namibian municipal law.20 The signature of the
president or his delegate is not enough to translate it into Namibian law. For it to be part of
Namibian municipal law in terms of Article 144 it requires legislative approval in the form of
an enabling legislation.
It essentially means that although the Namibian international law clause, that is,
Article 144, purports to make all international treaties automatically effective in Namibian
municipal law, it does not completely erode the sovereign power of the Namibian legislative
authority to transform treaties. In fact, provisions similar to the one found in the Constitution
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ofNamibia appear in constitutions of other countries. The interpretation that has been posited
to these provisions is that they do not take away the sovereign power of parliament to enact
treaties into municipal law.21
Moreover, it is submitted that the automatic application of treaties in Namibian
municipal law does not apply to all sorts of treaties irrespective of the nature and purposes of
the treaty(ies) involved. The role of the Namibian parliament to transform treaties, at least in
relation to some categories of treaties, has not been completely withered away. The argument
advanced here is not that Namibia should fall back to the pre-existing legal position in terms
of which all treaties required parliamentary approval. Quite the contrary. The argument is
mainly that a distinction could be made between those treaties requiring legislative
incorporation and those which do not. The obvious example of the treaties requiring
parliamentary approval would be those treaties affecting the liberties and duties of private
citizens. Treaties of this kind would in most cases require legislation to implement them
given that international treaties are largely drafted in vague and general terms. The specific
details on the modes of implementation would require special legislation.22
Thus, although the Namibian international law clause may attract laudable
commendation for making treaties a source ofmunicipal law problems abound as to whether
all treaties of a wide ranging variety should be treated as part of the law of the land. It is
entirely possible that Namibia will continue to ratify and incorporate treaties notwithstanding
Article 144 of the Constitution in order, for instance, to ensure democratic control of the
nation's conduct of its foreign relations and also make possible the implementation of
treaties. It is necessary to distinguish between those treaties which require parliamentary
approval and those which do not.
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In this regard, it is worth noting that even after the Namibian Constitution was
adopted in 1990, Article 144 has been reinforced by Namibia's participation in international
conventions. Despite its relatively few years of over half a decade as an independent State,
Namibia has ratified and acceded to a number of international conventions including human
rights treaties both universal or general and regional. As regards universal or general human
rights treaties, Namibia ratified the United Nations Charter on 23 April 1990. It has also
acceded to the International Covenants of 1966.23 The regional conventions which Namibia
has ratified are the OAU Charter and the SADC Treaty.24
Namibia is also party to several treaties which deal with specific human rights such as
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948, the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1966,
the Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid of 1973, the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979, the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment of 1984, the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, the Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 and the Second
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the Abolition
of the Death Penalty of 1989.25 Moreover, Namibia has acceded to the 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees.26 Namibia has, however, not acceded to the 1967 Protocol
relating to the Status of Refugees or to the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.
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1. The Namibian courts and human rights treaties.
The significance of Article 144 of the Constitution of Namibia in so far as it makes
international agreements (including human rights treaties) part of Namibian municipal law
has received positive confirmation and reinforcement from Namibian courts. It was
reinforced in Kauesa v. Minister ofHome Affairs and Others.21 Commenting on the domestic
status of the ACHPR, the Supreme Court ofNamibia noted that, "The Namibian Government
has, as far as can be formally established recognised the African Charter in accordance with
art 143 read with art 63(2)(d) of the Namibian Constitution. The provisions of the Charter
have therefore become binding on Namibia and form part of the law of Namibia in
accordance with art 143, as read with art 144 of the Namibian Constitution."28 In other words,
according to the Court, Namibia's ratification of the ACHPR meant that it, the ACHPR, was
directly applicable in Namibian national law. It directly created rights and duties for
individuals in municipal law. It could, therefore, be given domestic effect by Namibian
courts.29 Similarly, in Government of the Republic ofNamibia v. Cultura 2000 and Another,
the Namibian Supreme Court emphasised that, "Article 144 of the Constitution sought to give
expression to the intention of the Constitution to make Namibia part of the international
community by providing that... international agreements binding upon Namibia ... shall be
part of the law of Namibia."30
As with customary international law, it is clear that the Namibian judiciary has started
to give domestic effect to the international law clause of the Namibian Constitution in
relation to international agreements. In so doing, the judiciary has affirmed its significance
and role in Namibian national law. Importantly, however, this has only occurred in relatively
few cases. Moreover, no judicial decision has so far attempted to critically analyse Article
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144 of the Namibian Constitution in so far as it makes treaties self-operative in municipal law
in order to define its scope and precise parameters.
It is submitted that the Namibian courts should play a pivotal role in domestically
effectuating Article 144 of the Constitution of Namibia. This clause enables the courts and
similar tribunals to enrich national law especially human rights law and jurisprudence with
international standards. It provides an opportunity for the judiciary to take international
normative standards into account in developing national human rights law.
2. Exceptions to automatic incorporation.
According to Article 144 of the Constitution of Namibia, general rules of public
international law and international agreements form part of the law of Namibia unless
otherwise provided by the Constitution or Act of Parliament. Article 144 creates two main
exceptions to direct and automatic application of customary and treaty rules in Namibian
municipal law: constitutional supremacy and legislative sovereignty.
a. Constitutional supremacy.
Article 144 recognises that automatic and direct application of international law
(including international human rights law), customary and conventional, in Namibian
municipal law may be excluded by the Namibian Constitution itself. A clear and
unambiguous clause in the Constitution of Namibia overrides, or rather limits the direct
operation of international law in municipal law.31 In Kanesa v. Minister ofHome Affairs and
Others, Justice O'linn, commenting on this exception, has aptly observed:32
The specific provisions of the Constitution of Namibia, where specific and
unequivocal, override provisions of international agreements which have become part
ofNamibian law.
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The conditioning of the automatic application of international law (including customary
international human rights law) by the doctrine of constitutional supremacy underscores the
predominant nature of the Constitution of Namibia. It further underlines the significance
attached by the Namibian people to the Constitution as a compact that enshrines their goals
and aspirations.
However, the Constitution does not provide guidelines on how it or a provision
therein may exclude the operation of customary and treaty rules in Namibian municipal law.
This means that all sorts of possible situations may be invoked to exclude the operation of
customary international law and treaties in Namibian municipal law on the basis that the
Constitution provides otherwise. For instance, if an international agreement were in conflict
with the Constitution itself or a clause in the Constitution, then the treaty in question will not
form part of municipal law. Thus if a treaty duly entered into or executed by the relevant
executive authority and confirmed by the Namibian parliament conflicts with the substantive
provisions of the Constitution it will be possible to challenge it in municipal courts. In other
words, an argument would be advanced that since the treaty in question conflicts with some
substantive clause(s) of the Constitution, it is overridden by the Constitution. This
notwithstanding the fact that under international law the treaty is binding on Namibia.33 There
is an example of this situation arising from Ireland. In Christopher McGimpsy and Michael
Mcgimpsey v. Ireland and Others34 it was held that the treaty which was fully binding at
international law could be challenged on the grounds of conflict with a substantive
constitutional provision. But the Court proceeded to warn that such a challenge would not be
lightly entertained by the courts since there is a presumption in favour of the constitutionality
of treaties in particular and international law in general.
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Whether or not the Constitution or provision thereof is in conflict with an
international law rule will depend on each case and the issue will have to be decided by the
Namibian courts.35 Significantly, in effectuating this exception, Namibian courts will have to
bear in mind the responsibility incumbent upon Namibia not to violate its international
obligations especially the protection of individual human rights norms. They will have to
construe Namibian law particularly a constitutional rule so as not to be in conflict with
Namibia's international obligations to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms of its
citizens undertaken under various human rights treaties.
b. Legislative sovereignty.
The new municipal legal order of Namibia also recognises that an act of parliament
may operate to exclude the application of international human rights law in municipal law.
According to Article 144 of the Namibian Constitution, if an Act of Parliament provides
otherwise, the general rules of public international law and international agreements binding
upon Namibia under this Constitution shall not form part of the law of Namibia. This
provision conditions the automatic municipal application of international law (including
international human rights law) on the doctrine of legislative sovereignty.
This exception existed in the pre-existing Namibian legal dispensation and was
endorsed by the Namibian judiciary.36 However, unlike in the previous Namibian law where
legislative sovereignty only excluded the domestic operation of rules of customary
international law, the present Namibian law has extended it also to treaty rules. Article 144
empowers Namibian parliament to pass legislation overriding the direct automatic operation
of international law both customary and conventional in Namibian municipal law.
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Significantly, the provision does not only make the new legal position clearer but it also
elevates Namibian legislative supremacy in this regard to a constitutional status.
The exclusion of automatic application of international law in municipal law by
legislative sovereignty may arise where, for instance, an international law rule embodied
either in a treaty or custom is inconsistent with an Act of Parliament. Under these
circumstances, an Act of Parliament predominates and the operation of an international law
rule in Namibian municipal law is excluded. The legislative sovereignty qualification serves
to underscore the sovereignty of parliament. It signifies the supremacy of the will of the
legislature within Namibian municipal legal sphere.37
As in Botswana and Zimbabwe, by qualifying the incorporation principle with the will
of parliament, it means that the adoption of international law in Namibian municipal law is
not radical but rather cautious. It is a manifestation of a moderate submission to the will of
the international community. The enactment of a statute to exclude a rule of international law
from operating in municipal law may in certain instances amount to an implied opposition to
a rule of international law. Thus, if it is obvious that legislation may operate to exclude a rule
of international law from operating in municipal law, it means that national legislation is
higher in rank. The effect of this ranking would be to lessen the effectiveness of international
law in national law. On the other hand, an unqualified domestic application of international
law seems not to be a preferable option since that would undermine state sovereignty by
allowing rules of international law to operate unsupervised in municipal law ofNamibia.
It is not, however, abundantly clear whether the limitation applies to earlier or later
statutes, or both. It is submitted that as regards earlier statutes which are inconsistent with a
rule of international law binding on Namibia, the effect of Article 144 is to accord
95
international law a predominant position. Statutes falling under this category are superseded
by a rule ofboth customary and conventional international law.
But certainly, a later unambiguous and clear statute duly passed by the Namibian
parliament would override a rule of both customary and conventional international law which
has become part of the law of Namibia. This is in accordance with the lex posterior derogat
priori principle.38 Parliament's intention to violate a rule of international law in question
should be manifestly clear and unequivocal. However, the presumption that the legislature
will not violate the State's obligation in international law will continue to apply. Courts will
have to construe a municipal law provision in order to give domestic effect to Namibia's
international legal obligations.
The rationale for this presumption is that Namibia will in any case remain bound by
its international obligations irrespective of whether or not a treaty provision fails to be given
effect to because of its inconsistency with municipal legislation. A State can not invoke its
municipal law as a defence for inability to perform its international obligations.39 This was
specifically enunciated in the Greco-Bulgarian "Communities" Case in which the Permanent
Court of International Justice noted that "it is a generally accepted principle of international
law that in the relations between Powers who are Contracting Parties to a treaty, the
provisions ofmunicipal law cannot prevail over those of the treaty."40
The important point to note, however, is that the effectiveness of this exception will
depend on the approach of the judiciary. In practice, domestic courts endeavour as much as is
practicable possible to reconcile domestic legislation with a treaty or customary rule in
question with a view to ensure that the international obligation of the State is fulfilled.41 The
intention to repudiate a treaty must be clear and unequivocal although the courts would have
to try and harmonise the treaty with municipal law.42 It is only where it is explicitly clear that
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parliament wanted to disregard international law that the courts have no choice but to apply
legislation. They would not allow their own predilections to supersede legislative will.
It is submitted that, although these exceptions ensure that international law should not
have an absolute and unregulated operation in Namibian national law, their net effect is to
limit the role of international law (including international human rights law) both customary
and conventional in municipal law. They weaken the effectiveness of Namibia's newly
adopted monist approach to the inter-relation between international law and national law.
Also, they demonstrate Namibia's cautious approach of according international law a firm
place and function in its municipal law.
3. Conclusion.
The extant Namibian legal order has fundamentally improved and enhanced the
domestic status and role of international law (including international human rights law). A
constitutional strategy has been adopted to directly incorporate customary and treaty rules
into municipal law of Namibia. These rules do not only enjoy statute-like effect in Namibian
municipal law, they have also been accorded a constitutional status. This device makes
Namibian municipal law international law friendly. It enhances unity and interaction between
the two legal regimes. It also makes international law more effective in municipal law.
Individuals can invoke and rely directly on international norms before national institutions:
national courts and other bodies with similar trappings, under acceptable limitations. There is
a recognition of individuals not only as objects but also as subjects of international law
capable of claiming human rights norms independently of the State ofNamibia.
Thus Namibia has embraced a monist approach in its domestic treatment of both
customary and treaty rules. As regards customary international law, Namibia has not altered
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the previous legal position. Customary international law is directly applicable in municipal
law. The domestic position of treaties on the other hand has been fundamentally changed.
Unlike in the pre-existing law where treaties were governed by traditional dualist theory,
under the new 1990 legal dispensation, they are regulated by monism. This theory implies
that it is not necessary to legislatively incorporate treaties into municipal law of Namibia.
They are self-executing. It seeks to erode the power of parliament to transform treaties.
However, if the Namibian international law clause is reconciled with other constitutional
provisions especially those on the powers of the president and parliament of Namibia in
relation to treaties, it is clear that treaties especially those which come into force on signature
require parliamentary ratification in order to be part of the Namibian law. Moreover, Namibia
will continue to ratify and incorporate certain kinds of treaties notwithstanding Article 144.
Some treaties particularly human rights treaties require legislation that is sufficiently clear in
order to implement them in national law. Therefore, Article 144 does not completely displace
the transformation theory requiring treaties, or certain category of treaties to be internally
legislated.
It also emerges from Article 144 that the automatic application of international law in
Namibian law is not absolute. It can be excluded by the Constitution or statute. These are the
only recognised exceptions to, and limitations upon, automatic incorporation of international
law into Namibian law. They have displaced the act of state doctrine and stare decisis rule
which, under the pre-existing law were also recognised as capable of excluding the domestic
operation of customary international law. The abandonment of these exceptions raises
problems especially for the judiciary and executive. First, the stare decisis rule is a significant
aspect of any legal system especially the one with common law attributes such as Namibia.
Namibian lower courts would have to follow precedent of higher courts even where their
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decisions are in conflict with a rule of international law especially customary international
law. Similarly, there are certain matters with respect to which the executive arm of
government should have a final say. A typical example is national security. However, given
the proactiveness ofNamibian national law to international law the courts would reasonably
be expected to reconcile the international obligations of Namibia with these two rules and
ensure that they effectuate the former.
It is submitted that the Namibian constitutional strategy is an attractive and most
preferable mode of incorporating international law (including international human rights law)
into domestic law. It ensures clarity, certainty and predictability. Most significantly, as
supreme law of the land, the Constitution commands universal national respect. Moreover, as
a social compact, it would not be easily disregarded and whimsically tampered with in order
to reduce the effectiveness of international law in municipal law.
It is, however, important to note that Namibian courts have yet to reinforce the
significance of Article 144 in Namibian law. This clause in particular and international law,
customary and conventional, in general have been discussed in comparatively few and
isolated cases. They have only been referred to incidentally in cases dealing with the
interpretation of the human rights provisions of the constitution. Thus Namibian courts have
not internalised the Namibian monist theory. It is submitted that municipal courts should
adopt a positive and proactive attitude towards international law generally so as to accord it a
firm ground in municipal law. This approach further gives additional impetus and force to the
newly adopted Namibia's monist theory.
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It has been demonstrated in chapter four that Namibia's post independence legal order
has embraced a monist theory on the relationship between international law and national law.
This chapter examines the extent to which this theory has been observed in the post-
independence legal dispensation in the enforcement of human rights norms. The human rights
norms embodied in a constitutionally entrenched Bill of Rights are juxtaposed with similar
norms in major international human rights instruments in order to examine whether, in line
with the monist theory, the national human rights norms reflect international standards for the
protection of such norms.
In the process, the study examines the extent, if any, to which the Namibian judiciary
has domestically effectuated the monist theory when dealing with human rights issues
particularly by having recourse to international human rights law. The analysis concentrates
on those human rights norms where the theory has, explicitly or implicitly, arisen and
demonstrates that in actual practice the monist theory has been compromised. The emphasis
is not so much on Namibia's compliance with or implementation of international human
rights law. Rather, it is on the process of translating this law into municipal law ofNamibia.
1. Limitations on the monist theory,
a. The right to life.
The right to life is fully entrenched in international law. Article 3 of the UDHR
guarantees everyone the right to life. Under Article 6 of the ICCPR, every human being has
the inherent right to life. These clauses are analogous to, and widened by, Article 4 of the
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ACHPR. According to this clause, human beings are inviolable and entitled to respect for
their life. These instruments recognise the right to life as inherent in human beings. It is the
supreme and inviolable human right norm. It is non-derogable and should be protected at all
times. Without its effective guarantee, all other human rights are devoid ofmeaning.1 Further,
the right to life is not a negative right targeted solely at the State. This right calls for positive
measures to ensure its protection. According to Nowak, "the right to life has been deemed jus
cogens under international law."2
The right to life is similarly recognised and protected in municipal law of Namibia.
Article 6 of the Constitution provides that "The right to life shall be respected and
protected."3 However, unlike the international human rights instruments, this clause does not
give expression to the natural-law basis of the right to life as an inherent and inalienable right.
Nevertheless, as with international human rights instruments, it protects this right in
mandatory terms and more positively. Moreover, Article 6 protects the right to life absolutely.
It recognises this right as a non-derogable right. This article corresponds generally to
international law and particularly Article 4(2) of the ICCPR.
It is, however, worth noting that in terms of the ACHPR, the right to life may be
limited. Article 4 thereof provides that "..No one may be arbitrarily deprived of this right."
This clause, although phrased slightly differently, resembles, in content, Article 2(1) of the
ECHR which while recognising that everyone's right to life shall be respected, proceeds to
declare that no one shall be deprived of life intentionally. Both instruments do not accord the
right to life absolute protection. It may be limited by law provided the limitation is not
arbitrary or intentional. The ACHPR does not define what amounts to arbitrary deprivation of
life. This contrasts with the ECHR, which indicates instances under which life may be
intentionally taken. This may occur, for instance, pursuant to a sentence of the court, in self-
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defence, defence of property and in lawful arrest or prevention of escape of persons lawfully
detained or in action lawfully taken to quell the riot or insurrection.4 These limitations are
designed to ensure legality should the right to life be threatened. They are intended to
guarantee procedural fairness.
The requirement of legality in limiting the right to life has been underscored by the
Human Rights Committee. According to the Committee, the right to life includes the right not
to take someone's life arbitrarily. This right imposes a duty on State authorities to regulate
and limit circumstances in which life may be taken away including lawlessness and in the
case of life taken by law enforcement officials to ascertain the facts and to bring the culprits
to justice and if need be pay compensation.5 The duty to respect the right to life is also
imposed on private individuals and groups. Commenting on the right to life clause of the
ACHPR, Article 4, Umozurike has said "The respect for life calls for obligations, not just on
states but on groups and individuals as well. All other rights are contingent on the right to
life; one has to be alive to benefit from them."6 Moreover, security and similar forces have a
duty to respect the right to life. Thus in Free Legal Assistance Group et al v. Zaire1 the
African Commission on Human and People's Rights (hereafter the African Commission) held
that practices such as extra-judicial executions by members of the security forces contravene
Article 4 of the ACHPR.
The basic importance of the right to life in Namibia has been underlined in S v.
Tcoeib% The accused was convicted on two counts of murder and sentenced to two terms of
life imprisonment. He lodged an appeal to the Supreme Court of Namibia arguing, inter alia,
that the sentence of life imprisonment effectively amounted to death sentence and was
therefore unconstitutional. Commenting on Article 6, the Court emphasised the fact that
Article 6 incorporates the basic guarantees of the right to life. This right is immutable.
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Significantly, the Court invoked universal human rights standards to interpret Article 6. It
observed that it "must have regard to the 'contemporary norms, aspirations, expectations,
sensitivities, moral standards, relevant established beliefs, social conditions, experiences and
perceptions of the Namibian people as expressed in their institutions and Constitution', as
well as the consensus of values or 'emerging consensus of values' in the civilised
international community."9
It is submitted that the reasoning of the Court is sound. By utilising international
human rights norms to buttress its decision in addition to national law and comparative
national jurisprudence from South Africa and the United States of America, it avoided
adopting a narrow approach to the interpretation of Article 6 of the Constitution. This
approach is in line with Namibia's monist theory. It is authorised by Article 144 of the
Constitution ofNamibia. It gives additional impetus to the Court's decision.
To underscore the significance of the right to life, Namibia has abolished the death
penalty in its municipal law. Article 6 provides, in part, that ".. No law may prescribe death as
a competent sentence. No Court or tribunal shall have the power to impose a sentence of
death upon any person. No executions shall take place in Namibia."10 This clause is a blanket
outlawing of the death penalty in Namibian legal order. As Cottrell has observed, the
outlawing of the death penalty "makes Namibia very unusual in Africa."11 In fact, Namibia is
a minority country within the international community in adopting the absolutist approach
with respect to the abolition of the death sentence. Importantly, Namibia fulfils its obligation
under the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR aiming at the abolition of the Death
Penalty whose Article 1(1) categorically provides, "No one within the jurisdiction of a State
party to the present Protocol shall be executed."12 However, this treaty provides for an
exception to the abolition of the death penalty in relation to war crimes. The death penalty is
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reserved for individuals who commit war crimes. In contradistinction to this convention, the
Namibian Constitution is unconditional in its abolition of the death penalty. This sentence is
absolutely prohibited.
Thus, by and large, Article 6 of the Constitution of Namibia, despite variation in
formulation, is in line with international human rights instruments by protecting the right to
life absolutely and mandatorily. It lends support to the monist theory by merely replicating
international normative standards for the protection of the inalienable right to life. The
difference in its formulation emphasises that the scope of this fundamental norm varies from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
The abolition of capital punishment in Namibia has brought the penalty of life
imprisonment into the foreground, albeit, with some controversy. The question has revolved
around whether life imprisonment itself amount to a death sentence? At the inception of the
abolition of the death penalty in 1990 following the adoption of the Constitution ofNamibia,
courts decisions on the issue were inconsistent. In the fore-cited Tcoeib case the appellant
contended that a sentence of life imprisonment was, in effect, a sentence of death hence
unconstitutional according to Article 6. The High Court of Namibia held that life
imprisonment was not a sentence of death as envisaged by Article 6 of the Constitution. But
in State v. Nehemia Tjijo, the Court held that life imprisonment effectively amounted to the
death sentence.13 Notwithstanding, the Namibian courts have in recent cases imposed life
imprisonment stressing that Article 6 refers only to the death sentence as understood in its
ordinary meaning.14 It is submitted that this is the correct construction of Article 6. To hold
otherwise would amount to a dilution of a clear and otherwise straightforward provision.
However, it is significant to observe that in most of these cases, the Court interpreted
Article 6 purely on the basis of Namibian law and jurisprudence. It did not reinforce its
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decision by reference to the protection of the right to life in international law in line with the
adopted monist theory. It is submitted that these cases presented an opportunity for the Court
to invoke and use international norms on the protection of the right to life to interpret Article
6 in order to underscore the commitment of the judiciary toward Namibia's newly adopted
monist theory. The utilisation of these norms also complements the international law clause,
that is, Article 144 of the Constitution ofNamibia.
b. Personal liberty.
Personal liberty is elaborated under major human rights treaties. Under Article 3 of
the UDHR everyone has the right to liberty and security of persons. This article is analogous
to Article 9(1) of the ICCPR. But, additionally, the ICCPR prohibits subjection of anyone to
arbitrary arrest or detention or the deprivation of liberty except in accordance with the
procedure established by law. The ICCPR further improves upon the UDHR by requiring that
arrested person should be informed, at the time of his arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and
of the charges against him,15 brought promptly before court and be tried within a reasonable
time16 and if the arrest is proved to be unlawful should have an enforceable right to
compensation.17 Article 9 is similar to Article 6 of the ACHPR although the latter is broadly
framed and does not spell out in greater detail the essential elements of the right to liberty.
These provisions are complemented by Article 5 of the ECHR.
Similarly, personal liberty is reflected in the Constitution of Namibia. Article 7
thereof stipulates generally that "no persons shall be deprived of personal liberty except
according to procedures established by law." It is amplified by Article 11 which enshrines
principles of freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention in detail. According to paragraphs 2
and 4 thereof, these principles include the detainee's entitlement to be informed of the
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grounds of arrest in the language that he understands and the right to be brought to court
within forty-eight hours of the arrest or as is reasonably possible.
Articles 7 and 11 introduce into Namibian national law the international normative
standards for the protection of personal liberty. In fact, Article 11 of the Namibian
Constitution corresponds more closely to the respective Articles 9 and 5 of the ICCPR and
the ECHR than other instruments by providing in detail the prerequisites of personal liberty.
Thus as with international instruments, Namibian protective clauses recognise an arrested or
detained person entitlement to physical liberty.18 The safeguard applies to arrest or detention
on any ground, not just in relation to criminal proceedings. For instance, in the fore-cited
Free Legal Assistance Group et al v. Zaire the African Commission held that the indefinite
detention of individuals who protested against torture was contrary to Article 6 of the
ACHPR protecting the right to personal liberty. This right constitutes the most basic
protection that any person arrested or detained is entitled to know the reasons, that is, the
essential legal and factual grounds for his arrest. The safeguard constitutes the most important
protection in a democratic society.19
Personal liberty was a subject of discussion by the High Court ofNamibia in Djama v.
Government of the Republic ofNamibia.20 The applicant, who had been born in Somalia but
claimed to be entitled to Namibian citizenship by virtue of his father having been born in
Namibia and who had entered Namibia on 29 October 1990 under the auspices of the United
Nations High Commission for Refugees as a returnee, had been arrested on 31 January 1992
under Section 5 of the Admission of Persons to the Republic ofNamibia Regulation Act No.
59 of 1972. He was detained for approximately two weeks pending deportation without being
brought to court. He made an urgent habeas corpus application to the High Court ofNamibia
seeking his immediate release from detention. The issue was whether the detention for two
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weeks without being brought to court within a reasonable time violated Article 11 of the
Constitution ofNamibia prohibiting arbitrary arrest and detention.
The Court was thus asked to determine whether the period of detention in question
was unreasonable within Article 11. Significantly, in doing so, the Court did not only rely on
Namibian jurisprudence. It also invoked and utilised both universal and regional international
human rights instruments. As regards the latter, Muller, A .J., noted that "The ultimate issue to
be decided was whether the applicant's detention was arbitrary and whether he should be
released or not. The right of liberty is a right which features in most instruments of human
rights, whether regional or international. In Namibia it is embodied in the Constitution..."21
The Court then held that two weeks detention was unreasonably long and thus contrary to
Article 11 of the Constitution ofNamibia. The Court also observed that to require a person to
be detained until such time as the machinery of Government to facilitate his deportation was
in place could not be considered reasonable.
Clearly, the international instruments referred to by the Court constituted, in part, the
basis of its decision. Reference to these instruments firmly endorsed Namibia's monist
theory. It underlined the significance of the international sources in the protection of the right
to personal liberty in Namibian national law. However, the Court could have been more
positive and specific with respect to the regional and international instruments that it was
relying on in order to make it abundantly clear which instruments influenced it to hold that
two weeks detention was unreasonably long.
Personal liberty was also an issue in S v. MbahapaThe appellant was arrested on 11
July 1990 and charged with housebreaking. He was subjected to pre-trial custody. On the 17
July 1990 he escaped from prison. He was re-arrested and brought to court on 26 July 1990
on another charge of escaping from lawful custody. The housebreaking charge was
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withdrawn. On a charge of escaping from lawful custody, the accused averred that he had
escaped to avoid assaults by his captors. The Magistrate, however, convicted and sentenced
him to twelve months imprisonment. On appeal to the High Court, the appellant argued, inter
alia, that at the time of his arrest he was no longer in lawful detention and custody. Therefore,
his arrest was irregular and accordingly he was entitled to escape.
The Court construed Article 11(3) in order to determine whether the appellant arrest
was irregular. It held that from the time he was arrested on 11 July 1990 until his escape from
prison, the accused had not been in lawful custody and his escape was justified. In arriving at
this conclusion, the Court relied on comparative national decisions particularly from South
Africa and Zimbabwe such as Minister ofHome Affairs v. Bickle.
It is clear that while the Court in Djama v. Government of the Republic ofNamibia,
reinforced its decision with international human rights instruments in concluding that two
weeks in custody was unreasonable and hence contrary to Article 11, in 5 v. Mbahapa, no
reference was made at all to international human rights law and sources in interpreting the
right to personal liberty. The Court interpreted Article 11(3) mainly on national jurisprudence
and comparative national decisions. It is submitted that the Court in S v. Mbahapa could also
have easily buttressed its decision with international human rights norms in the same way as
it did with respect to comparative national jurisprudence. It has a constitutional mandate to do
so. This approach gives domestic effect to Namibia's monist approach to international law. It
provides an additional international human rights law dimension to the decision of the Court.
c. Fair trial.
The immutable guarantees of a fair trial entail all the necessary safeguards and
minimum acceptable standards of justice designed to afford the individual due process of
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law.23 In this regard, Article 10 of the UDHR affords everyone "full equality to a fair and
public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal." Article 11(1) thereof proclaims that
"everyone charged with an offence is entitled to be presumed innocent until proved guilty
according to law in a public trial at which he has all the guarantees necessary for his defence."
These safeguards are replicated and amplified in a detailed and an all-embracing Article 14 of
the ICCPR. But, additionally, Article 14 protects the right to legal representation, to cross-
examine witnesses, to speedy trial, against self-incrimination and autrefois acquit, and
autrefois convict. This clause is analogous to Article 6 of the ECHR and Article 7 of the
ACHPR.
At the domestic level, fair trial guarantees have been embraced by Article 12 of the
Constitution ofNamibia. Paragraph (1) of this clause enshrines the right to a fair and public
hearing by an independent, impartial and competent court, trial within a reasonable time, the
right to a public trial, presumption of innocence, the right to legal counsel and protection
against autrefois convict and autrefois acquit. This clause is in line with international
instruments. As with international instruments, it reveals most of the standards terms evolved
for the protection of the right to a fair hearing.
The prime aim of fair trial guarantees is the protection of the individual interest in
fundamental justice, legal certainty and the interest of the accused. These protections are
especially crucial in situation where an individual is already at odds with the State and totally
subjected to its powers.24
In examining how the laudable concept of a fair trial has been or is being effectuated
in practical terms in municipal law of Namibia and the extent to which the judiciary has
invoked and relied upon international human rights law to interpret it, it is significant to
underline that this concept encapsulates a number of safeguards.
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1. Reasonable time.
Two clauses in the Constitution of Namibia specifically protect trial within a
reasonable time.25 Article 12(l)(b) thereof requires trial to take place within a reasonable time
failing which the accused should be released. Article 11(3) demands that an arrested person
should "be brought before the nearest Magistrate or other judicial officer within a period of
forty-eight hours of his arrest or, if this is not reasonably possible, as soon as possible
thereafter.."26 This clause enshrines the safeguard more clearly and positively by designating
a specific number of hours, forty-eight, after which a person must be brought before a
Magistrate or judicial officer.
Significantly, both clauses ensure minimum delay in the determination of the legality
of the arrested person. The problematic issue concerns the guiding rule in determining
whether trial should take place within a reasonable time. When does a trial fall outside
reasonable time to constitute a breach of Article 12(l)(b)? Moreover, what is the effect of
delay in trying the accused? The international human rights instruments do not shed any light
on what this concept entails. It would seem that some element of systemic delays may be
expected and are acceptable. Swift justice may equally breed injustice. What is objectionable
is unreasonable or inordinate delays. Whether or not the delay is unreasonable depends on the
circumstances of each particular case. These circumstances were recounted in Barker v.
Wingo to include the nature, seriousness and complexity of the case, and prejudice to the
accused.27 Moreover, some authorities suggest that the attitude and conduct of the criminal
justice actors is also a relevant factor.28 Reasonableness in this context is thus a vague and
amorphous concept.
The issue of a speedy trial in Namibia was raised in S v. Amujekela.29 The accused was
convicted of contempt of court and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The Court record
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indicated that before he was convicted, the case had been postponed six times while he was in
prison for six months. On review by the High Court, Justice Frank noted that to allow an
accused to languish away in custody, basically at the hands of the Prosecutor-General, cannot
be countenanced. It is contrary to Article 12(l)(b) of the Constitution. The Court ordered that
the accused be acquitted and discharged.
While it is demonstrably clear that the High Court gave substance to the Namibian
protective clause on trial within a reasonable time, it is also clear that its decision was based
mainly on Namibian municipal law particularly Article 12(1 )(b) of the Constitution. It is,
therefore, not entirely clear whether the circumstances which constitute the basis for a
determination of whether delays are inordinate or not relate to objective international
standards or the local conditions prevalent in Namibia. Of course, the S v. Amujekela case
was concerned only with local conditions and obviously to insist upon the international
standards where the local circumstances do not meet the international standards required may
be problematic. Yet, local standards need not be used to justify failure to accord an accused
constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy trial or trial within a reasonable.
Trial within a reasonable time was also an issue in the fore-cited S v. Mbahapa. One
of the appellant's grounds of appeal was that following his arrest and detention on 11 July
1990 on a charge of housebreaking, he was not brought before a judicial officer within a
period of forty-eight hours or as soon as reasonably possible. The Court noted that the
determination of what was possible or reasonably possible had to be judged in the light of all
the prevailing circumstances in any particular case, account having to be taken of such factors
as the availability of a magistrate, police power, transport, but certainly not of convenience of
the police. Relying on comparative national decisions particularly from South Africa and
Zimbabwe, the Court found that in all the circumstances the appellant could have been
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brought before a judicial officer as soon as possible and ordered his immediate release.
However, as in S v. Amujekela, the Court did not also make reference to international human
rights standards and sources to buttress its decision.
2. Independent and impartial court or tribunal.
The fundamental protection of trial by an independent and impartial court or tribunal
in Namibian municipal law is found in Article 12(l)(a) of the Constitution. This clause
declares that "In the determination of their civil rights and obligations or any criminal charges
against them, all persons shall be entitled to a fair..hearing by an independent, impartial and
competent Court or Tribunal established by law."30 The additional requirement that a tribunal
should be competent implies that a tribunal should be able to take legally binding decisions.
This fundamental protection is a basic feature of the notion of natural justice. In all
proceedings whether civil or criminal or whether an ordinary court or a disciplinary or other
special tribunal an individual is entitled to be heard by an independent, impartial and
competent court or tribunal. The protection ensures that an individual must be afforded his
day in court by a fair tribunal. Thus, Article 12(1 )(a) incorporates the universal notion of a
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal or court into municipal law ofNamibia.
Article 12(l)(a) enshrines two main overlapping safeguards. First, judicial
independence. This concept primarily means independence of the courts or tribunals in the
sense of the doctrine of separation of powers. It relates essentially to the tribunals
organisation and their relationship to the executive. Tribunals especially courts must be
independent from the executive, the parties to the case and outside forces, and must offer
procedural guarantees. They must, in practice, be free from control, undue influence or
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manipulation by the executive or legislature.31 Judicial independence is the hallmark of a fair
hearing.
Judicial independence is ensured under Namibian municipal law. First, the
appointment of judges. Judicial appointment is governed by Article 82 of the Constitution.
Under paragraph (1) thereof, all appointments of judges to the Supreme Court and the High
Court are made by the President on recommendation of an independent Judicial Service
Commission. According to Article 85(1) of the Constitution, the Judicial Service
Commission shall comprise the Chief Justice, a judge appointed by the President, the
Attorney-General and two other additional members from the legal profession. Secondly,
judges are guaranteed security of tenure of sixty-five.32 Thirdly, should it become necessary
to remove the judge from office, either for misconduct or inability to discharge his/her
functions, a tribunal, one member of which must be, have held the position of, a judge is
appointed to investigate him/her and makes the necessary recommendation to the President.33
The strict procedures and mechanisms ensure the independence of judges. They make the
removal ofjudges from office difficult thereby ensuring their independence.
Article 12(l)(a) has further been fortified by Article 78(2) of the Namibian
Constitution. This clause commands that "the Courts shall be independent and subject only to
this Constitution and the Law of Namibia." Paragraph (3) further states that "No member of
the Cabinet or the Legislature or any other person shall interfere with Judges or judicial
officers in the exercise of their judicial functions, and all organs of the State shall accord such
assistance as the Courts may require to protect their independence, dignity and effectiveness,
subject to the terms of this Constitution or any other law." This clause places an injunction on
anybody from undermining the independence of the judiciary subject only to the Constitution
and the law ofNamibia. It embodies a crucial and more secure safeguard.
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Article 78(2) and (3) in particular and judicial independence in general were points of
contention in S v. Heita and Another/4 The accused were charged with treason. It so
happened that the trial judge, Justice O'Linn, had previously been involved in a similar case
in which he convicted and sentenced three other people to a term of imprisonment. The case
engendered public demonstrations. The demonstrators accused the judge of being pro-
SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organisation) ruling party and calling for his dismissal,
resignation and even arrest. At the commencement of the proceedings in this case, the judge
adjudicated, mero motu, on the question whether he should recuse himself from continuing
with trial because he considered the accusations relevant not only to the trial, but also to the
future functioning of the judiciary. According to Justice O'Linn, the campaign for his
dismissal amounted to an assault on and attack, not only to his independence, dignity and
effectiveness referred to in Article 78(3) of the Constitution, but also of those of his fellow
judges, including the Attorney-General and the Prosecutor-General.
Relying purely on Article 78(2), Justice O'Linn unequivocally observed that the
prohibition against interference with judges and judicial officers is not restricted to members
of the legislature and executive. It also extends to each and every person including pressure
groups. Further, according to Justice O'Linn, it is not only the independence of the judges
that must be protected, but their dignity and effectiveness. Finally, the judge found no basis to
recuse himself. Moreover, both the defence and the State expressed confidence in him.
It is clear that the Court gave the concept ofjudicial independence a broad and liberal
interpretation. It gave substance to the principle of judicial independence in Namibian
national law. The rationale for this sacrosanct safeguard is to ensure that judges perform
effectively their onerous functions as protectors of human rights of the individual and
guarantors of a fair trial.
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Secondly, is the concept of impartiality. This concept entails two main sub-rules: the
rule against bias (nemo judex in causa sua) and the right to be heard (audi alteram partem
rule). The latter rule requires that the accused be given the opportunity of being heard.
Consequently, trial in absentia may constitute violation of human rights if the accused is
unaware that criminal proceedings against him have been initiated or sentence handed down,
or if he is excluded from the proceedings. Article 12(l)(a) of the Constitution ofNamibia is,
however, silent on the issue of trial in absentia. It does not expressly protects individuals
against trials in absentia.
The more problematic of these rules is the rule against bias. This rule dictates that the
tribunal should not have an interest in the proceedings or be biased against one of the parties
thereon.35 The significance of this rule was underlined in the Lesotho case of Elliot
Mochochoko v. Regina,36 The accused was charged with theft by conversion. He appeared
before the Magistrate who was also a District Commissioner in the District wherein the
offence was committed. He made a successful application for the Magistrate to recuse himself
from the case. The Court noted that the test is not actual bias. Rather, it is whether from the
point of view of a reasonable person, the appellant was afforded a fair trial. It is based on the
notion that justice must not only be done, but must manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be
done.
Judicial impartiality has yet to be an issue in Namibian courts especially the rule
against bias. In view of the willingness of the Namibian courts to uphold human rights norms,
it can reasonably be expected that they will likewise protect the impartiality of Namibian
judges. The only problem is whether in doing that, the courts will seek guidance from




Article 12(l)(e) of the Namibian Constitution declares that "all persons shall be
afforded adequate time and facilities for the preparation and presentation of their defence,
before the commencement of and during their trial, and shall be entitled to be defended by a
legal practitioner of their choice."37 In line with international instruments, this clause
mandatorily entitles all persons adequate time and facilities to present their defence. It is
every individuals primary and unrestricted basic right to defend themselves at a trial. If they
cannot represent themselves, they should be afforded legal counsel. They should choose their
own counsel. They should not be compelled to be represented by legal counsel not of their
choice.38
Several provisions in the Constitution reinforce Article 12(l)(e). According to Article
25(2) of the Constitution, aggrieved persons who claim that a fundamental right or freedom
has been infringed or threatened may apply to the Ombudsman for legal assistance or advice
who at his or her discretion shall grant such request. Further, according to Article 95(h), one
of the principles of State Policy is the promotion of justice on the basis of equal opportunity
by providing free legal aid in defined cases with due regard to the resources of the State.
However, these additional safeguards have been watered down. First, provision of legal
assistance or advice under Article 25(2) is the discretion of the Ombudsman. Secondly, in
Article 95(h) legal assistance depends on availability of resources. The more limited the
resources, the less effective is this protection. Moreover, free legal assistance remains a State
policy but not a right.
The right to legal counsel is an important safeguard in the concept of a fair trial
especially in criminal proceedings in the Namibian set up. The vast majority of the population
is illiterate and, most significantly, they do not understand the official language of the courts
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which is English. This makes it all the more necessary for them to be afforded legal counsel
to ensure that they receive effective legal defence. This right guarantees effective protection
of the rights of the defence. Any hindrance therewith may amount to breach of this right.39
In practice, however, the Government of Namibia provides free legal assistance
particularly for serious cases such as murder and manslaughter. In other cases, this right is
limited where the accused cannot afford high legal fees. However, the Legal Assistance
Centre, a non-Govemmental Organisation based in Windhoek, whose responsibility involves,
inter alia, human rights education assists most individuals who cannot afford lawyers' fees. It
too operates under severe financial constraints.
The issue that has pre-occupied Namibian judiciary is whether the courts have a
general duty to inform the accused of the right to legal representation. This was the sticking
point in the fore-cited S v. Mbahapa case where the appellant, who was arraigned before a
Magistrate Court on housebreaking and escape from lawful custody charges, complained,
inter alia, that he had not been afforded a fair hearing because the presiding Magistrate failed
to apprise him of his right to legal counsel. He argued that the right was meaningless if he
was unaware of its existence. The question, therefore, turned on whether the Magistrate was
duty bound to inform the accused of his right to legal representation.
The High Court of Namibia examined the effect of Article 12(l)(e) on unrepresented
accused. It noted that in every case where the accused is unrepresented the magistrate must
inform him of his right to be legally represented. However, the Court further observed that
failure to inform the accused of this right does not necessarily amount to failure of justice
which results in nullification of the proceedings. It depends on the facts of each case and the
accused's own knowledge of his right. After citing with approval a quotation from the South
African decision in S v. Mabaso and Another on the same issue, the Court, per Hannah, A.J.,
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said, "The logic in this passage seems to me unassailable. If an accused knows that he has a
right to be legally represented but chooses not to be, what possible failure ofjustice can occur
if the presiding Magistrate fails to tell him what he already knows.."40 The Court found that
failure to inform the accused of his right to legal counsel occasioned him no prejudice and
decided not to interfere with the conviction on this ground. However, the Court did not state
how the authorities are to determine the accused's knowledge of this right, the standard of
such a determination and whether such a determination should take account of, inter alia,
international human rights law. In fact, no reference was made at all to international human
rights law notwithstanding the fact that Article 144 of the Constitution ofNamibia enjoins the
Court to have recourse to this law.
The duty of the presiding Magistrate to inform individuals charged with a criminal
offence of their right to legal counsel was also an issue in S v. Mwambazi.4' The appellant was
charged with fraud. The presiding Magistrate convicted and sentenced him for twelve months
imprisonment. One of the grounds of appeal was that the appellant had not been informed of
the right to legal representation. The Court, per Levy, J., held that the Magistrate was duty
bound to inform the accused of his right to legal representation especially where the charge
against him is serious. Failure to do so amounted to an regularity which vitiated the
proceedings. The Court quashed the conviction and set aside the sentence.
It is submitted that the reasoning of the court in both cases is indeed sound. The court
is under a legal obligation to inform the accused of the right to legal representation especially
where he/she is unrepresented and is facing a serious charge. This facility ensures that the
accused is accorded an effective legal defence. However, as in S v. Mbahapa case, the Court
in S v. Mwambazi did not buttress its reasoning with international human rights norms and
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sources. It based its decision mainly on Article 12(l)(e) of the Constitution, national
jurisprudence and comparative national judicial pronouncements.
4. Public trial.
The right to a public trial is recognised and protected by Article 12(l)(a) of the
Constitution of Namibia.42 This clause provides that "..all persons shall be entitled to a fair
and public hearing.." This protection is broad enough to cover the conduct of proceedings and
the announcements of decisions in public. According to the European Court ofHuman Rights
(hereafter ECtHR) the right to a public trial also implies a right to oral hearing at the trial
court level.43
In line with international human rights instruments, the right to a public hearing may,
however, be limited, where, for instance, it is waived by the applicant provided the waiver is
done in an unequivocal manner and there is no important public interest consideration calling
for the public to be present.44 Further, under Namibian municipal law, as with international
instruments, the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest
ofmorals, public order or national security or where publicity would prejudice the interest of
justice or if necessary in a democratic society.45 Moreover, under Article 12(l)(c) of the
Namibian Constitution the right may be excluded to protect "juvenile persons." This
restriction is meant to protect the welfare of vulnerable young persons. Generally, these
limitations are reasonable for the protection of the society at large. They do not diverge from
international human rights standards. They serve a significant societal interest.
The concept of public trial arose in Vaatz v. Law Society ofNamibiaf The applicant,
a legal practitioner, was accused by the Law Society of Namibia with unprofessional conduct
in that she had published an article in the Namibian newspapers soliciting for clients. The
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Law Society instituted disciplinary proceedings against her in terms of sections 71 and 72 of
the Attorneys Act of Namibia. The proceedings were conducted in camera. The issue was
whether the decision of the Council of the Namibian Law Society to conduct a disciplinary
hearing in camera contravened Article 12(l)(a) of the Namibian Constitution guaranteeing a
public trial.
Relying on the South African decision in Hassim v. Incorporated Law Society of
Natal, the High Court of Namibia interpreted the right to a public hearing narrowly and
restrictively, and held that this right envisages only criminal, but not disciplinary,
proceedings. In the Court's view, the proceedings in question were not criminal and could
appropriately be conducted in camera. This notwithstanding the fact that the Court referred to
ECHR. It noted that "Article 12 is similar to art 6(1) of ...the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Rome, 4 November 1950) and was
probably inspired thereby."47 It is contended that in line with Namibia's monist approach, the
Court should have seized the golden opportunity and utilised this convention to interpret
Article 12 broadly and liberally to include disciplinary proceedings. This approach would
also be in line with the human rights spirit of the Constitution ofNamibia. It enables the court
to rely on international human rights standards to reinforce the protection of the right to a
public trial at the national level.
It is further submitted that the narrow approach adopted by the Court has the adverse
effect of limiting the effectiveness of the right to a public trial in national law of Namibia. It
is significant that proceedings including disciplinary hearings should be held in public. Public
trial guarantee contributes to the maintenance ofpublic confidence in the judiciary and indeed
disciplinary tribunals. It ensures protection of litigants from secret administration of justice
with no public scrutiny.
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From the fore-going, it is evidently clear that except for minor differences in form, the
substantive content of Namibia's fair trial clause reflects international human rights
standards. It recognises the main international standards embodied in due process guarantees
such as everyone's right to speedy trial, an independent and impartial tribunal or court, public
trial, trial in the language understood by the accused and legal counsel. The Namibian clause
incorporates these principles into Namibian municipal law and gives effect to Namibia's
monist approach to the interaction between international law and municipal law. However, it
is also evident that the Namibian courts have not correspondingly given effect to this theory
when enforcing fair trial safeguards embodied in the Constitution. They have enforced these
guarantees mainly and narrowly on the basis of Namibian municipal law. The Namibian
courts have had recourse to Article 144 and human rights treaties and instruments in
particular and international law in general only in few cases. This attitude has reduced the
practical usefulness of international norms in the enforcement of fair trial guarantees in
Namibian municipal law. It has compromised Namibia's monist approach to international
law.
d. Torture and inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment.
The basic safeguard against torture and inhuman or degrading punishment or
treatment relates to the protection of the physical and spiritual dignity of the individual. These
practices occupy a prominent position in international law. The prominence of these practices
in international law is underscored by the fact that not only have they been made non-
derogable in the universal and regional conventions and instruments, but they also constitute
customary international law.48 Article 5 of the UDHR categorically proclaims that "no one
shall be subjected to torture, or cruel and inhuman treatment or punishment." A comparable
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prohibition is entrenched in Article 7 of the ICCPR, which, additionally, prohibits subjection
of anyone without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation. Similar directive
proscriptions appear respectively in Articles 3 and 5 of the ECHR and the ACHPR.
Additionally, the latter prohibits generally all forms of exploitation and degradation of man.
The realisation that these prohibitions are systematically practised globally has led to their
specific outlaw by the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment of 1984 (hereafter the Torture Convention)49 and the European
Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment of 1987.50
Whether or not a particular practice falls within any of these proscribed conducts
depends upon each case and certainly on the degree and intensity of the suffering inflicted.
The severest of these practices is torture. As was enunciated in Ireland v. United Kingdom51
torture amounts to suffering of a particularly intense and cruel nature.
Similarly, these practices are totally outlawed in municipal law of Namibia. Article
8(2)(b) of the Constitution ofNamibia provides that "No persons shall be subject to torture or
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." In Ex parte Attorney-General,
Namibia: In re Corporal Punishment by Organs ofState52 it was held that, read disjunctively,
Article 8(2)(b) outlaws seven distinct conditions: torture; cruel treatment; cruel punishment;
inhuman treatment; inhuman punishment; degrading treatment and degrading punishment. As
in major international human rights instruments, the Namibian clause outlaws these practices
in mandatory terms and without exceptions. They are non-derogable even in war times or
state of emergencies. Namibia's obligation to protect these practices is absolute and
unqualified. Thus, Article 8(2)(b) incorporates international standards on prohibition against
torture and other related practices into municipal law ofNamibia.
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At the implementation stage, despite the fact there has not been any official
confirmation of incidents of torture and none can reasonably be expected, there are cases of
this form of treatment taking place in Namibia particularly by members of the police, security
and defence forces.53 Prime victims are persons opposed to, or suspected of being opposed to,
the Government or the ruling SWAPO party or both. These include members and/or
sympathisers of Namibian opposition political parties, human rights activists or persons
suspected of being UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) spies.
These victims are blindfolded and beaten up for several days until they confess to being spies.
One such case involved Petrus Nangolo Nampala, a member of the DTA (Democratic
Turnhalle Alliance) party. He was accused of drink poisoning, arrested and detained at
Ondangwa by a mob of ex-PLAN (People's Liberation Army of Namibia) fighters on 22
November 1992. According to eye-witnesses and affidavits presented in the High Court of
Namibia, Nampala was tortured by, among other things, having his eyes gouged out with a
knife while he was still alive and then executed in the presence of the Namibian police. No
one was arrested.54
These practices occur notwithstanding the fact that the government of Namibia has
committed itself under the Torture Convention to prohibit their occurrences. Further, the
Committee against Torture established under the Convention to monitor its observance by
memberstates cannot receive and examine complaints by victims or persons on their behalf
because Namibia has yet to declare under Article 22 of the Convention that it recognises its
competence to do so. This factor limits the effect and significance of the Convention in
domestic law ofNamibia.
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Issues ofmajor concern which affect the implementation of protection against torture
and related conducts in Namibia are whipping and life imprisonment. The question is, do
these practices amount to cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment or treatment?
1. Whipping.
Whipping or corporal punishment, both judicial and non-judicial, has been a major
concern in an attempt to implement prohibitions against inhuman or degrading punishment or
treatment in Namibia and indeed in many parts of Africa. Significantly, this problem has
arisen several times before the ECtHR and has thus been declared unlawful under the
European Human Rights System.55
The institution of whipping in Namibia had been one of the prescribed methods of
punishment under the customary judicial system. Its constitutionality in contemporary
Namibian judicial system was at stake in the fore-discussed Ex parte Attorney General: In re
Corporal Punishment by Organs of the State.56 The question before the Supreme Court of
Namibia was whether whipping by or on the authority of any organ of State contemplated in
legislation was per se, or in respect of certain categories of persons or certain crimes, in
violation of Article 8(2)(b) of the Constitution outlawing torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading punishment or treatment. The administration of whipping fell into two broad
categories: legislation allowing judicial and administrative whipping, and whipping in
schools. The Court, per Mohammed A.J.A., adopted a disjunctive interpretation of Article
8(2)(b) and noted that whether or not a particular practice falls under Article 8(2)(b) depends
upon its severity. If the punishment contemplated was not of a sufficiently serious nature to
amount to torture or cruel treatment, the fact that it constituted degrading punishment sufficed
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to render it unconstitutional. To establish a violation of this provision only needed an inquiry
into whether the legislation or practice satisfied these criteria.
On the specific issue of judicial whipping of adults, the Court concluded that its
seriousness makes it an inhuman and degrading treatment. As such, it is contrary to Article
8(2)(b) of the Constitution. It dehumanises adults and violates their inherent dignity.
Significantly, the Court buttressed its decision by relying on similar Section 15 of the
Constitution of Zimbabwe and Article 3 of the ECHR. As regards the latter, the Court said,
per Mohammed A.J.A., that "The provisions of art 8(2) are not peculiar to Namibia; they
articulate a temper throughout the civilised world which has manifested itself consciously
since the Second World War. Exactly the same or similar articles are to be found in other
instruments. (See for example art 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.."57 It proceeded to observe that, ".. In Europe, art 3 of the
European Convention for the Protection ofHuman Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which
is in the same terms as art 8(2)(b) of the Namibian Constitution was interpreted in the case of
7yrer(supra) to render unconstitutional an order by a juvenile court in the Isle of Man,
sentencing the applicant 'to three strokes of the birch.' "58
The Court also relied on the ECtHR judgment in Tyrer v United Kingdom. It noted
that adult whipping is "inconsistent with civilised values pertaining to the administration of
justice.. There is an impressive judicial consensus concerning most of these general
objections...Tyrer v United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 1 (paras 32 and 33 of the judgment).."59
The Court proceeded to emphasise that "The provisions of article 8(2)(b) of the
Constitution are not peculiar to Namibia; they articulate a temper throughout the civilised
world which has manifested itself consciously since the Second World War."60 According to
the Court, whether or not corporal punishment is inhuman or degrading requires an objective
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test regard being had to the emerging consensus of values in the civilised international
community ofwhich Namibia is part and which Namibians share.61 These norms are not static
but are a continually evolving dynamic. What may have been acceptable as a just form of
punishment some decades ago may appear to be manifestly inhuman or degrading today.
Yesterday's orthodoxy might appear to be today's heresy.62 In the Court's view, Article
8(2)(b) of the Constitution must be read not in isolation but within the context of a
fundamental humanistic philosophy introduced in the preamble to and woven into the
manifold structures of the Constitution. Clearly, Article 3 of the ECHR,7yrer case and the
fact that corporal punishment is repugnant to universal civilised standards influenced, in part,
the Court to outlaw adult judicial whipping.
As regards juvenile whipping, the Court held that the criteria, reasoning and basis
which it, the Court, used for objecting to whipping of adults was also applicable to juveniles.
It nonetheless made specific reference to Tyrer case in these words: "In the case of Tyrer
(supra) the European Court ofHuman Rights also held that art 3 of the European Convention
on Human Rights which corresponds with art 8(2)(b) of the Namibian Constitution rendered
unlawful an order sentencing a juvenile to 'three strokes of the birch.'63 According to the
Court, juveniles too, as human beings, have an inherent dignity which is violated by
whipping. It rejected the notion that whipping provides flexibility in sentencing and avoided
unsuitable custodial sentences or that it did not adversely affect youth's character. For the
Court, whipping is inherently demeaning.
On the problematic question of whipping in schools, the Court noted a divergence of
judicial opinion on the matter.64 It nevertheless invoked the same reasoning it adopted for
abolishing whipping of adults and juveniles, and held that whipping in schools also violates
Article 8(2)(b) of the Constitution. This approach underscored Namibia's undertaking under
129
the 1989 Convention on the Rights of Child whose Articles 19(1) and 28(2) may be
interpreted as forbidding whipping in schools notwithstanding that these clauses do not
expressly outlaw this particular punishment.
The broad interpretation of Article 8(2)(b) adopted by the Court gives municipal
effect to Namibia's obligation under international law in general and particularly the 1984
Torture Convention, as State party, to outlaw these practices. Furthermore, reliance on the
international human rights conventions, in this case the ECFIR, the judgment of the ECtHR in
Tyrer case and universal human rights norms clearly and expressly demonstrates a
preparedness by the Namibian judiciary to internally give effect to Namibia's monist theory.
The approach reinforces and complements national human rights law with international
standards.
2. Life imprisonment.
The last but not least issue is life imprisonment. The inquiry here is whether life
imprisonment in itself amounts to an inhuman and degrading treatment. This issue arose in
the Tcoeib case. Following a murder conviction and sentence of life imprisonment by the
High Court of Namibia, the appellant case in the Supreme Court rested, inter alia, on the
ground that life imprisonment was unconstitutional as it conflicted with Article 8(2)(b) of the
Constitution prohibiting inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment. The Court noted that
in resolving this issue it had to take into account contemporary norms and aspirations of the
Namibian people. In the absence of that inquiry, the Court took judicial notice of the fact that
the Namibian people were in favour of life imprisonment in cases of extreme gravity in the
absence of the availability of capital punishment. It accordingly, held that life imprisonment
was not an inhuman and degrading punishment and was therefore not unconstitutional. This
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implies that in less extreme cases the courts may consider this form of penalty inhuman or
degrading. Significantly, the Court's decision was based not only on domestic law and
jurisprudence of Namibia but also on what it called "values or 'emerging consensus of
values' in the civilised international community."65 These values constituted, in part, the basis
of the Court's decision.
It is abundantly clear that the Namibian clause prohibiting torture and related practices
is in line with international human rights standards. Most significantly, in interpreting and
enforcing this clause, the Namibian courts have not only relied on national law and
jurisprudence, but have also invoked and drawn inspiration from international human rights
norms and sources as authorised by Article 144 of the Constitution of Namibia. This
approach has enabled the courts to integrate international human rights standards on
prohibition of torture and similar conducts into Namibian municipal law. Obviously, the
courts could have reached the same conclusion purely on the basis of the Constitution without
invoking international human rights norms. But reliance on these norms ensures that
Namibian jurisprudence is built firmly on international human rights law standards. It also
underlines the significance ofArticle 144 in Namibian domestic law.
e. Non-discrimination.
The principle of non-discrimination, as a dominant theme of the Western moral
philosophy, is now an established legal concept in international law. It is jus cogens.66 The
principle finds expression in major international human rights instruments. In Article 1(3) of
the United Nations Charter (hereafter the UN Charter) one of the purposes of the United
Nations is the promotion of human rights for all without distinction as to race, sex, language,
or religion.67 This principle has been enshrined in subsequent universal and regional major
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human rights instruments.68 These instruments are complimented by specialised treaties: the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965 outlawing racial
discrimination and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms ofDiscrimination against
Women, 1979 prohibiting any form of discrimination against women.69 These instruments
constitute the main sources and cornerstone of non-discrimination at universal, regional and
specialised level.
The principle of non-discrimination also constitutes an significant component of the
bulk of Namibian human rights law.70 It is enshrined in several clauses of the Constitution.
Article 10(1) of the Constitution begins by guaranteeing all persons equality before the law.
Paragraph (2) thereof prohibits discrimination thus: "No persons may be discriminated
against on the grounds of sex, race, colour, ethnic origin, religion, creed or social or economic
status." This clause corresponds to Article 2 of the UDFIR except that it additionally prohibits
discrimination on economic status. It is reinforced by Article 23 of the Constitution which
generally prohibits racial discrimination. Article 23 is singularly significant in Namibia if
viewed against the backdrop of colonialism by the erstwhile apartheid South Africa whose
laws were anchored on racial discrimination.
Prohibition of any discrimination or adverse differential treatment based on economic
status in Namibia is also important. It is novel in Namibian national law. This factor should
be viewed within the wider context of Namibian colonial rule. It underlines the adverse
economic position and conditions of the great majority of the Namibian people particularly
the Black population caused by the erstwhile colonial regime. It, therefore, seeks to ensure
that nobody should be discriminated against simply because he or she is poor or economically
disadvantaged.
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Clearly, with the exception of discrimination based on economic status, the main
Namibian non-discrimination clause: Article 10 resembles similar clauses embodied in major
human rights instruments. As with these instruments, the Namibian clause mandatorily
prohibits broadly and variously discrimination on such grounds as race, sex, language,
religion, ethnic origin, political or other opinion. In theory, this clause domestically
incorporates concepts, principles and norms encapsulated in, and prohibited by, these treaties.
The form and content of non-discrimination in the Namibian clause correspond to
international standards. It thus domestically effectuates Namibia's monist theory.
Most importantly, Article 10(2) of the Constitution of Namibia, as with international
human rights instruments, reflects an attempt to adhere to the rule of law. It enshrines the
notion that every person is equally subject to the law of the land as administered by the
courts. Individuals must be treated without discrimination in both civil and criminal judicial
proceedings. In order to underline its commitment to uphold these principles, Namibia has
ratified treaties abolishing discrimination such as the Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms ofDiscrimination against Women, 1979 and most notably the ACHPR.
The factors of discrimination in Article 10(2) are multifaceted. Their primary
objective is the protection of individuals against adverse differential treatment by any person
acting privately or officially. Importantly, some of the enumerated grounds reveal special
circumstances of Namibia. It is thus appropriate to examine these grounds individually
particularly those which have been the subject ofjudicial activity.
1. Ethnicity and racialism.
Namibian municipal law in general and Article 10(2) in particular prohibits
discrimination on the related grounds of ethnicity and racialism. As regards ethnicity, of the
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fore-cited international human rights treaties, only the ACHPR mentions ethnicity as a
ground of discrimination and corresponds to Article 10(2).
Discrimination on ethnicity becomes significant for Namibia if viewed in a wider
context of ethnic frontiers in Africa whose borders were arbitrarily and artificially, or rather
geometrically divided during colonialism. Consequently, most countries in Africa contain
different ethnic or tribal groupings within their borders. Moreover, there is a fixed hierarchy
of status between the various groups and individuals within groups.71 Thus ethnicity in many
African countries is fully embedded in society and often causes intra-tribal low key conflicts
which have the potential to destabilise the society. The inclusion of ethnicity as a
discriminatory factor in the Constitution of Namibia is a realisation of the potential problem
the phenomenon may cause. It also reflects Namibia's ethnic diversity.
As regards discrimination on the ground of race, it is submitted that it is apposite that
Namibia should flatly outlaw racialism in order to express its revulsion against the practice.
Racism is outlawed both under customary international law72 and treaty law particularly the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965 which binds
Namibia as a State party. The ratification of this and other related international treaties
reinforces Namibia's commitment to outlaw and deprecate, at least theoretically, the practice
of racial discrimination.
To reinforce Namibia's philosophy against racism and the anti-discrimination clause,
racial discrimination and the practice and theory of apartheid are specifically outlawed in
Article 23(1) of the Namibian Constitution. In addition, this clause criminalises the practice
and propagation of these practices.
The issue of non-discrimination particularly Article 23(1) was at stake in Kauesa v.
Minister ofHome Affairs.13 Importantly, in resolving this issue, the High Court of Namibia
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made eloquent reference to international human rights standards and sources particularly the
ECHR, UDHR, ACHPR, ICCPR, American Convention on Human Rights (hereafter ACHR)
and Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination. The applicant, a
police officer, stated in a television programme that the white command structure of the
Namibian police force was responsible for the corruption and all-pervading irregularities in
the force. He was subjected to disciplinary action under existing police regulations. He
subsequently made an application to the Namibian High Court to have the regulations
declared null and void, and for an order protecting his freedom of speech and expression. One
of the issues to be decided by the Court was whether the statement uttered by the applicant
was discriminatory against the respondents, the white members of the police force.
In determining whether the statement was discriminatory and thus contrary to Articles
10(2) and 23(1) of the Constitution, the Court relied upon the above-cited human rights
treaties and said, per O'Linn, J., that "The aforesaid international instruments recognise that
the protection of the dignity of all persons, equality before the law, including the equal
protection by the law, and non-discrimination are and should be the main components in
societies emerging from oppression to democracy as well as those intending to maintain
democracy."74 Justice O'linn proceeded to stress that "The Namibian Courts have expressed
themselves very strongly on the importance of the fundamental rights to equality and non¬
discrimination in the Namibian Constitution."75 Finally, the Court held that the applicant's
statement constituted a breach of the fundamental right of the respondents not to be
discriminated against on the basis of race. The above mentioned international human rights
instruments constituted, in part, the basis of its decision.
With respect to Article 23(1) of the Constitution, the Court observed that it is a
specific constitutional authority for legislation by an Act of Parliament to render criminally
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punishable, and to provide for punishment that will express the revulsion of the Namibian
people at practices of racial discrimination and the practice or ideology of apartheid. In this
regard, it is worth noting that paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 23 provide for affirmative
action, or positive discrimination legislation. Both clauses enjoin the Namibian parliament to
enact legislation specifically aimed at redressing the ills and prejudices caused by racial
discrimination and apartheid.
Crucially, in 1991 the Namibian parliament enacted the Racial Discrimination
Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 26 of 1991 in order to give effect to Article 23 and in
particular its paragraphs (2) and (3). The Act criminalises acts and practices of racial
discrimination and apartheid in relation to provision ofpublic services and amenities, and acts
involving incitement of racial disharmony and victimisation. The significance of this Act not
only in municipal law of Namibia but also in relation to international law has been
underscored by the Namibian High Court in the fore-cited Kauesa v. Minister of Home
Affairs. According to the Court, "When the provisions of s ll(l)(b) read with s 14 of the
Racial Discrimination Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 26 of 1991(Nm) are seen in the context
of ...international treaties and conventions, it can safely be said that this provision ..is..in line
with the constitutions and/or penal codes of many other democratic countries and
international treaties and conventions."76 In the Court's view, the Act reflects international
standards on prohibition of racial discrimination embodied, inter alia, in international human
rights treaties and instruments.
However, in so far as the Act criminalises racial discrimination, it is contended that it
should be construed in the light of human rights provisions of the Constitution ofNamibia. It
should not be applied in a way that undermines the human rights friendliness of the
Constitution. As the Court observed in Kauesa v. Minister ofHome Affairs, this Act is only a
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corrective measure, but not revenge; not discrimination in reverse; not the mere changing of
the roles of perpetrators and victim.
The vehement condemnation of racial discrimination by the Namibian courts as not
only a criminal law matter but also as offending against the Constitution was echoed in the
Government of the Republic of Namibia v. Cultura 2000. As highlighted earlier on in this
study, at stake was whether the State (Repudiation) Cultura 2000) Act 32 of 1991 violated
Cultura 2000 right to culture. The Supreme Court referred briefly and cursorily to the
international law clause (Article 144) of the Constitution and noted that the Constitution
articulates a jurisprudential philosophy which, in express and ringing tones, repudiates
legislative policies based on the criteria of race and ethnicity. It also observed that the
constitutional jurisprudence of a free and independent Namibia is based on total repudiation
of the policies of apartheid.77 It is clear that the Court's approach is influenced by institutional
racism under the colonial State. It is also a reflection of the Constitution's emphatic approach
against racism.
2. Sex discrimination.
Adverse differential treatment on the basis of sex in Namibia is explicitly outlawed by
Article 10(2) of the Constitution. This provision has been fortified by Article 95(a) of the
Constitution. The latter promotes, as State policy, legislation aimed at securing equal
opportunity for women. However, these clauses do not define sex discrimination.78 A
comparison is here made with Section 8(2) of the new South African Constitution which
outlaws discrimination not only on the basis of sex but also gender. It is submitted, however,
that sex discrimination in Namibia should cover all sexes. But, it should be underlined that
not all sorts of different treatment are automatically outlawed on the ground of sex. Different
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treatment based on reasonable and objective criterion, say, in the name of positive
discrimination is permissible.
Different treatment based on reasonable and objective factors is recognised by the
Namibian law with respect to women particularly their equality with men. It should, in the
first instance, be observed that women have traditionally been subjected to discrimination by
Namibian customary law and practices. There are entire systems of customary law co-existing
with official rules which discriminate against women in areas such as succession and family
law, property, finance and contracts.79 Secondly, there is a body of general legal norms and
national legislation which discriminate against women and limit their equality with men.
Statutory law and the inherited Roman-Dutch law have generated barriers that detrimentally
affect women's social, economic and political opportunities. Legislation affecting the rights
and status ofwomen was a feature of the pre-1990 legal order.80 In this vein, Article 18(3) of
the ACHPR imposes a legal obligation on Namibia, as state party, to eliminate every
discriminatory practice against women. This clause also obliges Namibia to protect the rights
ofwomen as stipulated in international declarations and conventions.
Against the backdrop of the ACHPR in particular and Namibia's pre-independence
racist laws and reality generally, tremendous improvements have been made since
independence to better the legal status ofwomen. Presently, in addition to Article 23(3) of the
Constitution of Namibia on affirmative action in favour of women, legislation has been
enacted which ensure equality of women with men. The most important legislation is the
Married Persons Equality Act, No. 1 of 1996. Section 2 thereof abolishes the marital power of
the husband over the person and property of the wife. This provision removes restrictions
placed by the marital power on the capacity of the wife to enter into contracts and litigate
including, but not limited to, registration of property in her own name, to bind herself as a
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surety, act as executrix of the deceased estate and trustee of the insolvent estate. In all these
transactions, consent of the husband is not required.
Further, according to Section 5 of the Act, spouses married in community of property
have equal power over the administration of the community of property, contract debts
incurred by the joint estate and disposal of the assets of the joint estate. Under Section 12, the
domicile of a married women is not determined only in relation to her husband domicile. It is
ascertainable by the same factors applicable to any individual capable of acquiring domicile
of choice. These legislative safeguards are designed to improve the status of women in all
aspects of life. They are aimed at removing discrimination against the female sector of
Namibian society. They also complement and effectuate Namibia's non-discriminatory laws.
Most significantly, they reinforce Namibia's monist theory.
The issue of discrimination against women arose tangentially in S v. D and Another8'
The two appellants were each convicted of rape and sentenced to three years' imprisonment
part of which was conditionally suspended. At stake was the cautionary rule in sexual assault
cases which required the court to consider allegations of sexual assault with abundant caution
despite the sex of the complainant. The Court, per Frank, J., noted that in an overwhelming
majority of cases of this nature the complainants are female and in Namibian social fabric this
state of affairs is hardly likely to change. In the Court's view, the so-called cautionary rule
has no other purpose than to discriminate against female complainants. The Court concluded
that "This rule is thus probably also contrary to art 10 of the Namibian Constitution which
provides for the equality of all persons before the law regardless of sex."82 This statement is a
judicial recognition that the cautionary rule in question infringes national human rights law.
As a corollary, this rule is also contrary to international human rights norms.
139
It is demonstrably clear that the domestic enforcement of the principle of non¬
discrimination by the Namibian judiciary has started to take account of international human
rights standards. The Namibian courts are increasingly relying on these standards to construe
non-discrimination clauses of the Constitution and related laws. This approach has the
beneficial effect of enriching national human rights law with international standards. It also
offers the courts an opportunity to broaden the national protection system in this area of
Namibian national law.
f. The right to property.
The right to property is firmly protected under general international law.83 It is also
specifically recognised and protected by various international human rights instruments.
Article 17(1) of the UDHR guarantees to everyone "the right to own property either alone as
well as in association with others." Paragraph (2) thereof prohibits arbitrary deprivation of
property. According to Article 14 of the ACHPR "the right to property shall be guaranteed."
Under the European human rights system the right to property is guaranteed not in the ECHR
but its First Protocol. Article 1 thereof provides that "every natural or legal person is entitled
to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions." These possessions include property rights.
A comparable Namibian clause on property rights is Article 16(1). This clause
commands that "all persons shall have the right in any part of Namibia to acquire, own and
dispose of all forms of immovable and movable property individually or in association with
others and to bequeath their property to their heirs or legatees.." Article 16(1) articulates the
individual right to property more positively. It brings out the natural-law component of this
right by protecting the right of "all persons."84 Moreover, it mandatorily recognises the right
or interests therein of all persons not only to acquire, own and dispose of property of
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whatever form; whether movable or immovable, but also their right to bequeath property to
other individuals irrespective of the manner of acquisition. The latter aspect is not found in,
and is thus an improvement on, the international human rights instruments. It is a recognition
of the fact that in modern times the law must secure this right, as with all other rights, more
firmly and establish a positive right of an individual to own property and bequeath it to
others.
Furthermore, by protecting "all forms of immovable and movable property," Article
16(1) includes protection of traditional or community property rights of black people in
Namibia in the same way that it protects the fee simple property rights of white Namibians. It
protects communal lands which are held under traditional customary law.85 Thus despite
differences in articulation, the substantive content and scope of this clause reflects, by and
large, international standards. It incorporates international property standards in Namibian
law and provides additional protective standards.
The Namibian property clause gives the State the right to limit the acquisition of
property by foreign nationals despite the fact that Article 99 of the Constitution encourages
foreign investment. This clause is in line with the general rule that the ownership of property
is subject to municipal law. Moreover, it serves a valid public purpose.86
The Namibian property clause has been supplemented by the Agricultural
(Commercial) Land Reform Act.87 This Act provides necessary details for the acquisition and
disposal of agricultural land. It also provides for control mechanisms of land allocation.
Property rights in general and Article 16(1) in particular were in contention in De
Roeck v. Campbell and Others.88 The case involved an application for a rule nisi for the
attachment of certain immovable property, namely erf 107, Olympia Township, in Windhoek,
owned by the first respondent pending the outcome of an action to be instituted by the
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applicant against the respondents. The question was whether or not property in question fell
within the ambit of Article 16(1) of the Constitution. The Namibian High Court interpreted
Article 16(1) broadly and held, per Levy, J., that Olympia Township falls within the ambit of
Article 16(1). It further noted that the right to own property is a fundamental human right
found in the Namibian common law and now entrenched in the Constitution. According to
the Court, ownership of property includes the right to possess one's own property, to dispose
of it and even to destroy it. Any person who interferes with this right has the onus to justify
his or her claim. It is clear that the Court interpreted property rights broadly and liberally. The
interpretation adopted by the Court is indeed appropriate. It in line with the human rights
spirit of the Namibian Constitution. It is submitted, however, that this approach should have
been informed with international jurisprudence and treaty clauses on property rights in order
to reinforce the Namibian right to property clause and lend support to and underscore
Namibia's monist theory.
There are several crucial but controversial issues associated with the right to property.
The main issues are expropriation and compensation. As a general rule, a State may
expropriate or compulsorily acquire property either of its citizens or foreigners subject to
payment of compensation.89 Thus Namibia has a sovereign right to expropriate property
subject to payment of compensation. Once expropriation is determined as lawful,
compensation follows. Both concepts are inter-connected.
1. Expropriation.
Article 16(2) of the Constitution ofNamibian embraces the notion of expropriation of
property under certain conditions. It empowers the State or a competent body or organ
authorised by law to expropriate individual property in the public interest provided the
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expropriation is not arbitrary or discriminatory. This clause corresponds to Article 14 of the
ACHPR which also subjects property rights of individuals to encroachment by the State in
the general interest of the community.
The recognition of the sovereign right of the Government of Namibia to expropriate
property provided it is in the general societal or public interest is in stark accord with general
international law. In the Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia
the Permanent Court of International Justice observed that expropriation was permissible in
international law if necessary for reasons of public utility, judicial liquidation and similar
measures.90 This principle has been reiterated in the Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty
Over Natural Resources of 1962.91 It now forms part of customary international law. But the
ECtHR has noted in Sporrong and Lonnroth v. Sweden that a fair balance should be struck in
expropriating individual property between the fundamental right, interest and welfare of the
individual to own and be in continued and peaceful enjoyment of his or her right to property
and the obvious need of the general public interest.92
The need to maintain this balance arose in Freiremar S. A. v. Prosecutor General of
Namibiaf The appellant was convicted for illegally fishing in Namibian territorial waters.
His fishing vessel was forfeited to the State. The Court held that confiscation of the fishing
vessel as a penalty for crime was permissible under international law and hence legislation
authorising forfeiture was not unconstitutional. It was in the general interest of the public to
forfeit such property. It is clear that the Court's decision was influenced partly by the fact that
expropriation of property for public interest is recognised by international law.
The issue of expropriation of property arose in the Cultura 2000 case. The High Court
nullified the State Repudiation (Cultura) Act, 1991 attempting to recover donations ofmonies
and property made by the previous government to the applicant on the ground that the Act
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empowered the State to take property without providing just compensation. According to the
High Court, the State action of recovering monies donated to the applicant amounted to
expropriation of property and was therefore contrary to Article 16(2). However, on appeal,
the Supreme Court took the view that Section 2(1) of the Act does not deal with
expropriation. It relates to repudiatory acts of the State according to Article 140(3) of the
Constitution.
In realisation of the fact that under apartheid riddled Namibia, the vast majority of the
African population was dispossessed of their land through racial laws, the Namibian
Government has adopted the National Land Policy (hereafter the NLP) which guarantees to
every Namibian equal protection of land rights.94 The NLP further aims at redressing the
social and economic injustices inherited from the colonial period and seeks to secure and
promote the interests of the poor and especially to ensure equity in access to land.95
Consequently, the Agriculture (Commercial) Land Reform Act was enacted to achieve these
aims. The Act authorises the Minister responsible for land to acquire land for public purposes
and in particular to give it to the disadvantaged communities. The extent to which this law
will ensure that the disadvantaged communities have access to land in fulfilment of the basic
right to property will depend on the Government's commitment to implement the NLP.
2. Compensation.
Compensation for expropriated property is a controversial aspect of the right to
property. It has led countries to design various standards of compensation to suit their own
local circumstances and conditions. In Namibia, Article 16(2) of the Constitution requires that
expropriation of property should be subject to payment of "just compensation." By contrast,
the UDHR and the First Protocol to the ECHR neither mention compensation for deprivation
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of property nor indicate the standard of measurement. Compensation is only mentioned in
Article 21(2) of the ACHPR. This clause diverges from the Namibian clause by declaring that
dispossessed people shall have the right to "..an adequate compensation."
The traditional rule supported by Western countries is that compensation for
compulsory acquisition of property should be prompt, adequate and effective.96 This rule
effectively requires full compensation. Its rationale is to compensate the owner a "going
concern value" or "fair market value" whose total amount is fixed promptly but payment of
which may be spread over a reasonable period provided such payment is guaranteed and
allowance for interest for late payment is made and that the compensation should be freely
transferable from the country paying it.97 This standard has, however, been challenged by
developing States as too rigid. They maintain that a less rigid standard of adequate
compensation be adopted.98 The standard sought by developing nations is contained in United
Nations Resolution 3281 of 1974." Article 2(c) thereof confirms the right of States to
nationalise foreign property subject to compensation being determined solely under the
domestic law of the nationalising State. However, Western nations have opposed this
standard of compensation. They insist upon full compensation despite international law
consensus for appropriate and adequate compensation.100
The opportunity to interpret and test Namibia's standard of just compensation arose in
Cultura 2000 case where the applicants argued, inter alia, that acquisition of property made
by the previous government to the applicants by the post-independence Government of
Namibia without providing just compensation was contrary to Article 16(2). The Supreme
Court having ruled that the government's action did not amount to expropriation meant that
the issue of compensation also fell away. An opportunity was therefore missed to judicially
examine what Namibia's standard ofjust compensation really entail and the extent to which it
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should reflect or be brought in line with the international standard of prompt, adequate and
effective payment.
The important point, however, is that Namibia's adoption of a just standard of
compensation clearly demonstrates a radical departure from the international standard of
prompt, adequate and effective payment. This dichotomy reflects Namibia's own domestic
conditions and historical experiences which were characterised by the fact that most
Namibians were dispossessed of property especially land during colonial rule. The just
standard of compensation is an attempt to ensure justice in the distribution and acquisition of
property. This process demands the adoption of much lesser strict requirements of
compensation assessment. In any event, international law is not against States adopting
standards of compensation depicting local conditions.
g. The right to education.
The right to education constitutes one of the main basic rights in international law. It
is protected by several human rights treaties and instruments. Article 17(1) of the ACHPR
guarantees every individual the right to education. However, this clause does not specify
conditions and criteria of achieving this right. By contrast, Articles 26 and 13 of the UDHR
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter
ICESCR) respectively do not only recognise everyone's right to education but recognise that
primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all, and higher education shall,
with restrictions based on capacity, be widely expanded. These clauses are analogous to
Article 2 of the First Protocol to the ECHR, albeit, the latter guarantees the right in negative
terms.
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Similarly, the Constitution ofNamibia protects the right to education.101 Article 20(1)
thereof provides that "All persons shall have the right to education." Paragraph (2) makes
primary education compulsory and guarantees free education at State schools. Paragraph (3)
guarantees all children of school-going age the right to attend school until they reach sixteen
years, or finish primary, whichever is the sooner.102 These clauses correspond, in content and
scope, to international human rights instruments particularly Articles 13(1) of the ICESCR
and 26(1) of the UDHR. They incorporate the international standards of the right to education
in Namibian municipal law and thus effectuate Namibia's monist theory. In particular,
Namibia domestically implements its international obligation under the ICESCR as a State
party to protect the right to education. However, unlike the international human rights
instruments, the Namibian clause is silent on free education in secondary and higher
education.
Article 20(1) enjoins Namibia, in line with international human rights instruments, to
provide education to its citizens. This clause protects the right to education in positive and
mandatory terms. By guaranteeing this right to "All persons," Article 20(1) brings out the
natural-law foundation of the right to education. Subject to reasonable exceptions, this right
inheres in every human being. The cornerstone of this right is to provide individuals with
opportunities of access to education institutions. With the exception of primary education, the
right to education does not guarantee to everyone the right of admission at educational
institutions.103
According to Article 20(4) of the Namibian Constitution, individuals are free to
establish and maintain private schools, colleges and kindred institutions of tertiary education
at their own expenses provided they maintain standards obtaining in State schools. This
clause is comparable to Section 25(3)(c) of the Constitution of Malawi. Namibia's limited
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resources makes it reasonable to permit these schools. The institution may, however, appear
to be discriminatory against pupils whose families cannot afford high fees charged by these
schools.
An important aspect of the right to education is parents' right to ensure education and
teaching of children in conformity with their own religious and moral beliefs.104 There is no
equivalent protection in the Namibian clause. This right is an adjunct to the right to
education. It ensures that the State respects the rights of parents while exercising its functions
in education. However, generally, the full and effective implementation of the right to
education in Namibia is affected by limited resources.
The right to education was considered in S v. Namseb.'0;> The Namibian High Court
declared that a child's right to schooling is a fundamental right. It is not a mere privilege.
Clearly, the Court adopted a broad and liberal interpretation of the right to education. This
approach is a reasonable construction of the right to education. It gives substance to this right.
However, the Court did not draw inspiration from international human rights
instruments protecting the right to education in interpreting the Namibian clause. The issue
was determined mainly on the basis of Namibian national law and jurisprudence. It is
submitted that in line with Namibia's monist theory, the Court should have utilised the
international human rights instruments and jurisprudence to buttress its decision. It is a rarity
that educational rights and indeed economic, social and cultural rights in general become a
subject of litigation before municipal courts. It is even more so for the courts to declare that
educational and similar rights, which are often called mere privileges, are indeed rights. This
case presented a rare opportunity for the Court to place reliance on international human rights
norms in interpreting the right to education. It would have given an added legal force to the
Court reasoning and reinforced Namibia's friendliness to international law.
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h. Cultural rights.
Cultural rights enjoy international recognition. Article 27(1) of the UDHR confers
everyone the right "freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts
and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits." Analogously, Article 17(3) of the
ACHPR states that "every individual may freely take part in the cultural life of his
community." This clause, additionally, imposes a duty on States to promote and protect this
right in line with duty-oriented approach of the Charter.106 Both clauses are similar to Article
15(l)(a) to (c) of the ICESCR. These protective clauses are fortified by Article 27 of the
ICCPR which ensures that minorities are not denied the right to their culture, religion or
language.107
The right to culture is similarly accorded constitutional recognition and status in
Namibian municipal law. Article 19 of the Constitution entitles every person "to enjoy,
practice, profess, maintain and promote any culture, language, tradition or religion." This
clause implements Namibia's obligation under the ICESCR and the ACE1PR as a state party
to protect cultural rights of individuals. It transforms international cultural normative
standards embodied in these treaties into Namibian municipal law. These cultural rights
include arts, music, dance and literature.
Protection of language in Article 19 is particularly significant. With the exception of
Article 27 of the ICCPR,108 most international human rights instruments do not expressly and
positively guarantee the right to use ones language. Thus the Namibian clause offers an
additional and more progressive safeguard than international instruments. It recognises the
different languages in the country.
The additional safeguards embodied in Article 19 are tradition and religion. As
regards tradition, the clause ensures that the traditional lives of the various ethnic groups are
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safeguarded. This accords with Article 17(3) of the ACHPR which enjoins States to promote
and protect traditional norms. The protection of religion also ensures that religious groups
practice and propagate their religion.
These rights are, however, not protected absolutely. Against the background of
colonialism, tribalism and apartheid, Article 19 makes the enjoyment of cultural rights
subject to the Constitution, the rights of others and the national interest. While it may be clear
what these other conditions entail, that is not the case with national interest. All sorts of
circumstances may be used to justify an erosion of this right under the guise of national
interest. The crucial point, however, is that any cultural practices that impinge upon these
conditions are invalid.
The opportunity to elaborate on cultural rights in general and particularly Article 19
presented itself in the Cultura 2000 case.109 The High Court of Namibia held that the State
Repudiation (Cultura) Act of 1991 authorising the government to confiscate monies and
donations advanced to the applicants was contrary to Article 16(1) of the Constitution of
Namibia protecting cultural rights. The Court arrived at its decision by relying on what it
called broad and universal cultural human rights norms. According to the Court, the effect of
Article 144 of the Constitution of Namibia was to assign these norms a domestic status.
Clearly, Article 144 influenced the Court to rely on international human rights norms to
interpret Article 19 of the Constitution of Namibia. These norms constituted the basis of the
Court's decision.
2. Conclusion.
It is abundantly clear from the preceding analysis that despite differences in the
drafting style, phraseology and formulation of human rights clauses, the juridical substantive
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content and scope of the protective clauses of the Namibian Bill of Rights reflects, by and
large, the influence of international human rights standards contained in major human rights
treaties and instruments such as the UDHR, ICCPR, ECHR, ICESCR and the ACE1PR. By
replicating human rights norms embodied in these instruments, the Bill of Rights essentially
incorporates these norms into Namibian domestic law. It domestically effectuates Namibia's
monist theory. However, the Bill contains additional safeguards with respect to rights such as
the right to property, education and non-discrimination. The additional protection of these
rights reflects Namibia's local conditions. The Bill was greatly influenced by the colonial
dispensation under which human rights especially land rights were denied the vast majority of
the Namibian people. Racial discrimination was also pervasive. Moreover, the bulk of the
Namibian population especially the Africans were denied basic educational rights. The Bill
recognises this reality and marks a positive and progressive approach as well as an
improvement upon the domestic human rights protection system. It gives an added impetus to
Namibia's monist theory.
Additionally, Namibia has, at least in theory, attempted to remedy some of the
practices which militate against the implementation of human rights norms such as sex
discrimination and whipping of male offenders under customary law and practices. These
practices reveal a conflict between cultural relativism and cultural imperialism and
universalism. They collide with universal norms. But to the extent that the cultural practices
place individuals in disadvantageous position, it is submitted that they should give way to
norms which enhance the status of individuals. Significantly, as an expression of revulsion
against these practices, the Namibian municipal law not only prohibits sex discrimination but
also encourages positive discrimination in favour of women and similarly placed individuals.
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It has also abolished the death penalty. The removal of these practices also gives additional
force to Namibia's newly adopted monist theory.
The monist theory has, however, been compromised at the enforcement level
particularly by the judiciary. Namibian courts are yet to implement this theory in domestic
law. International human rights law, both customary and conventional, has been invoked and
relied upon in relatively few and isolated cases in interpreting national law. For example, one
situation where the theory was given effect to is in relation to whipping. The Namibian
Supreme Court relied on Article 3 of the ECHR and the ECtHR decision in Tyrer case to
outlaw whipping in Namibian national law. The monist theory has also been domestically
effectuated with respect to the principle of non-discrimination and cultural rights. Even with
respect to these norms, the theory has been given a cursory and perfunctory attention. In most
cases such as those dealing with trial within a reasonable time, judicial independence,
expropriation of property and the right to education, the courts have reached their decisions
mainly on the basis of national law and jurisprudence. They have yet to actively use rich
international jurisprudence in the general area of human rights law to build upon national
jurisprudence. This approach effectively compromises Namibia's monist theory. It is
submitted that in order to effectuate this theory internally, national courts should actively
invoke and rely on international law and sources in legal proceedings. This approach also
serves a useful purpose of enriching national law with international standards. It further
broadens the national human rights protection system.
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This chapter examines the extent to which Botswana's inherited monist-dualist
approach has been implemented in the post-independence legal order with respect to human
rights law. It thus analyses the human rights norms in the Bill of Rights against similar rights
in major international human rights instruments in order to determine whether national
human rights norms not only reflect and, domestically incorporate, international standards for
the protection of such norms, but also reinforce the dualist or monist approach regarding the
inter-relations between international law and Botswana national law. It also examines the
manner in, and extent to, which courts have handled the inherited approach. In particular, it
examines whether, and the extent to which, the courts have utilised international human rights
norms in enforcing national human rights law. It concentrates on those national human rights
issues where international human rights norms have, explicitly or implicitly, arisen. As such,
the chapter deals mainly with the process of translating international human rights law into
Botswana municipal law.
1. Judicial Practice,
a. The right to life.
The right to life is recognised and protected in municipal law of Botswana. According
to Section 4(1) of the Constitution "No person shall be deprived of his life intentionally save
in the execution of the sentence of the court in respect of an offence under the law in force in
Botswana of which he has been convicted."1 This clause does not protect the right to life in
positive terms. It protects this right in negative terms by merely preventing the intentional
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deprivation of life. This contrasts starkly with provisions in international human rights
instruments especially the ACHPR and ECHR. Respective Articles 4 and 2 of both
conventions protect the right to life in positive terms.
As under the ACHPR and ECHR, the right to life in Botswana is recognised and
protected subject to limitations. However, the ACHPR does not specify instances under
which this right may be limited. It only prohibits arbitrary deprivation of the right to life.
Section 4(a) to (d) of the Constitution of Botswana recognises that this right may be violated
in the execution of a sentence of the court, in self-defence, to suppress a riot or prevent the
commission of an offence. This clause corresponds to Article 2(2) (a) to (c) of the ECHR.2
These exceptional instances ensure legality when deprivation of life is contemplated. This
means that these exceptions should be narrowly interpreted in order to protect life.
Despite phraseological technicalities, the Botswana right to life clause, in line with
international law, firmly protects the right to life. It implicitly incorporates international
standards for the protection of the right to life into municipal law of Botswana. It further
imposes a legal obligation on Botswana to protect this right. The practical importance of this
clause is, however, minimised by the institution of the death penalty.
1. The death penalty.
As indicated earlier on, the death penalty is categorically outlawed at the international
level by Article 1(1) of the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR Aiming at the Abolition
of the Death Penalty. However, in Botswana, as in many other countries, capital punishment
is a legally permissible and competent sentence.
The Penal Code of Botswana explicitly and unambiguously declares that ".. any
person convicted ofmurder shall be sentenced to death."3 Capital punishment is reserved only
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for most serious offences such as murder, treason4 and murder committed in the process of
committing piracy.5 In terms of Section 26(1) of the Penal Code, execution is by hanging. In
order to limit circumstances under which it may be meted out, the death sentence cannot be
imposed on persons below eighteen years6 and pregnant mothers.7 It also may not be imposed
where there are extenuating circumstances such as provocation, intoxication, youthfulness
and absence of actual intention to kill.8
It is apposite to note that although international human rights standards have been
invoked and relied on to challenge the constitutionality of the death penalty in Botswana, the
judiciary has exercised extreme restraint to outlaw it. One of the cases in which it was
challenged is Molale v. The State.9 The appellant was convicted by the High Court of
Botswana of murdering his girl-friend by inflicting fatal blows on her with an axe. He was
sentenced to death. On appeal to the Court of appeal, he argued, amongst other things, that
the death penalty imposed on him by the High Court violated his constitutional right to life
and, anachronistically, it is an antediluvian and barbaric penalty. Although the Court of
appeal reduced the sentence to fifteen years imprisonment on different grounds it, however,
failed to pronounce on the constitutionality of the death penalty. The Court, per Aguda, J.A.,
merely held that "following upon the conclusion to which I have arrived as regards the
sentence of death, it is no longer necessary for me to consider either of the two grounds fded
by Mr Morotsi as regards capital punishment." The pertinent ground read that "the method of
execution of the appellant ordered by the learned judge as prescribed by Section 203(1) of the
Penal Code was anachronistic, antediluvian and barbaric."
On pure legal technicalities, the Court was justified in not considering the issue of
capital punishment. However, capital punishment is an important and topical issue in
Botswana on which the view of the highest court in the country is necessary and would
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influence public opinion. In fact, this case is one of the few cases where the issue was
specifically raised. Moreover, the argument that the death penalty is antediluvian and barbaric
was an implicit invitation to the Court to take into account international normative standards
in determining its constitutionality. But the Court decided the issue mainly on the basis of
national law and declined to adjudicate its constitutionality.
Capital punishment was also an issue in Mosarwana v. State w The appellant, on
substantial evidence, was convicted of murdering the deceased for calling him a thief. The
High Court sentenced him to death in accordance with Section 203(1) of the Penal Code. It
also found that there were no extenuating circumstances and in accordance with Section 26(1)
of the Penal Code, ordered that the appellant be hanged. On appeal to the Court of Appeal,
the appellant argued, inter alia, that Section 203(1) permitting the death penalty was ultra
vires the Constitution since Section 4 thereof prohibits the intentional taking of life. The
Court failed to analyse the general import and content, and the precise limits of Section
203(1). It merely held that, on proper construction, Section 203(1) prescribing the death
penalty was not inconsistent with, and thus not ultra vires, the Constitution. The Court noted
that, while there was international sentiment, as reflected at the United Nations, to abolish the
death penalty, it could not rewrite the Constitution in order to give effect to such sentiment.
Its function in the interpretation of the Constitution was adjudicatory and not legislative.
Relying strictly and narrowly on national law and jurisprudence, the Court confirmed the
death sentence. It is submitted that this case presented an opportunity for the Court to utilise
international human rights norms to determine the constitutionality of the death sentence. If it
had adopted this approach, it would have found out that current thinking on the international
plane is increasingly moving towards the abolition of the death penalty. Also, the approach
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would have influenced the Court to reach a different conclusion and if need be substitute the
death sentence with a term of imprisonment.
The death penalty was also a contentious issue in State v. Ntesang.u The appellant
was convicted ofmurder and sentenced to death by hanging. He appealed against sentence on
the grounds, inter alia, that the death penalty breached the constitutional right to life clause.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and confirmed the death sentence imposed by the
High Court. It thus refused to declare capital punishment unconstitutional. However, the
Court took judicial notice of developments to abolish the death sentence at the international
level and invited parliament to consider effecting appropriate changes at national level. It,
nevertheless, refused to use these developments to determine the constitutionality of capital
punishment and if need be outlaw it.
These pronouncements clearly demonstrate judicial restraint in Botswana to invoke
and rely on international human rights standards to outlaw the death penalty. This form of
restraint is an indirect judicial confirmation of the classical dualist theory that international
and national law are distinct legal orders each governing a different legal sphere.
It is important to note that Botswana has not signed the Second Optional Protocol to
the ICCPR Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty and the ICCPR. It is, therefore, not
legally obliged to outlaw the death sentence or submit reports under both conventions to the
Human Rights Committee.12
Significantly, there is national debate to abolish the death penalty. The debate centres
around two approaches: abolitionism and retentionism.13 Abolitionists such as human rights
activists and defence lawyers contend that evidence is lacking that capital punishment deters
crime and as such it should be abolished. Retentionists especially members of the public and
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few politicians, on the other hand, defend capital punishment as a deterrent. They argue that
although capital punishment does not prevent crime, it has a deterrent effect.
There seems, however, to be no easy solution to this debate. Seemingly, capital
punishment in Botswana will continue to be lawful and permissible for some time. This is
because the debate is both emotionally and politically charged, and the greater part of the
public does not appear to be ready to endorse its abolition. It is submitted that the gradualist
approach is the only preferable approach, at least, at the present time. Significantly, capital
punishment has been sparingly imposed. According to Amnesty International Report, in 1995
only one man whose death sentence was confirmed by the Court of Appeal was awaiting
execution, two men convicted ofmurder and sentenced to death had their death sentences set
aside by the Court of Appeal and another man's death sentence, Boiki Mokholo, was
commuted to a fifteen-year prison term.14
b. Personal liberty.
Personal liberty in Botswana is recognised and protected by Section 5(1) of the
Constitution. This provision declares that "no person shall be deprived of his personal liberty
save as may be authorised by law." Section 5(1) corresponds to Article 6 of the ACHPR,
Article 3 of the UDHR and Article 9(1) of the ICCPR except that it does not also protect
security of person. Moreover, unlike the international human rights instruments, the
Botswana clause does not protect this freedom positively. It adopts a negativist approach.
Nevertheless, it incorporates, both in form and content, the basic international standards for
the safeguard of personal liberty. It extends procedural fairness and guarantees to the
individual in ordinary criminal process. It encompasses freedom from arbitrary arrest and
detention. This clause safeguards individual physical liberty.15
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The Constitution of Botswana, as with international instruments,16 does not guarantee
the right to liberty in absolute terms. It recognises executive powers of the State to deprive
the individual of his liberty, for instance, in execution of the lawful sentence of the court, on
reasonable suspicion of a person having committed an offence and to protect the rights of
others or the society.17 However, its deprivation must be authorised by law. This means that it
is not the deprivation of liberty in and of itself that is objectionable but rather that which is
arbitrary and unlawful.
It is in this vein that Section 5(2) of the Constitution provides that an individual
whose right to personal liberty is threatened or who is arrested or detained should be
informed as soon as practicable, in the language that he understands, of the reasons of his
arrest or detention. In paragraph 3, any person who is arrested or detained on reasonable
suspicion of having committed an offence should be brought as soon as is reasonably
practicable before court usually within forty-eight hours. If he is not tried within a reasonable
time, he shall be released unconditionally or upon reasonable conditions to ensure that he
appears at a later date for trial. These safeguards guarantee the right of habeas corpus. They
correspond to Article 5(2) to (5) of the ECHR. They are designed to ensure legality when this
freedom is curtailed. In practice, these safeguards are generally respected by government
authorities.18
The most controversial issue concerns arrest or detention by police officers on
reasonable suspicion of the person having committed an offence. Generally, police officers
have powers to arrest any person on reasonable suspicion or grounds of having committed a
crime.19 The question that emerges is, what amounts to reasonable grounds or suspicion that a
person has committed a crime? Or, what is the test of reasonableness in these cases? This
issue was a point of contention in Oakametse v. Attorney-General and Another.20 The
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applicant was arrested by the Police in Serowe in the Central Administrative District on
allegations that she called the complainant a witch. She was detained. She challenged her
detention in the High Court on the basis of Section 5(2) of the Constitution. The Court held
that to arrest and detain someone but without evidence of any offence which she has or was
suspected to have committed is unlawful and intrusion of her physical liberty. It further held
that, where an individual is arrested or detained on suspicion that she has committed an
offence, the suspicion must be reasonable and based on real evidence but not mere
allegations. It ordered her release. The Court did not, however, indicate whether the test of
reasonableness should be judged by national or international human rights standards. It,
nonetheless, based its decision only on the constitutional provision protecting individuals
right to liberty.
c. Fair trial.
Section 10 of the Constitution of Botswana elaborates the right of individuals to a fair
trial.21 It is analogous to Article 14 of the ICCPR and Article 6 of the ECHR. It resembles
Article 7 of the ACHPR. It is also equivalent to Articles 10 and 11 of the UDHR. As with the
international human rights treaties and instruments, the Botswana fair trial clause contains the
Anglo-saxon concept of due process of law.22 This right entails the minimum guarantees of
the accused in criminal proceedings. These guarantees include trial by an independent and
impartial court, trial within a reasonable time, presumption of innocence, trial in the
accused's language or the language that the accused understands, public trial and legal
representation. It is important to examine the extent to which Botswana courts have drawn




The concept of trial within a reasonable time is embraced by municipal law of
Botswana. Section 10(1) of the Constitution provides that "any person charged with a
criminal offence shall, unless the charge is withdrawn, be afforded a ..hearing within a
reasonable time." This clause resembles Article 6(1) of the ECHR and Article 7(1 )(d) of the
ACHPR. However, the equivalent Article 14 (3)(c) of the ICCPR talks of "trial without undue
delay." Essentially, this phrase also captures the substantive elements of trial within a
reasonable time. Thus the Botswana clause, as with the international human rights
instruments, encapsulates the concept of a speedy trial. It ensures that trials commence and
finish speedily. This right includes not only the right to a speedy trial but also to a judgment
within a reasonable time.23
The problematic issue concerns the guiding rule in determining whether trial should
take place within a reasonable time. Judicial activity on this issue was attracted in The State v.
Merriweather Seboni:4 On 31 December, 1967 the accused was charged with theft of
Government funds totalling 1, 257 South African Rands. The trial took place on 3 February,
1969. It effectively meant that there was a delay ofmore than a year. The delay was wholly
attributable to the State in that a lot of time was taken in transmitting the record from the
Magistrate, who presided over preparatory proceedings, to the Attorney-General for his
decision whether to prosecute the accused in the High Court or remit the case to the
Subordinate Court for trial. It was finally decided that trial should take place at the High
Court. At the commencement of the proceedings, the accused raised a preliminary issue
concerning his right to be tried within a reasonable time as provided for under Section 10(1)
of the Constitution. He argued, inter alia, that this provision had been infringed in relation to
him because he had to wait for approximately one year before his trial could commence. The
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State argued that the delay was not attributable to it. Rather, it was caused by the shortage of
staff and administrative inefficiency and as such the accused could not seek the benefit of
Section 10(1).
The Court construed Section 10(1) and noted that although the question whether or
not there has been unreasonable delay depends on the circumstances of each case, nonetheless
a delay of this magnitude was extremely unreasonable. It flagrantly violated Section 10(1) of
the Constitution and thus prejudiced the accused. The Court observed that administrative
deficiency cannot be invoked as justification for failure to comply with this clause. Clearly,
the Court's decision cannot be faulted in the light of the inordinate delay involved. It gave
substance to Section 10(1). Significantly, the Court decided the matter not only on the basis
of Section 10(1) of the Constitution. It also sought guidance from comparative national
decisions particularly Baker v. Wingo case and Article 5(3) of the ECHR dealing with trial
within a reasonable time to reinforce its decision. With respect to the latter, the High Court,
per Dendy Young, C.J., as he then was, observed that "Article 121, paragraph 1 of the
German Criminal Procedure Code provides that no one may be kept in detention on remand
for more than six months...The provision is supposed to take account of Article 5, paragraph
3, of the European Convention on Human Rights.."25 Justice Dendy Young proceeded to note
that "In my view, these two decisions throw some light on the problem before me."26 The
Court dismissed the State's application and ordered a retrial. Article 5(3) of the ECHR
formed, in part, the basis of the Court's decision.
However, subsequent court decisions do not reveal the same readiness to seek
guidance from international human rights law and sources to construe Section 10(1) of the
Constitution. In Rapula Sello v. State27 the accused was convicted of malicious damage to
property and sentenced to three years imprisonment. One year lapsed before his appeal
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against sentence was heard by the High Court of Botswana. The Court, per Heyffon-
Benjamin, C.J., as he then was, pointed out that trial within a reasonable time did not end on
conviction in the court of first instance. It also applied on appeal. The Court held that the
delay in question was unreasonable. However, the Court relied purely on Section 10(1), and
not international human rights norms, to declare that the delay was unreasonable. Similarly,
in S v. Makwekwe28 a delay of two years and eight months was held to be unreasonable. The
Court retorted that it is no small matter for a man to live for years with a serious charge
hanging over his head. The delay of this nature inflicts mental suffering and must of necessity
interfere with the freedom of movement, employment opportunities and social life of the
accused. However, as in Rapula Sello v. State, the Court decided the matter purely and only
on the basis of national law. It did not inform its decision by international human rights
standards in order to reinforce its reasoning and broaden its approach to the concept of trial
within a reasonable time.
Be that as it may, international human rights standards and sources were invoked and
utilised to interpret Section 10(1) in Johannes Kgolagano v. Attorney-General.29 On 2
December 1992 the accused was charged with murder. He was admitted on bail. His trial in
the High Court only commenced on the 8 June, 1995. This meant that there was a two and
half years delay in bringing him to trial. At the commencement of the trial, his attorney
invoked Section 10(1) of the Constitution and argued that the applicant had been denied the
right to trial within a reasonable time. In determining whether the delay in question was
unreasonable, the Court sought assistance and guidance from comparative case law in
Zimbabwe and the United States interpreting similar clauses30 as well as international human
rights instruments.
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With respect to international human rights instruments, the Court noted that "the right
to be tried within a 'reasonable time' is also guaranteed by Article 6(1) of the European
Convention for the Protection ofHuman Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. This right is also
embodied in the African Charter on Human and People's Rights., (see Article 7(1))."31 The
Court then concluded that the embodiment of this principle in different constitutions and
international instruments reflects a universal acceptance of the right to a speedy trial as an
important factor in the concept of fair trial. It held that two and half years delay was
extremely unreasonable. Thus unlike in previous cases, the determination that there was
unreasonable delay in this case was partly inspired by human rights treaties particularly
Article 6(1) of the ECHR and Article 7(1) of the ACHPR.
It should be pointed out that there is a lack of consistency in the jurisprudence of
Botswana courts regarding the available remedy when trial within a reasonable time
safeguard is breached. In Rapula Sello v. State case, the accused was acquitted but, in
Seboni's case, the Court ordered a retrial. In Makwekwe's case, the Court observed that a
delay of two years and eight months was a factor to be taken into account when determining
sentence whereas in Johannes Kgolagano v. Attorney-General, because of the seriousness of
the charge, the Court could not order the stay of the proceedings.
Most significantly, the decisions demonstrate the fact that instances in which
international law and sources in general and particularly human rights treaties have been
invoked and relied upon to construe the right of accused persons to be tried within a
reasonable time in Botswana have been irregular and inconsistent. They have also not been
uniform. The courts have yet to develop a clear and consistent pattern of invoking
international human rights norms to interpret this right. This approach lessens the
effectiveness of international law in protecting the right of individuals to be tried within a
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reasonable time in national law. It further reinforces Botswana's inherited classical dualist
theory. These cases presented an opportunity for the courts to actively invoke international
human rights law to interpret the concept of trial within a reasonable time so as to reinforce
national human rights law and jurisprudence, and broaden the national protection system.
2. Language.
In terms of Section 10(2)(b) of the Constitution of Botswana, the accused is entitled to
be informed of the nature of the offence charged in the language that he understands and in
detail. This clause corresponds to Article 14(3) (a) of the ICCPR and 6(3) (a) of the ECHR.
Interestingly, the ACHPR is silent on the issue of language notwithstanding the co-existence
of various ethnic languages in many African countries. Nonetheless, in line with other
international human rights instruments, Section 10(2)(b) accords individuals the right to be
informed of the offence not in their own language but in the language that they understands.
Although this clause speaks only about information relating to the nature of the charge but
not the actual conduct of the proceedings, it is submitted that the language facility also
applies to the conduct of the trial.
The importance of using the language an accused understands in Court was
underscored in the Kenyan case of Andrea v. The Republic.12 In this case, the accused's
language was Swahili. His statement was recorded in English. The trial was also conducted in
English. He complained that he did not understand English but could only speak Swahili and
Portuguese. His objection was upheld by the High Court noting that the possibility of the
accused misunderstanding the proceedings was very great. The facility is designed to ensure
that the accused follows the proceedings fully. In this regard the courts have warned against
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raising the issue of language to ventilate matters that are irrelevant to the issue in the trial
such as propaganda.33
Trial in the language understood by the accused is especially crucial in Botswana and
it is to be welcomed. Despite the fact that Botswana is generally proclaimed to be a
homogenous society, there are several other ethnic groups in the country each speaking its
own language.34 This makes the issue of language comprehensible to the accused all the more
necessary. But, this safeguard is watered down by the fact that the different ethnic languages
in the country are not official languages of the court. The official language of the court is
English. This factor poses greater difficulties in enforcing this safeguard since many people
speak their vernacular languages and do not fully understand English. Thus many may not
understand the nature of the charge or even follow the trial fully.
In view of the difficulties inherent in enforcing the language safeguard, the protective
clause in Botswana, as with the international human rights instruments,35 guarantees the
accused the right to an interpreter without payment if he cannot understand the language used
at the trial.36 This safeguard is implemented in practice. However, it is not expressly clear
whether this safeguard extends to provision of interpreters during pre-trial interrogations. It is
submitted that the right to an interpreter should not only be available at the trial. It should
also be made available in pre-trial interrogations of the accused and suspects. Further, one
issue that the Botswana clause does not cover, and has yet to be judicially determined, is
whether interpretation also covers translation of relevant written documents such as evidence
and judgments. It is further submitted that in order to guarantee the accused a fair trial,
written materials relevant in court should also be translated into the language that he/she
understands.
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The critical question relates to the effectiveness of the right to an interpreter in
ensuring that the accused fully understands and follows the proceedings. This issue may arise
where, for instance, the interpreter has an interest in the proceedings or he being the only
person who speaks the accused's language does not also understand English very well. The
former issue has arisen mainly within the context of using police officers as interpreters who
almost invariably play a larger part in investigation of crimes. It arose in State v. Galeboe."
The police officer, who was an investigating officer in the case, was used by the Magistrate as
an interpreter despite objection from the defence that he, the police officer, had an interest in
the case. The appellant had also indicated that there was some misinterpretation on the part of
the interpreter. Relying strictly on Section 10(2)(b) of the Constitution and evidence before it,
the High Court observed that the use of an interpreter who had taken part in the investigation
was an irregularity. It, however, held that because there was no evidence that the accused had
suffered prejudice it could not overturn the decision of the lower court.
Similarly, in Mokwena v. State38 the Court used a police officer as an interpreter.
Relying entirely on Section 10(2)(b), the Court observed that the practice of using the police
as interpreters in court was undesirable but sometimes unavoidable. In both cases, the Court
decided the matter purely on national law, that is, Section 10(2)(b) of the Constitution of
Botswana. It made no reference at all to international human rights law and jurisprudence
dealing with the right to interpreters. This approach could have informed the Court about the
importance attached to this right in international arena and its potential effects on the
individual and, it is submitted, could have persuaded the Court in both cases to vitiate the
proceedings.
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3. Independent and impartial court or tribunal.
The municipal law of Botswana embraces the concept of trial by an independent and
impartial court or tribunal. Section 10(1) of the Constitution accords any person charged with
a criminal offence the right to be tried by "an independent and impartial court." This clause
resembles Article 10 of the UDHR and Article 6(1) of the ECHR. It also resembles Article
14(1) of the ICCPR except that the latter further requires that the tribunal should be
competent. Article 7(l)(d) of the ACHPR only requires the tribunal to be impartial. Thus, by
and large, the concept of trial by an independent and impartial court in Botswana reflects
international safeguards. It is an institutional guarantee that the rights and duties of
individuals in civil suits and criminal charges are not to be heard and decided by political
institutions.39
This institutional guarantee embodies two main over-lapping concepts: independence
and impartiality. First, independence. Judicial independence relates primarily to the
relationship between the courts and the executive. It dictates that the accused must be heard
by a tribunal which does not reach its decision due to pressure from the executive and outside
forces. Secondly, impartiality. This concept entails two main sub-rules. First, the rule against
bias (nemo judex in causa sua). This sub-rule dictates that the tribunal should not have an
interest in the proceedings or be biased against one of the parties thereon.40 The court is
biased if, for instance, it or one of its members has an interest, pecuniary or otherwise, in the
proceedings. Secondly, is the right to be heard (audi alteram partem rule). This rule requires
that the accused be given the opportunity to be heard. Consequently, trial in absentia may
constitute a violation of the right of the accused to a fair hearing. This rule may, however, be
waived by the accused if, for instance, he or she conducts himself or herself in a way that
makes trial in his or her presence practically impossible.
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Of the two concepts, it is impartiality especially the most problematic rule against bias
that has attracted the attention ofBotswana courts. It arose in Ali Khan and Another v. State.41
The appellants were charged, inter alia, with contravening the Fauna Proclamation of 1961
and Central Kalahari Game Reserve (Control of Entry) Regulations of 1963 in that they
entered the Central Kalahari Game Reserve and hunted therein without permits. The
Presiding Officer who tried the case was also the District Commissioner for the area and in
charge of the administration of the proclamation and regulations thereunder and in particular
with the issuance of entry and hunting permits. The appellants made an application for his
recusal on the basis that he was likely to be biased against them. He refused to recuse himself.
The issue was raised on appeal.
In determining whether the District Commissioner infringed Section 10(1) of the
Constitution on the right of the accused to be tried by an impartial tribunal or court, the High
Court sought assistance from comparative decisions especially South African and English
cases42 and held that the Presiding Officer ought to have recused himself. The Court further
emphasised how this rule is strictly enforced by noting that it does not require actual bias but
a likelihood of bias. It is sufficient if an impression is reasonably created in the minds of the
appellants that they would not have a fair trial. The predication of rule is that justice must not
only be done, but must manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.43 The case was
remitted to the trial court for re-trial.
The concept of judicial impartiality also arose in State v. Mack44 The appellant was
convicted of attempted rape contrary to Section 138 of the Penal Code of Botswana. He
pleaded guilty. The prosecutor stated the facts which the accused admitted. But then the
judicial officer, taking the view that the facts did not disclose the crime charged, that is, the
intention necessary to commit the crime of rape, summarily acquitted the accused. The
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Attorney-General, being dissatisfied with the decision of the Magistrate, appealed to the High
Court. The High Court allowed the appeal and referred the case back to the Magistrate for re¬
trial. When the case re-opened, the Magistrate forthwith recused himself on the ground that
the accused would be prejudiced if he presided because he was not clear about some aspects
of the law on rape.
Convinced that the Magistrate was refusing to try the case, the Attorney-General
applied to the High Court and asked it to direct the Magistrate to try the case. He argued that
the Magistrate was biased against the State. The Attorney-General invited the High Court to
invoke "its inherent power to see that justice is done not only to the accused but also to the
state, and to deal with the matter by way of review." After considering the point raised by the
Attorney-General, the High Court concluded that it could not compel the Magistrate to re-try
the case because he was entirely entitled to determine whether or not the accused was going
to receive a fair trial. There was no bias on the part of the Magistrate. It accordingly
dismissed the appeal.
It is evidently clear from both cases that the Court did not take into account
international human rights standards particularly human rights treaties enshrining the concept
of impartiality when interpreting this right. It decided the issue purely on the basis of the
constitutional clause on fair trial. It is unclear whether factors which constitute bias should be
judged only according to national conditions or whether they should take on board
international normative standards.
4. Legal counsel.
Section 10(2)(d) of the Constitution of Botswana proclaims that "every person who is
charged with a criminal offence shall be permitted to defend himself before the court in
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person or, at his own expense, by a legal representative of his own choice." Paragraph (e)
thereof further requires that a person be "afforded facilities to examine in person or by his
legal representative the witnesses called by the prosecution.." These clauses firmly guarantee
the right to legal representation in criminal proceedings. They are similar to Article 11(1) of
the UDHR, Article 14(3) (d) of the ICCPR, Article 6(3)(c) of the ECHR and Article 7(l)(c)
of the ACHPR.45 This right should be available to the individual as soon as he or she gets in
contact with the criminal justice system, that is, soon after the arrest.
Legal counsel safeguard in Botswana, as in international human rights instruments,
encompasses numerous individual rights.46 First, the right to defend oneself in person. It is
the primary, unrestricted right of everyone charged with a criminal offence to be present at
the trial and to defend himself or herself. Fie should not be tried in absentia. If he is unable to
do so, he can forgo this right and then, as his second right, he can make use of defence
counsel. The court is required to inform him of this right. In principle, he may engage an
attorney of his own choosing. This implies that legal counsel should not be imposed on the
accused.47 The third issue, relates to expenses. If the accused can afford it, he should meet his
own legal expenses. Here the Botswana clause diverges from the international human rights
instruments in that it does not expressly guarantee the accused free legal assistance if he lacks
financial means. However, depending primarily on the seriousness of the offence and the
potential maximum punishment the accused is likely to receive such as in murder and
manslaughter cases the State renders free legal assistance.
An opportunity to examine the juridical content of the right to legal representation
arose in Tshipo v. Stated The appellant was charged with careless driving. His application for
postponement of the case so that he could engage an attorney was refused by the presiding
Magistrate. On appeal, the High Court observed that legal representation becomes even more
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significant if failure to engage an attorney would result in prejudice to the accused. In
Richard Macha v. State49 the Court warned that the courts must always act reasonably and
must not over-act or be carried away or seen to be carried away by the circumstances of any
particular case. They must weigh the rights of the individual, as enshrined in the Constitution,
against the rights of the State and the people as a whole to have justice done fairly by
affording the accused legal counsel.
In both cases, the Court made reference to comparative national judicial decisions
particularly South African decisions in determining whether or not the accused right to legal
representation has been infringed.30 However, no reference was made at all to international
judicial decisions and international human rights treaties and instruments protecting the right
to legal counsel to reinforce the Court's decision in both cases.
By contrast, in Agnes Bojang v. State,51 the Court did not only invoke and rely on
comparative national judicial decisions, but it also sought assistance and guidance from
provisions of international human rights instruments in determining whether the Magistrate
Court was under a legal obligation to inform the applicant of her right to legal counsel on a
charge of stealing by a person employed in the public service. The Court noted that "due to
paucity of case law in our courts which should guide this court in solving the question which
faces it, it should not be surprising that assistance is sought from... some of the international
conventions designed to provide guarantees similar or near to those found in our Constitution
or laws."52 After referring to these international conventions, the Court emphasised that the
right to legal counsel is meant to ensure a fair hearing. Failure to protect this right renders
other constitutional safeguards meaningless. It quashed the conviction. Thus the court's
decision was partly influenced by human rights normative standards in these treaties.
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A peculiar aspect of the right to legal counsel in Botswana but which is not found
anywhere in the international human rights instruments concerns the right to legal
representation in customary or traditional courts.53 Section 10(12)(b) of the Constitution
excludes the right to legal representation in customary courts or proceedings in a subordinate
court for an offence under customary law. This inroad into the right to counsel is further
embodied in Section 27 of the Customary Courts Act.54 Persons appearing before these courts
who wish to exercise this right must apply to court to have their cases transferred to the
magistrate's courts.55 Failure by the court to accede to the application renders the trial a
nullity. The reason for this is that the concept of legal representation does not form part of
Botswana indigenous system ofjurisprudence. Moreover, the officers who preside over these
courts are not formally trained in the law or procedure which lawyers practice.56
Significantly, a great number of people in Botswana, and indeed in most countries in
Southern Africa, are subject to, and governed by, customary law. Criminal and civil cases of a
minor nature, which constitute the majority of cases before courts in these countries, are dealt
with in customary or traditional courts. This essentially means that exclusion of legal
representation in these courts curtails and further compromises the accused's guarantee of a
fair trial. The practice adversely affects the right of individuals to legal representation
especially those living under the system of customary law. This practice illustrates a conflict
between international human rights norms and customary practices.57 Most importantly, it
shows that Botswana does not fulfil its obligation under international human rights law and
specifically the ACHPR to ensure the enjoyment of this freedom by its citizens. Its municipal
law diverges from international normative standards.
Legal representation under customary law has been questioned in courts. However,
the courts have addressed it only on the basis of national law particularly the Constitution and
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not international law. It was questioned in Moisakamo v. Moisakamo.58 The case did not
concern human rights law. Rather, it dealt with the division of matrimonial property
following upon divorce. The parties had been married by Christian rites and their property
was therefore governed by the Married Persons' Property Act (Cap 29:03 of the Laws of
Botswana), specifically by Section 7 of the Act which applies to marriages between
"Africans." The effect of Section 7 is that in the absence of another prior arrangement
between the parties, their property rights are governed by customary law. Counsel for the
defendant argued that this fact effectively excluded the jurisdiction of the High Court to
entertain the action. The proper forum was the customary court. However, the High Court
was of the view that it had jurisdiction based, inter alia, on the fact that legal practitioners
have no right of audience in customary courts. This could compromise legal defence of the
parties. The unhappiness of the High Court with exclusion of legal representation in
customary courts, particularly in criminal law field was expressed thus: "Of course the
provisions of the Customary Courts Act in so far as they purport to bar legal representation of
persons charged with offences under the Penal Code before customary courts are of doubtful
constitutional firmness and validity."59
It is submitted that the right to legal representation must also be accorded the accused
in customary courts. The issues before these courts may be complicated for the accused to
handle without the assistance of a legal practitioner. The presence of a lawyer may also be
beneficial to the court itself in unknotting these issues. The fact that the accused fails to opt
out of the customary court's jurisdiction when the case first came to these courts should not
be held against him. He has the constitutional right to legal representation at any stage of the
judicial process. Legal representation is vital in these courts as in ordinary courts. It is a
180
universal and inherent right of every person whether indigent or rich and irrespective of
whatever law he or she is subject.
At the implementation stage, the right to legal counsel is compromised by the fact that
most people in the country cannot afford the high fees charged by attorneys. However, the
government has a policy of providing free legal assistance to individuals who cannot afford
the high fees charged by lawyers. In practice, this policy has been given effect to especially in
murder and other serious cases. Moreover, the University of Botswana Legal Clinic and
Botswana Centre for Human Rights provide free legal assistance to needy persons. The work
of both institutions is, however, limited by lack of adequate financial resources.
Notwithstanding these issues, it is clear that except for Agnes Bojang v. State case,
Botswana courts have construed the right to legal representation predominantly on the basis
of national law and jurisprudence. They have not actively and consistently sought assistance
and guidance from international human rights standards and sources when interpreting this
right in order not only to enrich national law with international standards but also to utilise
these standards to broaden and extent the right to legal counsel to customary law.
5. Public trial.
The right to a public trial is recognised and safeguarded in the municipal law of
Botswana.60 Section 10(10) of the Constitution requires that "all proceedings of every court
and proceedings for the determination of the existence or the extent of any civil right or
obligation., including the announcement of the decision of the court.., shall be held in
public." A comparable safeguard is contained in Article 14(1) of the ICCPR and Article 6(1)
of the ECHR. The ACHPR does not have an explicit provision protecting the right to public
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trial. But this right can be implied from Article 7 according every individual the right to have
his cause be heard.
Section 10(10) of the Constitution of Botswana protects the right to public trial
mandatorily and in positive terms. It extends this right both to civil and criminal proceedings.
It means that all trials in civil and criminal matters must, in principle, be conducted publicly
and orally.61 Further, by providing that public trial should be made available in "every court,"
the Botswana clause envisages customary courts. However, unlike the international human
rights instruments, public trial in Botswana encompasses the announcement of the decision in
public. The right to a public hearing may, however, be waived by the individual. The waiver
should be unequivocal. It also should not conflict with important public interest consideration
calling for the public to be present at the trial.62
Thus, Section 10(10), largely, incorporates the international human rights standards of
trial in public in Botswana municipal law. It accords parties to the proceedings public
hearing. In a democratic society, this right further extends to the general public. It is the duty
of the State to ensure its observance in practice.
As with the international human rights instruments,63 the municipal law of Botswana
broadly recognises that the right to a public hearing is subject to restrictions. The press and
public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest of morals, public order or
national security or where publicity would prejudice the interest of justice or if necessary in a
democratic society.64 Moreover, a public hearing may be excluded if necessary to protect the
welfare of certain individuals. Section 10(1 l)(b) of the Constitution refers to "persons under
the age of 18 years." This restriction is designed to protect the interest of vulnerable young
persons. Under these instances, in camera trials would be justified.
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The most controversial of these exceptions is exclusion of public hearings in the
interest of national security. It was an issue in State v. Gordon Tokwe,65 The applicant was
charged with official corruption contrary to Section 99(a) of the Penal Code of Botswana.
When trial commenced, the State made an application for trial to be conducted in camera on
the ground that the case involved matters of top secret which affected national security.
Matters in question concerned receipt ofmoney by a member of the Botswana police from a
foreign embassy for providing that embassy with secret information concerning security and
political matters. Relying on the English case ofAttorney-General v. Leveller Magazine and
others (1979) 68 Cr. App. R. 342, the Court, per Justice Hannah, as he then was, examined
Section 10(10) of the Constitution and noted that it is important that wherever possible courts
should conduct their proceedings in public. It stressed that courts should examine carefully
any argument advanced in favour of secrecy based on national security.
According to the Court, the rationale ofpublic hearing is to provide safeguards against
judicial arbitrariness. It also protects litigants from secret administration of justice with no
public scrutiny. Publicity makes the administration of justice transparent. Moreover, it
ensures democratic control of the justice system. It is the rational idea of better finding the
truth.66 It further contributes to the maintenance of public confidence in the courts. It thus
ensures that justice should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to
be done. However, as in most cases on fair trial, the Court arrived at its decision without
seeking any guidance from international human rights standards.
Significantly, except for minor differences in form, it is clear that the substantive
content of the Botswana fair trial clause largely reflects international human rights standards.
It embodies the main international human rights standards of a fair trial. However, in practice,
the judiciary has not actively invoked and utilised international human rights standards in
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enforcing these guarantees. The judiciary has interpreted these clauses mainly on the basis of
national law and jurisprudence. References to comparable clauses in international human
rights instruments and international decisions has been minimal, inconsistent and irregular.
Put differently, Botswana courts have accorded international human rights norms a limited
role in interpreting national fair trial guarantees.
d. Torture and inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment.
The prohibition of torture and related practices is articulated in the municipal law of
Botswana.67 Section 7(1) of the Constitution categorically and unambiguously declares that
"no person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment or other
treatment." This clause is comparable to Article 5 of the UDHR and Article 7 of the ICCPR.
The latter, additionally, prohibits subjection of anyone without his free consent to medical or
scientific experimentation. Similar directive proscriptions appear respectively in Articles 3
and 5 of the ECHR and the ACHPR. Additionally, the latter prohibits generally all forms of
exploitation and degradation of man. Thus Section 7(1) is literally equivalent to clauses in
international human rights instruments. It translates international normative standards on
prohibition of torture and kindred conducts into the domestic law of Botswana.
It is worth noting that although there is no documentary evidence, incidents of torture
in Botswana especially by police and other security forces have been alleged particularly
during detentions of suspected criminals.68 The practice has been revealed in a number of
judicial pronouncements. In George Khoza and Another v. Attorney-General & Another69 the
accused were convicted by a Magistrate Court on a plea of guilty for kidnapping a South
African citizen. They were given a custodial sentence. They applied to the High Court for
their release arguing that their plea of guilty was extracted through torture and violence by the
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police and threats that if they refused such treatment would be repeated. The Court believed
their story, quashed the conviction and set them free.
A method of torture reportedly used by Botswana Police is known as "riding the
jack." It was employed in Mosotho Masina & Mogosi v. State.10 The appellants were
questioned by the police for three days. They were taken to the entrance of the toilet, made to
undress, handcuffed behind their back, made to sit on the bare floor, a piece of plastic held
over their mouths and noses which was removed whenever they were near suffocation when
they would be asked the whereabouts of the deceased and the appellants' knowledge of his
death. Each time they denied the process was repeated. The Court of Appeal struck out the
confession obtained as a consequence of this practice. This practice obviously violates
Botswana's obligation under international law and should be avoided. Police interrogations
should be supervised by independent persons and individuals.
It is apposite to observe that while the international human rights instruments
mandatorily prohibits any form of torture and associated treatment without exceptions,
Section 7 does not. Paragraph (2) thereof preserves any punishment that was permissible
before the Constitution came into operation, that is, before independence in 1966. Any
punishment that was lawful before this date is excluded from the prohibitions. This clause
creates an exception to the prohibition of torture and similar practices.
This raises the question whether practices such as whipping and hanging which
predate the adoption of the Constitution of Botswana are excluded from torture and similar
practices? Do these practices amount to inhuman or degrading treatment? Attempts to
implement prohibitions against torture and inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment
have been confronted with these major issues.
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1. Whipping.
Whipping, both judicial and non-judicial, has been a major concern in an attempt to
implement prohibitions against inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment in Botswana.
This punishment is reserved for offences such as rape, assault occasioning actual bodily harm,
housebreaking and robbery. It can be imposed on adult males but not female offenders, males
sentenced to death and those over forty years.71
The constitutionality of whipping has been challenged in Botswana courts.
Significantly, in trying to resolve the issue, the courts have invoked and relied on
international human rights law. It was an issue in Clover Petrus v. State.72 The two accused
were charged with and convicted by a Magistrate for house breaking and theft contrary to
Section 305(10)(a) of the Botswana Penal Code (Amendment) Act of 1982. Each of the
accused was sentenced to three years imprisonment and to corporal punishment as provided
for by Section 301(3) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act (hereinafter the CPEA).
This clause authorises the administration of corporal punishment at delayed and repeated
intervals. The accused lodged an appeal against both the conviction and sentence with the
High Court. On the issue of corporal punishment, they argued that such a penalty was
contrary to Section 7(1) of the Constitution of Botswana outlawing torture or inhuman or
degrading punishment or other treatment and as such unconstitutional.
In arguing that the institution of corporal punishment or caning is unconstitutional, the
appellants relied on the decisions of the ECtHR in Tyrer v. The United Kingdom and other
relevant international human rights instruments, to wit, the ECHR and the ACHPR.73 In
essence, the appellants wanted the Court to determine the constitutionality of corporal
punishment against international human rights law embodied in these sources.
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In resolving this point, the Court, per Aguda, J. A., also invoked and relied, in part, on
these human rights treaties, that is, Article 5 of the ACHPR, Article 5 of the UDHR, the
ACHR and the ECHR.74 Justice Aguda noted that he relied on these instruments to
demonstrate that human rights have matured into customary international law binding on all
States including Botswana.
The Court also referred to the ECtHR decision in Tyrer v. United Kingdom. Maisels,
J.P., as he then was, said, "I now deal with the reasons for the court's finding that corporal
punishment as prescribed in section 301(3) of the CPEA is ultra vires...We were also referred
to a decision of the European Court of Human rights, Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 2 EHHR
l..and to the decision of the German Court on 10th June 1963... A reading of the dicta in the
various judgments ...leaves me in no doubt that the repeated and delayed infliction of strokes
as enjoined by section 301 (3), would be regarded as inhuman or degrading."75
The Court proceeded to observe that there is a universally recognised normative
prohibition against corporal punishment. Moreover, as a "member of a comity of civilised
nations," Botswana is legally bound to proscribe this form of punishment.76 The Court finally
held that the infliction of whipping in a delayed and repeated manner was inhuman and
degrading punishment. It, however, held that whipping per se is not an inhuman or degrading
punishment.77 The important point for the present study is that the Court relied on
international human rights treaties and Tyrer v. United Kingdom in which the ECtHR
declared birching to be inhuman to outlaw instalmental whipping. The international human
rights norms embodied in these sources constituted part of the basis for declaring instalmental
whipping unconstitutional.
The ECtHR decision in Tyrer v. United Kingdom was also used to challenge whipping
in Desai andModi v. The State.™ The case involved an appeal to the High Court ofBotswana
187
against both conviction and sentences from a decision of the Senior Magistrate for Gaborone
Administrative District in which the appellants were charged with unlawful possession of
habit-forming drugs, mandrax, contrary to the Habit Forming Drugs Act of Botswana. Both
appellants were each sentenced to ten years imprisonment. But the second appellant, Modi,
received an additional three strokes with a cane and the first appellant, because of his age,
sixty-two years, was spared the strokes. As in Clover Petrus v. State, the second appellant
argued as against the sentence of corporal punishment that the imposition of a long term of
imprisonment in addition to corporal punishment amounted to an inhuman and degrading
treatment and as such contravened Section 7(1) of the Constitution prohibiting that form of
punishment. Both appellants also argued that the provisions of domestic legislation
empowering the courts to impose a sentence of whipping were unconstitutional hence null
and void.
The Court rejected the argument that a sentence of strokes was inhuman and
degrading. However, after referring to Clover Petrus v. State case and the ECtHR's decision
in Tyrer v. United Kingdom,19 it noted that to combine strokes with a term of imprisonment
amounted to an inhuman and degrading treatment. It ordered the deletion of the strokes.
It is demonstrably clear that Botswana courts have been hesitant to outlaw corporal
punishment notwithstanding the fact that they have sought guidance from international
human rights law to determine its constitutionality. What is objectionable, according to the
courts, is the mode of executing it in a repeated and delayed manner and its combination with
other similarly severe sentences such as long term of imprisonment rather than the institution




The second problematic issue regarding prohibition against degrading and inhuman
punishment or treatment is the institution of hanging. The question that arises is whether
hanging, as a mode of executing the death penalty, in itself constitute a degrading and
inhuman punishment or treatment? This institution was challenged in Mosarwana v. State.*0
The appellant contended, inter alia, that hanging to be visited on him on a murder conviction
and subsequent death sentence contravened Section 7(1) of the Constitution prohibiting
torture or inhuman or degrading punishment and was as such unconstitutional. He drew the
Court's attention to the fact that the United Nations has urged its members, of which
Botswana is, to restrict the number of offences for which the death penalty might be imposed
with a view to its final and complete abolition throughout the world. However, the Court
simply ignored the submission premised on what was happening at the international level. It
merely said that its function was adjudicatory but not legislative and cursorily held that
execution by hanging was a lawful punishment.
Similarly, in the fore-cited State v. Ntesang, it was argued on behalf of the appellant
that hanging that he was ordered to undergo by the High Court amounted to an inhuman and
degrading punishment and therefore contrary to Section 7(1) of the Constitution. The Court of
Appeal construed this provision narrowly and restrictively, and held that hanging was saved
by Section 7(2) of the Constitution. According to the Court, Section 7(2) created an exception
to the prohibition on inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment which was lawful
immediately before the Constitution came into operation. Thus since hanging was a lawful
mode of execution immediately before the Constitution came into force it was not an
inhuman or degrading punishment. It was intra vires the Constitution. Again, the Court took
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the view that since its functions were merely adjudicatory but not legislative, it could not
outlaw hanging.
e. Democracy.
The legal system of Botswana recognises the right to democratic governance. This
right is, however, not enshrined in the Bill of Rights. It is protected by Section 67 of the
Constitution. This clause stipulates that a person shall, unless he is disqualified for
registration as a voter under the law, be entitled to be registered as a voter for electing
members of the National Assembly. However, unlike the international human rights
instruments such as Article 21 of the UDHR, Article 25 of the ICCPR and Article 13 of the
ACHPR,81 Section 67 does not positively accord to everyone the right to vote. It merely
stipulates conditions which a person shall satisfy in order to be registered as a voter. These
are citizenship, age, and residence.82 Section 67 is reinforced by the Electoral Act.83 The Act
prescribes procedures for registration of voters, elections, polling and election petitions.
Section 30 thereof specifically requires an intending voter to be registered in a given
constituency and to produce the voter's registration card in order to be permitted to vote.
These provisions are underscored by the requirement of periodic presidential and
parliamentary elections. Presidential and parliamentary elections are authorised by Sections
32 and 61 of the Constitution respectively.
These provisions, in line with international human rights instruments, are designed to
accord universal suffrage internal domestic effect. They encapsulate the pluralist and
democratic nature of Botswana through a representative government. They spell out in detail
the essential elements and minimum content of democracy as the right of all citizens to be
governed according to their will and to participate in the political life of their societies. The
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authority of a government, elected by a majority to conduct the public affairs of the society is
a consequence of the exercise of the right of participation in public life by all citizens,
whether they belong to the majority or the minority.84
The right to democracy in Botswana has arisen mainly within the context of the right
of female citizens married to foreigners to pass their Botswana citizenship to their children.
This is because according to Section 61(1 )(a) of the Constitution, only citizens of Botswana
are entitled to vote. The question is, are children of these women also entitled to vote? To put
the issue into proper context, in 1987 Parliament enacted the Citizenship Act which stripped
Botswana female citizens married to foreigners of their rights to pass their Botswana
citizenship to their children. This means that because they are not citizens of Botswana,
having assumed the citizenship of their fathers, children of these women could not enjoy the
human rights, including the right to vote, enjoyed by children born to Botswana men. This
Act was successfully challenged in Attorney-General v. Unity Dow.85 Relying on international
human rights treaties such as the ACHPR and Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women of 1967,86 the Court of Appeal of Botswana declared the 1987
Citizenship Act unconstitutional. Most importantly, the case led to an enactment of the
Citizenship (Amendment) Act No. 14 of 1995. Section 4(1) thereof extends citizenship to
children of Botswana women married to foreigners. As a corollary, children of Botswana
women now enjoy universal suffrage in Botswana.
Clearly, the above human rights treaties were instrumental in influencing the Court to
declare the Citizenship Act unconstitutional. They also prevailed upon the National Assembly
to enact the Citizenship (Amendment) Act. The Court's approach seeks to shift away from
Botswana dualist conception of international law and its municipal law. It complements
Botswana's standards of protection with international standards. It is submitted that if the
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judiciary can vigorously and consistently pursue this approach it can cross-fertilise national
law with international standards and accord these standards a firm and solid place in
Botswana municipal law.
f. Non-discrimination.
The principle of non-discrimination enjoys a prominent status in the normative order
of Botswana. It features in two clauses in the Constitution. Section 3 thereof guarantees every
person in Botswana the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual whatever his race,
place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex.87 This provision should be examined
conjunctively with Section 15 which regulates discrimination in greater detail. Its paragraph 1
prohibits discriminatory law either of itself or in its effect. Paragraph 2 forbids discrimination
of any person by a person acting by virtue of written law or in performance of public function
or authority. It defines discrimination in paragraph 3 as affording different treatment to
different persons attributable wholly or mainly to their respective descriptions by race, tribe,
place of origin, political opinions, colour or creed whereby persons of one such descriptions
are subjected to disabilities.
The main non-discriminatory clause in Botswana: Section 3 corresponds mainly to
Articles 14 of the ECHR except for the omission of concepts of religion, language and birth
embodied in this instrument. It slightly resembles Article 2 of the ACHPR. It clearly reveals
the influence of the European non-discrimination clause.88 It is its replica. Thus the content of
this right corresponds to international human rights standards. It entails the concept that
individuals are equally subject to the law of the land as administered by ordinary courts.
Botswana's commitment to abide by the principle of non-discrimination is underlined
by the fact that it has ratified treaties abolishing discrimination notably the Convention on the
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Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979, the Convention on the
Elimination ofAll Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965 and the ACHPR, though it is yet to
ratify others. It has, in theory, incorporated the non-discrimination normative standards
encapsulated in these treaties into its municipal law. The non-discrimination clause of
Botswana, in line with the main international human rights treaties, prohibits discrimination
based on a variety of grounds. It is appropriate to examine whether in adjudicating these
grounds the judiciary has sought guidance and assistance from international human rights law
to reinforce its decisions.
1. Racialism.
Racialism, as a ground of discrimination, does not only feature conspicuously in
international law but it also appears prominently in the Bill of Rights of Botswana. It is
prohibited by both Sections 3 and 15(1) of the Constitution. Moreover, Botswana's
ratification of the ACHPR and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, 1965 has underlined its commitment to outlaw and deprecate, at least
theoretically, the practice of racial discrimination.
It is worth observing that Botswana courts have not, unlike courts in countries such as
South Africa and Namibia, ardently attacked racism. But they too hold similar views against
the practice. A rare occasion presented itself in S v. Zweiger89 The accused, a white South
African, was charged with unlawful possession of firearms and ammunition, and uncut
diamonds valued at 6000 Botswana Pula (equivalent of 1000 British sterling). He was fined
and given a non-custodial sentence. On review, the High Court noted that the sentence was
too lenient in view especially of a similar case tried by the same magistrate six months ago of
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two poor blacks charged with possession of diamonds valued at 22 Botswana Pula who were
each given three years jail term two ofwhich were suspended conditionally.
Relying only on Section 3 of the Constitution, the Court noted that there was no
evidence that the Magistrate took into account the fact that the accused was white but felt that
the decision projected such a picture. It observed that "nothing is more calculated, or more
likely to induce a sense of outrage than an impression that an accused is being given special
treatment on account of his race." However, the Court made no reference to similar clauses in
international instruments and comparative international jurisprudence in order to buttress its
reasoning and give municipal effect to Botswana's international obligations to outlaw racism.
2. Sex discrimination.
The main non-discriminatory clause of the Constitution, that is, Section 3, flatly
outlaws adverse differential treatment based on sex. However, Section 15(3) does not include
sex as one of the of discriminatory factors. But both the High Court and the Court of Appeal
of Botswana in the Unity Dow case conclusively held that Section 15(3) was not restrictive
and definitive, unless this was clearly so from the intention of the Legislature, of
discrimination. Rather, it extended the meaning or is explanatory of the word discrimination.
Thus sex discrimination is also outlawed in Section 15(3).90
Discrimination on the ground of sex has arisen mainly in relation to women's equality
with men. This is a central issue in Botswana. In this regard, Article 18(3) of the ACHPR
legally obliges Botswana, as a State party to this Convention, to ensure the elimination of
every discrimination against women.
Discrimination against women arises in two areas. First, customary law. Secondly,
legislation. With respect to customary practices, there are customary rules existing alongside
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official rules which discriminate against women. For example, women are discriminated
against under succession, property and family law. Thus unless the husband makes a specific
bequest to his wife, she does not inherit from his estate. The estate devolves upon the eldest
son. Moreover, where the father dies intestate, customary law of succession does not
recognise the rights of female children to succeed to his property on his death. The property
devolves only upon his eldest son but not other children.91
The question that arises is, are these customary practices compatible with the non¬
discrimination norms? Or rather, can the non-discrimination norms be derogated from on the
basis of these practices? These questions become pertinent when analysed within the context
of Section 15(4)(d) of the Constitution. This clause makes customary law an exception to
equality and non-discrimination in addition, for instance, to derogations reasonable justifiable
in a democratic society. This poses the question, is the exclusion of the principles of equality
and non-discrimination under customary law justifiable in a democratic society? This issue
arose specifically in a Swaziland case of Ross-Spencer and Another v. Master of the High
Court.92 The case involved the constitutionality of a statute exempting the estates of Africans,
but not Europeans, from death duties despite the constitutional guarantee of equality of
protection before the law subject to the exception that the law could make discriminations
where reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. The Swaziland High Court held that this
kind of differential treatment was reasonably justifiable in a democratic society since the
Swazi society comprised classes or groups of people living under different social and
economic conditions. Thus it was reasonable to construe the law to effectuate this factual
reality.
On a pure question of reasonable interpretation of the law in question, the approach of
the court is appropriate. It is not a derogation from the principle of non-discrimination.
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Rather, it is a recognition of the fact that society in countries like Swaziland, and certainly in
Botswana, live under customary law and practices which oftentimes are antagonistic to, and
in conflict with, the universal norms but without in themselves being discriminatory provided
they reflect practical reality and do lead to social cohesion.
This case is, however, contrasted with the fore-cited Unity Dow case in which the
Attorney-General argued that the omission of the word "sex" among the discriminatory
grounds in Section 15(3) of the Constitution did not breach the non-discrimination clause
because it had been intentionally omitted so as to reflect the fact that under the customary law
of Botswana society is based on patrilineal structure. This means that discrimination of this
nature was reasonably justifiable in Botswana democratic society. Drawing inspiration from
court decisions in other countries and international human rights treaties especially the
ACHPR, which is an embodiment of African human rights normative values and standards,93
the Court rejected this argument holding that it was impossible to accept the argument that
Botswana is a discriminatory society. According to Bizos, J.A., "If the makers of the
Constitution ofBotswana intended it to discriminate against women because it is a patrilineal
and male oriented society, they could not have missed the opportunity of expressly debarring
them from holding office as President, minister, deputy minister or member ofParliament."94
Obviously where the customary practices are not only unreasonable as the Court
observed in Unity Dow case but are also utterly discriminatory, in content and effect, it is
submitted that preference should be given to universal norms. Of course, this approach
engenders a situation where customary norms give way to universal rules resulting in cultural
imperialism where norms are imposed on the public by vanguard elite groups.95 But whatever
the effect of these imposed norms may be, especially with respect to the notion of cultural
imperialism, an unreasonable customary practice would have to be construed and if need be
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corrected and modernised to effectuate universal standards which advance the status of the
womenfolk.
Second is the question of discriminatory legislation. There is a body of laws which
limits equality of women with men. The inherited Roman-Dutch and statutory law have
generated barriers that adversely affect women's social, economic and political opportunities.
There is an array of legislation on areas such as citizenship, family law and labour law which
discriminate against women.96 In family law sphere, the Deeds Registry Act is the most
pertinent legislation.97 Under Section 18(4) thereof, a woman married in community of
property is deprived of her right to have immovable property transferred or ceded to her
except where the property has been exempt from community of property. This clause denies
women the most important commodity in the country. Section 5 thereof gives the husband
power alone to deal with their joint estate. Thus the husband is given the right, which is not
available to the wife, to dispose of their joint property. Further, under the Administration of
Estate Act, a married woman cannot be granted letters of confirmation without the husband's
QO
consent.
These pieces of legislation and customary practices are incompatible with the
principle of non-discrimination. They are, on strict application of Article 18(3) of the
ACHPR, discriminatory against women. Significantly, the whole question of sex
discrimination in Botswana especially in relation to the womenfolk was resolved by the Unity
Dow case. Relying heavily on international human rights conventions such as the ACHPR,
UDHR and ECHR and Convention on the Elimination of all Forms ofDiscrimination against
Women of 1967, the Court of Appeal outlawed sex discrimination. According to Justice
Aguda, these instruments must be resorted to whether or not they "have been specifically
incorporated into our law."99
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The Court stressed that discrimination based wholly on sex is not only
unconstitutional but is violative of universally recognised human rights norms. According to
Justice Aguda, "more than ever before, the whole world has realised that discrimination on
grounds of sex, like that institution which was in times gone by permissible both by most
religious and the conscience of men of those times, namely, slavery, can no longer be
permitted or even tolerated, more so by the law."100 It is, therefore, clear that the prohibition
of sex discrimination in major human rights treaties and general norms of international
human rights law played a central role in influencing the Court to declare sex discrimination
unconstitutional in Botswana.
Most significantly, the Unity Dow case compelled the Government to announce in
1994 its intention to commission a consultancy to review all the relevant laws of the country
and recommend changes in order to improve the status of women.101 However, this still
remains an aspiration only.
g. Property rights.
Two clauses in the Constitution of Botswana protect basic property rights. In Section
3(c) of the Constitution "every person in Botswana is entitled to the., protection for the
privacy of his home and other property and from deprivation of property without
compensation." Section 8(1) thereof emphatically states that "no property of any description
shall be compulsory taken possession of, and no interest in or right over property of any
description shall be compulsorily acquired.." This clause is the main property clause in
Botswana. It does not only protect the right to property. It also protects "interest in or right
over property." It protects a legally recognised interest or right in property. This relates to any
interest of a proprietary or pecuniary nature, which if not immediately held or claimed in the
198
property is nevertheless so associated with the property. It excludes any remote interest or
right in the property.102 Protection of property or interest therein of any description includes
both movable and immovable property including land held on freehold title and communal
land held under customary law.103 Thus Section 8(1) offers a secure protection of property
rights irrespective of the manner of acquisition.
Section 8(1) does not, however, employ the language of the international human rights
instruments such as Article 17(1) of the UDHR, Article 14 of the ACHPR and Article 1 of the
First Protocol to the ECHR and formulate the classical right to property positively. It does not
categorically prescribe individuals entitlement to property. It adopts a negativist approach and
merely protects property or interest or right therein from compulsorily acquisition. The
international human rights instruments employ mandatory terms by providing that the right to
property shall be protected and shall not be arbitrarily expropriated or compulsorily acquired.
Nonetheless, Section 8(1) constitutes the legal basis for the protection of individuals' right to
property in Botswana. To ensure its practical application, this clause has been supplemented
by the Acquisition ofProperty Act104 and Land Control Act.103 The latter Act aims at creating
for citizens of Botswana a statutory 'right of pre-emption' in the acquisition of land in
freehold sector including agricultural land. The former empowers the President to acquire
property or interest therein if he deems it necessary or expedient in the public interest.
It is clear that both the substantive content and scope ofBotswana property clauses are
in line with international law. They, by and large, reflect international standards for the
protection of property rights. They recognise everyone's right to own property or interests
therein irrespective of the manner of acquisition. The main controversial issues associated
with property rights are expropriation and compensation. It is apposite to examine whether in
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dealing with these issues the judiciary has been inspired by international human rights law
and sources.
1. Property expropriation.
In line with international law, Botswana property clauses authorise the State to invoke
its executive powers to expropriate property of any kind or description. Section 3(1) of the
Acquisition of Property Act empowers the President to expropriate any property if he deems
it expedient or necessary in the interest of defence, public safety, public health, public
morality, town and country planning or land settlements and for purposes beneficial to the
community. Section 8(1 )(a) of the Constitution authorises compulsory acquisition of property
if it is injurious to the health of human beings, animals or plants; for purposes of securing the
development; in the general public interest and where reasonably justifiable in a democratic
society.106 Additionally, property may be expropriated for purposes of exploitation,
development or utilisation ofmineral resources.107 This limitation broadens areas in which the
State may expropriate property. It takes into account special and peculiar circumstances of
Botswana economic needs. The economy of Botswana is dependent on mineral resources. It
is, therefore, reasonable to allow the State to acquire property for development or utilisation
ofmineral resources.
These limitations are designed to serve a significant societal need. However, they
should be balanced against the welfare and interest of the individual to own and be in
continued and peaceful enjoyment of his or her right to property.108 This means that
expropriation of property should not be arbitrary or discriminatory. In order to ensure
legality, it should be according to law.
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Unlike most African countries, Botswana did not embark on massive property
expropriation after independence. As such no major inroads have been made into the property
clauses. Consequently, expropriation laws have not attracted much judicial activity. One of
the few cases in which these laws were challenged is The President ofBotswana and Others
v. Pieter Bruwer and Anotherf9 On 10 July 1996, the Minister of Local Government, Lands
and Housing issued a notice in the Government Gazette expressing its intention to acquire for
public purposes the respondents' farm (Molopo Ranch) together with improvements thereon,
which included livestock (15 000 head of cattle) pursuant to the Acquisition of Property Act.
The respondents contested the acquisition. Their main complaint related not to the President'
power to acquire immovable property, in this case the farm, but the moveable property
especially livestock in the farm.
The main issue for the Court was, therefore, whether the President's power to acquire
property under the Acquisition ofProperty Act extended to moveable property. The Court did
not question the general authority of the President to compulsorily acquire immovable
property for public purposes. With respect to moveable property, the Court interpreted
Section 8(1) of the Act which forbids compulsory taking of possession of private property or
interest in or right over property of any description in order to determine whether the
President's power extends to such property. It held that the President had no power under the
Act to acquire livestock in the farm. Amissah, J.P. said, "Clearly, the Acquisition of Property
Act empowers Government to compulsorily acquire immovable property only. Government is
incompetent to acquire moveable property. A notice of intention to compulsorily acquire
cattle, which are moveables, as well as land, as the notice under consideration shows, is
invalid.."110
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This case was, of course, decided strictly and purely on the basis of the Acquisition of
Property Act which applies to immovable property only. It is significant to note that in
arriving at its decision, the Court invoked and relied on comparative jurisprudence from
South Africa and England. Jurisprudence from these countries influenced it to conclude that
moveable property could not be expropriated under the Act. However, no reference was made
to property clauses in human rights treaties. Moreover, no recourse was had to international
jurisprudence on the subject. The Court confined itself only to national legislation and
jurisprudence. It did not broaden its interpretation by relying on international norms and
jurisprudence. As such, it reinforced Botswana's inherited dualist theory.
2. The standard of compensation.
As highlighted elsewhere, neither the UDHR nor the First Protocol to the ECHR
mention compensation for deprivation of property and the standard of compensation.
Compensation is only mentioned in Article 21(2) of the ACHPR. This clause provides: "In
case of spoliation the dispossessed people shall have the right to the lawful recovery of its
property as well as to adequate compensation." In so far as it requires adequate compensation
for expropriated property, Article 21(2) approximates partially to Section 8(b)(1) of the
Constitution of Botswana which requires that any expropriation of property must be
accompanied by "prompt payment" of "adequate compensation."
Again, as indicated earlier on, the traditional rule supported by Western countries is
that compensation for compulsory acquisition of property should be prompt, adequate and
effective.1" This means that Botswana's standard of compensation diverges from the
international standard in so far the requirement of effective, or rather full compensation is
concerned. But it conforms to the adequate compensation standard favoured by developing
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States.112 In fact, within the context of economic and social conditions in Botswana, the full
compensation standard is too high and unsupportable. Local conditions demand the adoption
of much lesser strict requirements of compensation assessment. This is within its sovereign
right.
The opportunity to interpret and test the standard of compensation arose in Attorney-
General of Botswana v. Western Trust (Pty) Ltd, commonly called the Bonnington Farm
case.113 On 28 August, 1978 the Government compulsorily acquired two properties,
Bonnington Farms, used for grazing and farming purposes, belonging to the respondent in
terms of the Acquisition of Property Act. No dispute arose as regards the necessity of the
acquisition since the land was clearly needed for use in town and country planning in the
outskirts of Gaborone, the capital city of Botswana. When it became clear that the views of
the two parties as regards the appropriate amount of compensation were irreconcilable, a
Board of Assessment was constituted in terms of Section 11(4) of the Act to assess
compensation. Being dissatisfied with the level of compensation awarded by the Board to the
expropriatee, the Government appealed to the High Court of Botswana.
As regards the preferred method of determining compensation, the Court interpreted
the "adequate compensation" provided for by Section 8(b)(1) of the Constitution to mean the
total market value of the property or what a "willing seller and purchaser would most
probably have done in an open market sale" together with potentialities such as the industrial
development value and hope value. In arriving at this method of assessment, the Court
interlaced its decision with decisions from other countries interpreting similar provisions. It
noted that "..we consider that reading the constitution, and the South African and English
authorities on the point, the only fair method of valuation is one based on the principle that
the expropriatee should be compensated adequately for the land, and in so far as money can
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do it, be put back into the same position as he would have been had the land not been
expropriated."114 However, the Court did not adopt the same approach and refer to
comparative international norms and decisions of bodies such as the ECtHR interpreting
similar clauses.
In sum, it is clear that Botswana courts have not actively invoked international human
rights norms to construe Botswana expropriation and compensation laws. International norms
have played no role in assessing and reviewing the legal interpretation and application of
Botswana's expropriation and compensation laws against a backdrop of rapid urban
expansion. They have underscored Botswana's dualist theory by relying primarily on national
provisions and jurisprudence.
h. Educational rights.
The right to education, as with most human rights norms traditionally treated as
economic, social and cultural rights; the so-called second generation rights,115 enjoys no
constitutional status and recognition in Botswana municipal law. It effectively means that,
legally speaking, there is no basis for Botswana citizens to assert the right to education in
municipal law.
At the international stage, educational rights are enshrined in Article 26 of the UDHR,
Article 13 of the ICESCR and Article 17(1) of the ACHPR. These clauses are analogous to
Article 2 of the First Protocol to the ECHR, albeit, the latter guarantees the right in negative
terms. The former articles do not only recognise everyone's right to education but recognise
that primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all, and higher education
shall, with restrictions based on capacity, be widely expanded. These instruments enjoin
States Parties to provide education to its citizens not as a privilege but as a right. The
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cornerstone of this right is to provide individuals with opportunities of access to educational
institutions. However, with the exception of primary education, the right to education does
not guarantee to everyone the right of admission at educational institutions."6
Of these instruments, Botswana has expressed consent to be bound by the ACHPR.
This means that internationally, Botswana is legally bound to respect educational rights of its
citizens except that they cannot assert and claim these rights at municipal level as the ACHPR
has not been translated into municipal law. In practice, however, individuals enjoy the right to
education. Despite the fact that the educational system inherited at independence particularly
at the post-primary level, was among the least developed in Africa,"7 Botswana has taken
steps to provide education at primary, secondary, technical and vocational, and university
levels. The current National Development Plan is poised to attaining universal access to the
first nine years of education: seven and two years of primary and secondary education
respectively and to increasing access to other higher levels of education. The Department of
Non-formal education, set up in 1978 as part of a national strategy to widen access to
education, administers a national literacy programme as well as correspondence courses."8
In stark contrast to international human rights instruments, there is no legal provision
in Botswana allowing individuals to establish and maintain private schools and kindred
institutions of tertiary education. Notwithstanding, in principle, private schools are permitted
at owner's expenses. Limited resources makes it reasonable to permit these schools even
though some families cannot afford to send their children to these schools because they
charge high fees. Furthermore, parents have the right to ensure education and teaching of
children in conformity with their own religious and moral beliefs and convictions.
The enjoyment of the right to education is, however, limited by law in certain
instances. Section 29 of the Education Act, No. 40 of 1966 which deals with Teacher
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Training College Regulations compels pregnant students to withdraw from colleges. Their
return to college is conditional upon approval by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of
Education. Further, students cannot write examinations during pregnancy. They can only
write after six months of pregnancy. These regulations were challenged by students in SRC,
Molepolole College ofEducation v. Attorney-General ofBotswana."9 The Court of Appeal
noted that the regulations were not, as claimed by the College and accepted by the High
Court, protective measures to the mother and child, and an encouragement of a well planned
maternity leave. Rather, they were designed to punish unmarried young mothers. This is
particularly so since the recurrence of pregnancy results in permanent exclusion from
colleges. Moreover, married students are not subjected to similar measures. Their cases are
considered "particular cases."
Although, the Court did not make any specific reference to international human rights
norms in general and treaties protecting the right to education to arrive at its conclusion,
nonetheless, it approvingly referred to and relied upon Unity Dow case wherein eloquent and
extensive reference was made to human rights treaties to outlaw sex based discrimination.
Relying on this case, the Court underlined the fact that the whole intention of making
regulations specifically for women was unreasonable and unfair, and struck down the Teacher
Training College Regulations. The human rights treaties formed, albeit indirectly, part of the
basis of the Court's decision.
2. Conclusion.
Despite differences in the drafting style, phraseology and formulation, it is evidently
clear that the various human rights norms embodied in the Bill of Rights of Botswana bear
influence of Western liberal-oriented international human rights standards. Their juridical
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substantive content and scope are, by and large, in line with international human rights
standards. They were influenced by, and thus domestically effectuate, standards embodied in
international human rights instruments. Even the attendant derogation and claw-back clauses
are crafted in terms similar to those contained in international human rights instruments. This
was a clear, albeit implicit and indirect, attempt to accord international human rights norms a
role in municipal law of Botswana. By replicating human rights norms in international
instruments, the Bill of Rights implicitly incorporates international standards in these
instruments into Botswana national law.
The practical application and enforcement of human rights norms by courts has,
however, not been consistent with the idea mirrored in the Bill of Rights. When interpreting
the various human rights norms in the Bill of Rights, Botswana courts have not actively and
consistently referred to and relied upon similar provisions in international human rights
instruments and international norms generally. Their interpretation has mainly been based on
national law and jurisprudence. Admittedly, there are instances where reliance has been
placed on human rights treaties such as the UDHR, ICCPR, ECHR and ACHPR as well as
international customary law, for instance, in cases of non-discrimination, concepts such as
trial within a reasonable time, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, democracy
and the right to life. But, even in these instances such reference has been cursory. It has also
occurred in few and isolated cases. Moreover, it has not been consistent and uniform.
It is also significant to note that even in cases where international norms are invoked
and relied on to interpret domestic human rights law especially with respect to practices
which ex facie are repugnant to human rights norms contained in the Constitution, the courts
have not actively relied on international norms to invalidate these practices. For example,
international human rights norms have been relied on to challenge the death penalty, corporal
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punishment and hanging as a mode of executing the death penalty. In some of these instances
the courts consulted international sources mero motu and acknowledged their importance in
interpreting national law. But, they were not prepared to use norms in these sources to nullify
these practices. Instead, they invoke national standards to endorse them.
Thus it is evident that despite being authorised by the Interpretation Act to construe
national law on the basis of international treaties, Botswana courts have restrained themselves
from actively invoking international law to enhance domestic human rights protection and
enrich national jurisprudence. They have not been active enough to employ the rich legal
resource provided by international standards to interpret national law and accord these
standards a firm and solid place in Botswana national law. This approach reinforces the
classical dualist, not monist, theory inherited from the United Kingdom. It endorses the
conception that international law and Botswana national law are separate legal regimes. The
adverse effect of this approach is that it limits the role and effectiveness of international
human rights law in national law. Perceptibly, courts will continue to adopt this approach in
the foreseeable future in the light of the few cases and inconsistent manner in which the
subject is being handled unless, statutorily or constitutionally, the legal position is explicitly
clarified and courts empowered to invoke directly international law in general when enforcing
national law including human rights law.
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It has been demonstrated in the previous discussion that Zimbabwe, like Botswana,
inherited from Britain the dualist theory with respect to treaties and monism in relation to
customary international law. This chapter examines the post-independence practice in order
to find out whether this legacy still obtains.
The exercise is undertaken by examining human rights norms embodied in the
constitutionally entrenched Bill of Rights. These norms are compared and contrasted with
similar norms in major human rights treaties and instruments in order to find out not only
whether national norms reflect international standards, but also whether they embrace the
inherited legal legacy. In the process, the chapter examines how the Zimbabwean courts have
treated the subject in practice in the enforcement of human rights norms. In particular, it
examines whether, and to what extent, the courts have utilised international human rights law
and sources in enforcing human rights especially in trying to resolve some of the critical
issues that arise in the enforcement process.
1. Judicial Practice,
a. The right to life.
The municipal law of Zimbabwe recognises and protects the right to life.1 According
to Section 12(1) of the Constitution "no person shall be deprived of his life intentionally save
in execution of the sentence of a court in respect of a criminal offence of which he has been
convicted." This protective clause corresponds to Article 3 of the UDHR, Article 6 of the
ICCPR and Article 4 of the ACHPR. In particular, it is equivalent to Article 2(1) of the
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ECHR. The Zimbabwean, as with the similarly drafted Botswana, right to life clause, but
unlike the international human rights instruments, does not protect the right to life positively.
It protects this right in negative terms by merely forbidding the intentional deprivation of life.
It does not express its natural-law foundation as an inherent and inalienable right. By contrast,
the international human rights instruments protect this right in directory and positive terms.
They also articulate its inalienability.2
Nevertheless, the Zimbabwean clause recognises the sanctity of life by prohibiting its
intentional deprivation. This right is supreme. As Dinstein points out, it "is incontestably the
most important of all human rights. Civilised society cannot exist without legal protection of
human life. The inviolability or sanctity of life is, perhaps, the most basic value of modern
civilisation."3
However, unlike most international human rights instruments, and certainly the
UDHR and ICCPR, the right to life is not accorded absolute protection in municipal law of
Zimbabwe. Section 12(2) (a) to (d) of the Constitution recognises that this right may be
limited in self-defence; defence of any person or property; in order to effect a lawful arrest or
prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; for purpose of suppressing a riot,
insurrection or mutiny; in order to prevent the commission of an offence or if a person dies as
a result of lawful act of war. With the exception of the latter limitation, the Zimbabwean
clause corresponds to Article 4 of the ACHPR and, in particular, Article 2(2) (a) to (c) of the
ECHR. It is a transplant of the ECHR both in its formulation of the right to life and
circumstances under which this right may be limited or curtailed. These clauses recognise that
under exceptional circumstances, the State can use its executive powers to derogate from the
right to life. However, in order to ensure legality, the deprivation of life should unintentional.
Also, it should not be arbitrary.4 It should be in accordance with the law.
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Thus, in line with international human rights instruments, the Zimbabwean municipal
law recognises and protects the right to life. Its right to life clause incorporates international
standards for the protection of the right to life into municipal law. It, together with the
international human rights treaties such as the ICCPR and the ACHPR which Zimbabwe has
ratified, also imposes a legal obligation on Zimbabwe to protect individuals life.
It is significant to note that Zimbabwean courts have yet to analyse the right to life
clause especially in relation to equivalent clauses in the international human rights
instruments. It is thus not possible to assess whether and the degree to which the courts have
been, and will be, guided by international human rights standards when interpreting the right
to life. However, one issue that arises in connection with the implementation of this right is
the death penalty.
1. The death penalty.
The death penalty is a lawful and competent sentence under the national law of
Zimbabwe. Its imposition is authorised by Section 12(1) of the Constitution. As in Botswana,
execution in Zimbabwe is by hanging. It is reserved only for the most serious offences such
as murder, treason, rape, murder committed in the process of committing piracy and robbery
or attempted robbery where there are aggravating circumstances.5 However, its application
may be excluded but only in exceptional cases where there are extenuating circumstances, for
instance, where a person kills in self-defence or under provocation. Except for persons below
eighteen years and pregnant mothers, the death penalty can be imposed on anybody convicted
of these offences. The exclusion of the death sentence in respect to these categories of people
is designed to limit circumstances under which it may be meted out.
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As observed earlier on, Article 1(1) of the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR
Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty categorically and explicitly outlaws the death
penalty. However, Zimbabwe has yet to sign this convention. As such, Zimbabwe is not
legally obliged to observe it.
Significantly, in the early 1990s the debate, probed by the public and civil society,
both national and international such as Amnesty International, ensued on the abolition of the
death sentence in Zimbabwe due to a number of prisoners who were condemned to death and
awaiting execution. The debate was, however, aborted when Parliament impetuously passed
the Criminal Laws Amendment Act of 1992 which retains capital punishment for murder,
treason and military offences. This means that capital punishment in Zimbabwe will continue
to be lawful and permissible for some time in the future. As a matter of fact, it is carried out
in practice. A number of prisoners who were condemned to death and awaiting execution
have since been executed. According to Amnesty International Report, seven people were
executed in Zimbabwe in 1997, which represented a significant increase over previous years,
five others were sentenced to death and twenty-two remained under sentence of death at the
end of the year.6
It is significant to observe that the death penalty has notper se attracted active judicial
attention in Zimbabwe. However, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe has expressed its view
regarding its constitutionality and appropriateness in Zimbabwean municipal law. In Catholic
Commission for Peace and Justice in Zimbabwe v. Attorney-General, Zimbabwe and Others
the Court, per Gubbay, Chief Justice, expressly and categorically noted that "It was not
sought, nor could it reasonably be, to overturn the death sentences on the ground that they
were unlawfully imposed. The judgments of this Court dismissing the appeals of the
condemned prisoners cannot be disturbed. They are final, and the constitutionality of the
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death penalty per se, as well as the mode of its execution by hanging, are also not susceptible
to attack."7 This approach clearly marks a judicial confirmation of the institution of the death
penalty in Zimbabwean municipal law. It is ample evidence of self-restrain exercised by the
Zimbabwean courts to outlaw the death penalty. It underlines the fact that so long as the
judiciary hold this view, the death penalty will continue to be institutionalised in Zimbabwe.
It is submitted that this case presented an opportunity for the Supreme Court to
authoritatively determine the appropriateness of the death penalty in Zimbabwean municipal
law both against the Constitution of Zimbabwe and indeed current international human rights
standards. The fact that the legislature passed a law preventing its attack does not usurp the
power of the judiciary to determine its constitutionality. The Supreme Court has inherent
powers to determine whether or not the death penalty is constitutional in municipal law of
Zimbabwe.
b. Personal liberty.
Section 13(1) of the Zimbabwean Constitution provides that "No person shall be
deprived of his personal liberty save as may be authorised by law..." The specific safeguards
protected by this clause are the right of the accused or detainee to be informed as soon as
practicable, in the language that he understands, of the reasons of his arrest or detention; the
right of any person who is arrested or detained for purposes of bringing him to court or on
suspicion of having committed an offence and who is not released, to be brought as soon as is
reasonably practicable before court, and if he is not tried within a reasonable time, to be
released unconditionally or upon reasonable conditions and the right to compensation for
unlawful arrest and detention.8 Section 13(1) corresponds to Article 3 of the UDHR, Article 9
of the ICCPR and Article 6 of the ACHPR. It is also analogous to Article 5 of the ECHR.9
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These conventions similarly prohibit unlawful arrest and detention of individuals. However,
unlike the international human rights instruments, Section 13(1) does not protect security of
persons.
Section 13 recognises that personal liberty is subject to exceptions. The limitations are
crafted in almost the same terms as in the ECHR. They include, inter alia, limitations
designed to execute the sentence of the court, to secure the attention of the person in court,
based on reasonable suspicion of a person having committed an offence, in order to prevent
the unlawful entry of a person in the country or for the purpose of expulsion, extradition or
other lawful removal of the person from the country.10 These limitations are not peculiar to
Zimbabwe. They are also found in most international human rights instruments. They are
designed to serve a significant societal purpose.
It is evidently clear that Section 13(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, in line with
international human rights instruments, protects individuals physical freedom subject to
restrictions. It largely bears influence of international safeguards. It guarantees individuals
procedural fairness against unlawful intrusion with their liberty. This provision imposes a
legal obligation on State authorities to respect and observe the liberty of the individual.
The right to personal liberty constitutes a scheme for providing arrested individuals
and detainees with proper safeguards. It ensures protection of the individual physical liberty.
Any restrictions on this right must be authorised by law. The law relied upon must be
consistent with civilised and international norms and standards. Its rationale is to avoid
arbitrary deprivation of personal liberty."
The most controversial issue, however, concerning restrictions on personal liberty
concerns arrest by police officers on reasonable suspicion that a person has committed an
offence. Generally, the police in Zimbabwe have powers to arrest any person on reasonable
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suspicion of having committed a crime. The question that emerges is, what amounts to
reasonable grounds or suspicion that a person has committed a crime? This issue has been
entertained in the courts in Zimbabwe. It arose in Moll v. Commissioner of Police and
Others}2 The Zimbabwean High Court emphasised that the arresting police officer must take
reasonable care before effecting an arrest. He must personally have reasonable grounds to
suspect that the person being arrested has committed a crime. If he has difficulties in
determining whether suspicion is reasonable on the basis of the information to hand, he
should confirm it with superior officers. Otherwise the arrest is unlawful. In S v. Miller13 the
Court held that failure by an arresting police officer to take steps to confirm or allay the
suspicion makes the suspicion unreasonable and the consequent arrest unlawful.
It is clear that in both cases, the Court gave life and substance to the right to liberty. It
adopted a broad and liberal interpretation of this right. However, the Court decided the issue
entirely on the basis of Section 13 of the Constitution. It did not inform its reasoning by any
reference to international human rights standards or sources. It is not clear whether the
grounds of suspicion should take account only of local conditions or should also have regard
to international normative standards.
Another issue that has arisen in relation to the Zimbabwean personal liberty clause
relates to imprisonment for inability to fulfil a contractual obligation or civil debt. The
question is, does civil imprisonment infringe the right to personal liberty? In this regard,
Section 13(2)(c) of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of liberty save
"in execution of the order of a court made in order to secure the fulfilment of an obligation
imposed on him by law." This clause authorises derogation from the right to personal liberty
in cases where it is necessary for purposes of civil imprisonment. This issue arose in
Chinamora v. Angwa Furnishers and Others}4 Importantly, in trying to resolve this issue, the
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Court made eloquent reference to international human rights instruments and sources. The
respondent, Angwa Furnishers Ltd, obtained a default judgment in the Magistrates Court
against the applicant, Chinamora, for an amount ofmoney, being a debt incurred through the
purchase of goods from the respondent. The applicant was unable to pay. The respondent
made and obtained a decree of civil imprisonment against him. The applicant challenged the
Magistrate's order in the Supreme Court arguing, inter alia, that the civil imprisonment
ordered against him violated his personal liberty guaranteed under Section 13(1) of the
Constitution. He also based his case partly on the fact that imprisonment for a civil debt is
prohibited by Article 11 of the ICCPR which binds Zimbabwe as a State party, Article 1 of
the Fourth Protocol to the ECHR, Article 7(7) of the ACHR and on the ACHPR to which
Zimbabwe is also a party.15
Significantly, the Supreme Court also relied on these treaties in order to determine
whether the Magistrate Court (Civil) Rules, 1980 (Statutory Instrument No. 290 of 1980)
which authorise the Magistrates Court to order civil imprisonment were contrary to Section
13(1) of the Constitution. The Court noted that to adopt any other construction, always
acknowledging that an inroad into the substantive protection afforded by Section 13(1) should
be interpreted restrictively in favorem libertatis, would be to render the provision superfluous.
However, although the Court acknowledged the important constitutional issue raised by the
case and the prohibition of civil imprisonment in international law, it remained unpersuaded
by the argument that civil imprisonment violates Section 13(1). According to the Court, the
argument was purely an academic exercise devoid of any practical realities. It dismissed the
application and ordered the applicant to honour the judgment.
It is submitted that the Court approached the issue in a simplistic way. It also
accorded the international human rights instruments and sources relied upon by the applicant
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less weight and consideration especially if, by its own admission, any inroad into the right to
physical liberty should be interpreted in favour of the liberty of the individual. An argument
based on international human rights law and particularly human rights treaties far from being
an academic exercise, serves significant practical benefits. It gives additional practical force
and impetus to the protection in question and ensures that the liberty of the individual is
indeed safeguarded.
Personal liberty has been the main focal issue in cases of arrest and detention without
trial or preventive detention especially during state of emergencies.16 Under the Zimbabwean
Constitution, primary powers to declare a state of emergency resides with Parliament. But the
actual power to declare the state of emergency reposes in the President after obtaining
parliamentary approval.17 The state of emergency may be declared if the President thinks it is
necessary or expedient for public safety, public order and essential services and preservation
of peace, order and good government. Since independence, the President has exercised these
emergency powers due to constant threats posed by the erstwhile South African regime in
pursuit of its destabilisation campaign of its neighbouring Southern African States. To realise
its aim, the South African Government sponsored espionage agents against its neighbours.
Disturbances in Matebeleland areas in the late 1980's also forced the government of
Zimbabwe to declare state of emergencies in these areas. Consequently, the police arrested
and detained several people under emergency laws.18
These arrests and preventive detentions were challenged in courts. One case in which
they were challenged is Minister of Home Affairs v. Dabengwaf The respondent was
charged with high treason. He was detained under Section 17 of the Emergency Powers
(Maintenance of Law and Order) Regulations of 24 May 1983. According to paragraph
2(1 )(b) of the Second Schedule of the Constitution, his detention was subject to review
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"forthwith" after the expiry of thirteen days by a review tribunal. His detention was, however,
not reviewed. He applied to the High Court for an order directing his release. The High Court,
in granting the writ de homine libero exhibendo observed that the respondent's continued
detention in the face of the failure to effectuate review provisions constituted an illegality
which could not be allowed to perpetuate. It declared his detention illegal. On appeal, the
Supreme court reversed this order reasoning that it is not in every case that failure to afford
personal liberty safeguards results in the granting of this order. The Court may compel the
authorities to comply with the regulations. Nevertheless, the Court emphasised the crucial
importance of the right to personal liberty of persons especially those under preventive
detention. According to the Court, state authorities are under a legal duty to safeguard this
freedom.
Further, in Minister of Home Affairs v. Austin and Another,20 the respondents were
accused of spying against Zimbabwe for the former apartheid government of South Africa.
They were arrested and detained under Section 17 of the Emergency Powers (Maintenance of
Law and Order) Regulations and the Official Secrets Act of Zimbabwe. They challenged the
detention order signed by the first appellant, Minister of Home Affairs, on the ground that it
did not "inform" them of the reasons for the detention as required by Section 17(2) of the
Emergency Regulations. The High Court, per Blackie, J., as he then was, held that the
respondent's detention was unlawful by reason of the first appellant's failure to supply
adequate reasons for their detention. On appeal, the Supreme Court endorsed and upheld the
decision of the High Court. It held that the detention order was defective in the information as
to the reasons of the detention. The appeal was dismissed.
Dumbutshena, C.J., as he then was, stressed that in drawing up the grounds of
detention, it is incumbent upon the detaining authority to appreciate that the detainee must be
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furnished with sufficient particulars to enable him to prepare his case and to make effective
representations before a review tribunal. A bare and bold statement that the detainee was a
spy was not sufficient to warrant his detention. In arriving at its decision, the Court referred to
Indian, English and South African decisions interpreting similar provisions on preventive
detention.21 Although the decision of the Supreme Court was sound in that it gave effect to
the right to personal liberty, it, however, did not rely on international human rights treaties to
reinforce its decision. It also did not draw inspiration from decisions of international tribunals
interpreting emergency provisions embodied in human rights treaties in the same way that it
did with comparative national jurisprudence. Decisions of these tribunals such as the ECtHR,
the European Commission of Human Rights (hereafter the European Commission) and the
Human Rights Committee (hereafter the HRC) are also useful in assisting the Court to
determine how these provisions have been interpreted at the international level. They guide
the Court in interpreting national clauses. They also broaden its approach towards
interpretation of national human rights law in this area.
By contrast, international human rights law and sources were invoked and relied upon
in Bull v. Minister of Home Affairs to interpret Section 13 of the Constitution.22 The
petitioner, a legal practitioner, petitioned the High Court for an order declaring that Section
106(2) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act (hereafter CPEA), Cap. 59 which
empowered the Minister of Home Affairs to oppose any application for bail the granting of
which would be prejudicial to national security was contrary to Section 13(1) of the
Constitution. He made the petition after his clients had been denied bail by a Magistrate
Court on the basis of Section 106(2) of the CPEA. The Minister opposed the application
arguing, inter alia, that Section 106(2) could not be tested against Section 13(1) of the
Constitution since the denial of bail to the accused was in the interest of national security.
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After construing both clauses, the Court concluded that Section 106(2) could be tested
against, and was indeed contrary to, Section 13(1) of the Constitution. It held that Section
106(2) was unconstitutional.
Crucially, the High Court arrived at its conclusion by, inter alia, relying on decisions
of the ECtHR interpreting Article 5 of the ECHR. It noted that its conclusion was "fortified
by the passage in the judgment of the European Court on Human Rights in the case of
Stogmuller v. Austria 1 EHHR 155 at 190-91...speaking of Article 5 of the European
Convention on Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms (which article is the parent of
Section 13 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe) and more specifically of Article 5(1 )(c).." The
ECtHR decision in Stogmuller v. Austria influenced the Supreme Court to declare that
Section 106(2) was contrary to Section 13(1). This decision is one of the few cases in which
the Zimbabwean courts have invoked and relied on international human rights standards to
interpret preventive detention regulations in relation to the right to personal liberty. It
reinforced the Court's decision that Section 106(2) of the CPEA was unconstitutional.
It is apparent from these pronouncements that in those cases that were decided
immediately after Zimbabwe's independence, the courts were reluctant to invoke and rely
upon international human rights standards and sources to declare unlawful emergency laws
and regulations. These courts were staffed by pre-independence judges. Their approach
towards human rights law was still guided and influenced by discriminatory and apartheid¬
like laws of the former Southern Rhodesia. They had not yet developed a human rights
culture. The decision in Bull v. Minister ofHome Affairs made a significant inroad into this
approach.
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c. Fair trial guarantees.
The municipal law of Zimbabwe embraces fair trial safeguards. These guarantees are
elaborately recognised and protected by Section 18 of the Constitution. The clause is in line
with Article 10 of the UDHR and Article 7 of the ACHPR. In particular, the safeguards in
Section 18 are replicated and amplified in detailed and all-embracing Articles 14 and 6 of the
ICCPR and ECHR respectively. Thus, as with international human rights instruments, the
Zimbabwean fair trial clause protects rights such as public hearing, trial by an independent
and impartial tribunal, trial within a reasonable time, the right to legal counsel and right of the
accused to have proceedings conducted in the language that he/she understands. It is in direct
accord with international human rights standards.
The clauses reveal most of the standard principles and norms evolved for the
protection of the right to a fair trial or guarantees of due process of law. They encapsulate
most of the necessary safeguards and minimum acceptable standards of justice associated
with a fair hearing. The basic aim of these standards is to protect the individual interest in
fundamental criminal justice and legal certainty.23 The examination that follows focuses on
some of the specific guarantees embodied in the right to a fair trial.
1. Trial within a reasonable time.
In terms of Section 18(2) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe "If any person is charged
with a criminal offence, then, unless the charge is withdrawn, the case shall be afforded a fair
hearing within a reasonable time.."24 This protection ensures that there is minimum delay in
determining the lawfulness of the arrest of an individual. The central issue is, what does trial
within a reasonable time really entail?25
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This issue was at stake in In Re Mlambo.26 The applicant had been arrested on 3
October, 1986 and charged with theft. He was released on bail after two weeks in custody. He
subsequently appeared in court on twelve different occasions up to August 1987 when
charges were withdrawn. However, in August, 1990, he was summoned again to appear in
court on substantially the same charges. He applied to the Supreme Court alleging that his
right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed. The overall length of delay was
approximately four years and seven months.
The Court considered several points. In resolving these points, it sought guidance and
assistance from the ECtHR decisions. The first point concerned the meaning of the term
"charged." The Magistrate in the court of first instance interpreted this term to mean the
moment when the accused person is brought to plead in court. The Court Supreme disagreed
with this interpretation. Relying on two cases of the ECtHR, namely Eckle v. Germany
(Federal Republic) and Foti v. Italy, dealing with an analogous Article 6(1) of the ECHR the
Court, per Gubbay, C.J., noted that "I have no hesitation in holding that the time frame is
designed to relate far more to the period prior to the commencement of the hearing or trial
than to whatever period may elapse after the accused has tendered a plea."27 This observation
was in line with what the ECtHR had said in Eckle v. Germany (Federal Republic), namely,
that " 'charge' for the purpose of art 6(1), may be defined as 'the official notification given to
an individual by the competent authority of an allegation that he has committed an criminal
offence.."28 Finally, the Court held that the appellant was charged either upon arrest or on the
first remand by the Magistrates' Court in October 1986.
The second point related to factors which the court is legally to take into account in
determining whether or not the accused person has been accorded trial within a reasonable
time. The Court again relied on the judgment of the ECtHR, namely, Konig v. Federal
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Republic ofGermany,29 dealing with Article 6(1) of the ECHR. It noted that each case had to
be considered on its own surrounding circumstances particular regard being paid to the
complexity of the case, the applicant's behaviour, the manner in which the case was handled
by state authorities, the very administration of justice and the interest of the society. As
regard the latter factor, the Court broadened the accused "presumptively prejudicial"
approach to societal interest. It held that four and half years was extraordinarily inordinate
delay. It further held that the delay was attributable to the State. Accordingly, Section 18(2)
was infringed. The Court ordered a permanent stay of the proceedings. It also ordered the
Attorney General to pay the costs of the application.
This pronouncement clearly demonstrates that in interpreting the protective clause on
speedy trial, the Zimbabwean Supreme Court drew inspiration from international sources
especially the ECHR and decisions of the ECtHR enforcing the right to be tried within a
reasonable time provision of the ECHR. They formed the basis for determining the meaning
and juridical content of the right of the accused to be tried within a reasonable time. The
Court used these sources to interpret this right liberally and broaden its scope.
2. Legal counsel.
Section 18(3)(d) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe proclaims that "every person who is
charged with a criminal offence shall be permitted to defend himself in person or, save in
proceedings before a local court, at his own expense by a legal representative of his own
choice." Paragraph (e) further declares that such a person "shall be afforded facilities to
examine in person or, save in proceedings before a local court, by his legal representative the
witnesses called by the prosecution.."30 These clauses accord individuals the right to legal
representation in line with international human rights instruments such as Article 11(1) of the
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UDHR, Article 14(3) (d) of the ICCPR, Article 6(3)(c) of the ECHR and Article 7(1 )(c) of
the ACHPR. They guarantee, in mandatory language, that the accused or defendant should be
represented by counsel or accorded an effective legal defence.31 The Zimbabwean clause
adopts the tone of the international human rights instruments by according the right to legal
representative to "every person." It recognises the inalienable nature of this right. It thus gives
expression to its natural law origin. Individuals must represent themselves in person. They
can, however, decide not to represent themselves in person and instead make use of defence
counsel. But this should be at their own, and not the State, expenses.
The importance of the right to legal representation in Zimbabwe municipal law was
stressed in S v. Woods and Another?2 The police extracted extra-curial confessions and
statements from the accused persons despite the fact that they, the accused persons, had
demanded to first consult their lawyers. The trial court did not exclude evidence obtained as a
result of these confessions when convicting the accused. On appeal, the Supreme Court held
that the police conduct was so serious a violation of the appellants' right to legal
representation that the confessions should have been ruled to be inadmissible evidence.
According to the Court, legal representation is an important safeguard in the criminal justice
system.
Moreover, in Minister ofHome Affairs v. Dabengwa, Fieldsend, C.J., as he then was,
underlined this safeguard when he said, "it is contrary to any true concept of justice that at the
discretion of a police officer a detained person should be unable to obtain legal advice and
consult with his legal representative. To allow that right in turn to be suspended when there is
a state of emergency would be to render it entirely nugatory."33 However, in both cases, the
Court did not make use of international human rights standards to reinforce its decision. It
based its decision only on national law ofZimbabwe.
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The requirement that individuals should defend themselves at their own expenses is
not peculiar to Zimbabwe. It is in line with international human rights standards. Generally,
individuals meet their own legal fees. However, free legal assistance is provided by the State
to individuals who cannot meet high legal fees charged by lawyers particularly for serious
cases such as murder and manslaughter. But in other cases of a minor nature, this right is
circumscribed by high legal fees charged by attorneys. Thus for those accused who cannot
afford these charges, the right is an illusory.
It worth noting that, unlike the international human rights instruments, Section 18(3)
paragraphs (d) and (e) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe exclude legal representation in
proceedings before "local" or traditional courts.34 This is based on the assumption that the
concept of legal representation does not form part of the traditional justice system and that the
officers who preside over traditional courts have no formal training in the law and procedure
of ordinary courts. As in Botswana and indeed most African countries, a great number of
people in Zimbabwe live under customary law and practices. The majority of cases are dealt
with in these courts. Clearly, denial of representation by legal counsel in these courts curtails
the accused's guarantee of a fair trial.
It is submitted that legal representation must be made available in local courts.
Individuals who come to these courts are entitled to justice in the same way as individuals
who go to ordinary courts. Clearly, Zimbabwe's municipal law diverges from international
human rights standards. Its municipal law is incompatible with the obligation Zimbabwe
assumed under the ICCPR and ACHPR to protect the right to legal counsel of persons living
under this system of law.
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d. Torture and kindred practices.
The domestic law of Zimbabwe outlaws torture and related practices.33 The relevant
Section 15(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe provides that "No person shall be subjected to
torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment or other such treatment." Although this clause
prohibits these practices by adopting a negative, as opposed to a positive, approach, it
nevertheless captures the sentiment of international human rights instruments by outlawing
these conducts in mandatory terms. It is literally equivalent to Article 5 of the UDHR and
Article 7 of the ICCPR. The latter additionally prohibits subjection of anyone without his free
consent to medical or scientific experimentation.36 Similar proscriptions appear respectively
in Articles 3 and 5 of the ECHR and the ACHPR. Under these instruments, torture and the
related conducts are non-derogable.37 Thus the Zimbabwean protective clause translates
international human rights norms on the prohibition of these conducts into domestic law.
At the implementation stage, observance of prohibitions against torture in Zimbabwe
has been compromised by the activities of the police and security forces particularly during
state of emergencies in the Matebeleland provinces and the outlying areas after the 1980
Elections.38 Following upraising from these regions, the Government accused supporters of
the opposition ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Peoples' Unity) party of orchestrating the
disturbances. It unleashed attacks through its security forces notably specially North Korean
trained force called the Fifth Brigade in these areas. Several people were reported to have
been tortured. The action of the security forces were widely condemned by non-
Governmental organisations such as the Legal Resources Foundation, the Catholic
Commission for Justice and Peace, and Amnesty International.39
It is worth noting that under the Zimbabwean municipal law, unlike the international
human rights instruments, torture and other similar practices are not prohibited in absolute
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terms. According to Section 15(2) to (6) of the Constitution, prohibition against torture and
other similar practices is not applicable to treatment reasonably necessary to prevent the
escape of persons in lawful custody, whipping of eighteen years under in loco parentis and in
the execution of the death penalty. These practices constitute exceptions to the prohibition
against torture and related conducts. Any act falling under these practices is legally
permissible. These are issues of major concern regarding prohibition against torture and
related conducts. They limit the practical implementation of this safeguard. In this regard, the
Zimbabwean protective standards diverges from, and falls below, the international standards.
The question that recommends itself is, do these practices amount to cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment or treatment? It is significant to examine how the Zimbabwean courts
have handled these issues and whether in trying to resolve them they have sought any
guidance and inspiration from international human rights norms.
1. Corporal punishment.
Corporal punishment or whipping, both judicial and non-judicial, has been one of the
prescribed modes of penalising persons convicted of criminal offences in Zimbabwe under
the customary judicial system.40 It is still retained even in the contemporary judicial system
for certain offences such as rape, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, housebreaking and
robbery. Whipping can be inflicted on both adults and minors, but not on female offenders.
The constitutionality of whipping has been challenged in Zimbabwean courts. It was
challenged in State v. Ncnbe.4i The Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether
subjecting a male offender to whipping was inhuman or degrading punishment hence contrary
to Section 15(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe outlawing torture and related conducts. The
Court made two observations concerning Section 15(1). In both circumstances it sought
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guidance from international human rights norms and sources especially the ECtHR decision
in Tyrer v. United Kingdom interpreting a similarly worded Article 3 of the ECHR. First, the
Court noted that Section 15(1) did not cover only torture. It also covers other lesser forms of
punishment or treatment. This means that torture has to be construed disjunctively, as the
ECtHR noted in Tyrer v. United Kingdom. The Court stated that "while the word 'torture'
stands alone in the subsection, the nouns 'punishment' and 'treatment' are qualified by the
adjectives 'inhuman' and 'degrading.' The use of the word 'or', and not 'and', between
'inhuman' and 'degrading' favours a disjunctive and not a conjunctive interpretation.
Certainly that was the construction applied to the identical protection by...the European Court
ofHuman Rights in Tyrer v. United Kingdom,.."42
In the second instance, the Court noted that what had to be examined in order to
ascertain whether the punishment was inhuman or degrading was the manner and extent of its
application. Relying again on Tyrer v. United Kingdom, the Court then held that whipping an
adult, by its very nature, was both inhuman and degrading and thus contravened Section
15(1). As Section 15(1) was virtually identical to Article 3 of the ECHR, the Court noted that
it was influenced by decision of the ECtHR in Tyrer v. United Kingdom where a judicial
birching of a 15-year-old youth was held to be degrading hence contrary to Article 3 of the
ECHR.
The Court further noted that it had to have regard to the fact that the abolition of
whipping in very many countries of the world demonstrates that it is repugnant to the
"conscience of civilised men."43 Justice Gubbay noted that he was persuaded that the
whipping which each of the three appellants was ordered to receive was relentless in its
severity and "contrary to the traditional humanity practised by most of the whole civilised
world, being incompatible with the evolving standards of decency."44 Moreover, the
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punishment was so excessive as to shock or outrage contemporary standards of decency.45
Finally, the court outlawed adult whipping as a form ofjudicial sentence.
It became clear that this decision related only to whipping of adults. The whipping of
male minors or juveniles continued to be regarded as constitutional.46 Two years later, the
constitutionality of whipping male minors was questioned in State v. A Juvenile41 An
eighteen-year-old male was convicted of an aggravated assault and sentenced to receive cuts
in accordance with Section 330 of the CPEA of Zimbabwe.48 The Supreme Court was split on
the vexing issue of whether or not juvenile whippping is constitutional. Significantly, both
camps based their views on the Tyrer case. The majority view represented by Dumbutshena,
C.J., as he then was, held that even the whipping of minors was inhuman and degrading, and
therefore unconstitutional. It needed to be abolished. In particular, Justice Dumbutshena
approvingly referred to the ECtHR decision in Tyrer v. United Kingdom thus: "The European
Court of Human Rights considered in Tyrer v United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 1 at 11 part
33, circumstances which made the punishment ofwhipping 'degrading within the meaning of
art 3' of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms... The European Court of Human Rights was of the view that: 'The very nature of
judicial corporal punishment is that it involves one human being inflicting violence on
another human being. Furthermore, it is institutionalised violence, that is in the present case
violence permitted by the law, ordered by the judicial authorities of the state and carried out
by the police authorities of the State.'"49 To demonstrate that he and his brethren were
influenced by this case, Justice Dumbutshena noted that "It would be strange were we to
come to a contrary view."50
In addition, the Court reinforced its reasoning with United Nations Standard
Minimum Rules for the Administration of Justice, 1985. Gubbay, J.A., as he then was,
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remarked "Although there is no explicit reference in international human rights instruments to
corporal punishment as a judicial sanction, a recent inroad has been made by the United
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, 1985 (the
Beijing Rules). According to Rule 17:3: 'Juveniles should not be subject to corporal
punishment.' The definition of juvenile is left to national practice."51 In fact, Gubbay recalls
that the decision of the Court in this case to outlaw whipping of juveniles was "influenced by
the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Justice (the Beijing
Rules)."52 The Court, per Justice Dumbutshena, questioned whether corporal punishment of
juveniles can really be justified in a civilised society with evolving standards of decency that
mark the progressiveness of a maturing society such as Zimbabwe?53 Finally, the majority of
the Court concluded that whipping of juveniles was inhuman and degrading, and therefore
contrary to Section 15(1) of the Constitution ofZimbabwe.
The contrary view, represented by Justice McNally, noted that the ECtHR did not
hold that all violence to the person is per se wrong. It merely stressed that the issue involved
value judgement. In the minority's view, whipping minors was not inhuman or degrading
because it, inter alia, imposed a "short, sharp, salutary and brief painful punishment which
achieves in very many cases exactly what is required." For this view, imprisonment in these
cases is unacceptable hence the necessity ofwhipping.
The Court proceeded to consider mero motu the constitutionality of whipping in
schools. Again, Justice Dumbutshena, as he then was, did not only rely on the decisions of
the ECtHR in Tyrer v. United Kingdom. He also sought guidance from other decisions of the
European Court interpreting Article 3 of the ECHR. He noted that "In Campbell and Cosans
v. United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHHR 293, the European Court of Human Rights considered
that the criteria used in the judicial punishment were applicable in a case concerning school
237
corporal punishment... It appears to me that in a system of education, which has formal rules
on corporal punishment drawn upon by a competent authority, the same considerations
governing judicial punishment must apply."54 Justice Dumbutshena proceeded to observe that
"The cases from the European Court of Human Rights cited above strengthen my belief that
once an authority has enacted legislation for the chastisement of school children by school
masters, the authority delegated by the parents to school teachers to inflict reasonable
physical chastisement on pupils disappears, that is, the common law no longer applies and
with it the delegated authority vanishes."55 According to justice Dumbutshena, "An added
advantage is that the courts of this country are free to import into the interpretation of Section
15(1) of the Zimbabwean Constitution interpretations of similar provisions in international
and regional human rights instruments such as, among others, International Bills of Rights,
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
and the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights."56 Clearly, the decisions of the ECtHR
and international instruments influenced the Court to also declare whipping in schools
unconstitutional.
The decision triggered sharp reaction from the Zimbabwean Parliament. Parliament
enacted the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 11) Act, 1990 and section 5 thereof
authorises whipping ofmale minors or juveniles. This Act also effected some amendments to
the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. Section 329 thereof permits moderate whipping of
six strokes on males under eighteen years. It is entirely possible that Parliament was
influenced by the divergence of opinion in the Supreme Court to override the decision in S v.
A Juvenile and re-introduce whipping of juveniles. This also explains why Zimbabwe has not
ratified the Torture Convention. Significantly, however, the judgments of the ECtHR played a
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pivotal role in the Zimbabwean Supreme Court's decision to outlaw judicial corporal
punishment ofboth adults and juveniles as well as whipping in schools.
2. "Death row " phenomenon.
The second problematic issue regarding prohibition against inhuman or degrading
punishment or treatment is the "Death row" phenomenon. The question that arises is whether
the "Death row" phenomenon or delays in executing the death penalty, in itself constitute an
inhuman and degrading treatment? This issue arose when attempts to challenge the
constitutionality of hanging in courts were forestalled in 1990. Parliament took an
unprecedented step of amending the Constitution to preclude any argument about the
constitutionality of hanging. Section 5 of the Constitutional Amendment (No. 11) Act
stipulates that the sentence of death cannot be declared unconstitutional on the ground that the
process of execution is degrading or inhuman.
Consequently, the challenge has been levelled not against whether the death penalty is
inhuman or degrading per se but rather at delays in carrying out the death penalty or the
"death row" phenomenon. The most far reaching decision in which this issue emerged is
Catholic Commission for Peace and Justice in Zimbabwe v. Attorney-General, Zimbabwe
and Others.51 Importantly, the Zimbabwean Supreme Court resolved the issue by reference to
international human rights law and sources particularly decisions of the ECtHR and HRC.
The three accused were each convicted of murder separately. They were each sentenced to
death and incarcerated for about four and half years while awaiting execution. The applicant,
a human rights organisation, brought an application to the Supreme Court on their behalf to
have the sentences quashed. It argued that delays in executing the appellants was inhuman
and degrading.
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The main issue for the Court was whether delays in executing a death sentence could
be regarded as an infringement of the right to freedom from inhuman or degrading
punishment. The Court referred to several decisions in various jurisdictions and concluded
that a delayed execution of the death sentence as in this case was a breach of Section 15(1). It
quashed the death sentences and substituted life imprisonment. For purposes of this study, it
is illuminating to stress that one of the leading international judicial pronouncements which
influenced the Court to quash the death sentences was the ECtHR case of Soering v. United
Kingdom.™ In this case, the applicant alleged that the decision by the Secretary of State in the
United Kingdom to extradite him to the United States of America to face a trial in Virginia on
a murder charge, would contravene Article 3 of the ECHR. The ECtHR held that the delays in
executions in Virginia amounted to inhuman and degrading punishment contrary to Article 3.
It upheld the application. This case was followed in Zimbabwe.
In addition, the Supreme Court invoked and relied on decisions of the HRC. It, per
Gubbay, C. J., as he then was, noted that, "In recent years the Human Rights Committee,
under art 5 para 4 of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, has handed down decisions on whether the length of detention on death row
amounted to a violation of the prohibitions against 'torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment' under art 7 of the Covenant...They are Earl Pratt and Ivan Morgan,
Communication Nos 210/1985 (20 July 1990) and Randolph Barrett and Clyde Sutcliffe,
Communication Nos 270/271/1988 (30 March 1992)..."59 In these cases, the Committee was
of the view that a very long period on death row, even if partially due to the failure of the
condemned prisoner to assert his or her right to seek a remedy, cannot exonerate the State
party from its obligations under the Covenant. Justice Gubbay remarked that "It is this latter
that I find the more compelling."60 Relying partly on these judgments, the Court noted that in
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the light of the constant fear by the prisoners of being put to death, the mental anguish and
suffering endured by them, the death penalty should be set aside. The Court further observed
that whether a form of treatment is assessed as inhuman or degrading depends on the exercise
of value judgment which has to take account of the emerging consensus of values in the
civilised international community, as evidenced by the decisions of other courts. Clearly,
these decisions also formed the basis for the Court to hold that the death row was inhuman
and degrading.
The decision in Catholic Commission for Peace and Justice in Zimbabwe v. Attorney-
General, Zimbabwe and Others has a far-reaching significance. It clearly demonstrates the
extent to which the Zimbabwean courts are moving away from the classical dualistic
approach of treating international human rights law and national law of Zimbabwe as two
distinct legal regimes each having a separate sphere of application. By relying actively and
rigorously on international human rights law and sources, the Zimbabwean courts recognise
the significant role of this law in municipal law. This approach is fully in line with
international obligations of Zimbabwe to outlaw any inhuman or degrading treatment or
practice.
3. Civil imprisonment.
The notion of civil imprisonment is another problematic issue which has arisen in
Zimbabwe with respect to prohibition of inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment. The
question is, does civil imprisonment amount to an inhuman or degrading punishment or
treatment? Civil imprisonment is flatly proscribed under international human rights law.61
Article 11 of the ICCPR categorically and unambiguously provides that "No one shall be
imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation." This clause is
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comparable to Article 1 of the Fourth Protocol to the ECHR which stipulates that "No one
shall be deprived of his liberty merely on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual
obligation." These provisions prohibit positively and mandatorily any incarceration of an
individual for inability to perform a contractual obligation or civil debt. They constitute the
basis for protection from civil imprisonment at international level. They contain additional
restrictions of the executive powers of the state authorities to deprive a person of his/her
physical liberty. These provisions cover any contractual obligation, namely, the payment of
debts, performance of services, or the delivery of goods. This right is non-derogable.62
The protection does not, however, cover criminal offences related to civil-law debts or
obligations of public interest, which were imposed by statute or court order such as payment
of maintenance under family law and detention for fraud. A person convicted of these
offences may be punished with imprisonment even when he is able to pay his debts.63
As indicated above in relation to the right to personal liberty, civil imprisonment in
Zimbabwe is authorised by Section 13(2)(c) of the Constitution. Moreover, in terms of
Section 27 of the Magistrates Court Act (Cap 18) "The Court may, upon the return of the
summons and whether the judgment debtor appears or not, make a decree of civil
imprisonment against such debtor and authorise the issue of a warrant for his arrest and
detention in any prison named in the warrant." These provisions constitute the basis for civil
imprisonment under municipal law of Zimbabwe. This is in sharp contrast to international
law.
However, according to Section 27(ii) of the Magistrates Court Act, civil imprisonment
shall not be ordered against a judgment debtor if he/she proves to the satisfaction of the court
that he/she has no means of satisfying the judgment debt either wholly or in part and either
out of his/her present means or out of future earnings or income. This clause creates an
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exception to civil imprisonment. It, however, imposes a duty on the debtor to prove that
he/she is unable to honour his/her debt. This means that if the debtor fails to discharge this
duty or there is sufficient evidence that he/she is able to pay but decides not to pay or divests
himself/herself of all his/her property, he/she is liable to civil imprisonment.64 This issue was
one of the issues that the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe was invited to adjudicate in the fore-
cited Chinamora v. Angwa Furnishers and Others. The applicant challenged a decree of civil
imprisonment ordered against him on the basis, inter alia, that the imprisonment contravened
the constitutional prohibition on inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. He argued
that if he were imprisoned for inability to pay his debt, this would amount to an infringement
of his immutable right not to be subjected to an inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. However, evidence on record indicated that the applicant was able to pay his
debt but he decided to divest himself of his property so as to avoid payment.
In resolving this issue, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe made eloquent reference to
international human rights instruments and sources dealing with imprisonment for inability to
pay a debt or contractual obligation such as Article 11 of the ICCPR, Article 1 of the Fourth
Protocol to the ECHR and Article 7(7) of the ACHR. The Court emphasised the point that
under each of these instruments, the implication is that only impecunious judgment debtor is
protected. They do not protect the debtor who has the means to pay the debt but obdurately
declines to do so. According to the Court, the purpose of these instruments is to protect the
individual against imprisonment for debt in circumstances where there is a genuine inability
to pay. Relying on these instruments, the Court finally held that the imprisonment of the
applicant was ordered not as a punishment but for wilful refusal to fulfil an obligation by
divesting himselfof his property. He was able to pay his debt but clandestinely decided not to
do so. Accordingly, since the choice whether to undergo or avoid the indignity and
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humiliation of incarceration rested with the debtor, the procedure of civil imprisonment did
not contravene the constitutional prohibition on inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. It was perfectly in order for the Magistrate Court to issue a warrant of civil
imprisonment against him.
It is submitted that the Court's utilisation of international human rights law and
sources to broadly interpret the Zimbabwean national law on civil imprisonment is a sound
one. The interpretation ensures that only people who are unable genuinely to honour their
debts are protected. It does not protect fraudulent or malicious debtors. This approach
challenges the Zimbabwean classical dualist theory with respect to conventional international
law. It seeks to bring the Zimbabwean protective clause in line with international human
rights regime.
e. Non-discrimination.
The principle of non-discrimination is recognised and protected under the municipal
law of Zimbabwe. It is outlawed in two provisions of the Constitution. Section 11 thereof,
which is exactly the same as the Botswana clause, provides that, "Whereas every person in
Zimbabwe is entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, that is to say,
the right whatever his race, tribe, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex, but
subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest..." Section
23 entitled 'Protection from Discrimination on the Grounds of Race, etc' provides in
paragraph (1) that "Subject to the provisions of this section - (a) no law shall make any
provision that is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect; and (b) no person shall be
treated in a discriminatory manner by any person acting by virtue of any written law or in the
performance of the functions of any public office or any public authority." This clause is also
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analogous to Section 15 of the Constitution of Botswana. It reinforces Section 11 by
protecting non-discrimination in greater detail. It prohibits any law that is discriminatory
either of itself or in its effect. It also outlaws discrimination of any person by a person acting
in accordance with any written law or in performance ofpublic function or authority.
These clauses correspond to Articles 2 and 7 of the UDHR, Article 14 of the ECHR,
Articles 14(1) and 26 of the ICCPR and Articles 2 and 3 of the ACHPR. Section 11, in
particular, corresponds to Article 14 of the ECHR despite the fact that it omits concepts of
religion, language, birth or other status embodied in this instrument. It clearly reveals the
influence of the European non-discrimination clause. It also slightly resembles the ACHPR
clause. The international clauses firmly enshrine the principle of non-discrimination. They
mandatorily prohibit, broadly and variously, discrimination on such grounds as race, sex,
language, religion, ethnic origin, political or other opinion.65 These instruments constitute the
cornerstone of non-discrimination at universal level.
Thus, in line with international human rights treaties, the Zimbabwean non¬
discrimination clauses outlaw discrimination based on whatever ground. Both clauses outlaw
discrimination in mandatory terms, positively and without exceptions. Moreover, every
person in Zimbabwe has an inherent right not to be discriminated against. Theoretically, these
clauses internally incorporate non-discrimination norms encapsulated in, and prohibited by,
these treaties. The form and content of this right correspond to international human rights
standards.
The enumerated grounds of discrimination in the Zimbabwean clause are wide-
ranging. However, most of these grounds are yet to be a subject of litigation in Zimbabwean
courts. For instance, notwithstanding the fact that racialism engulfed Zimbabwe during
colonial rule, it has not attracted much of judicial attention. But it is doubtless that should
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racialism arise in future court proceedings, the courts will express their revulsion against the
practice. The Zimbabwean courts especially the Supreme Court has exhibited a proactive
stance in favour of human rights protection in issues like corporal punishment. However, one
issue that has occupied a focal point in the courts of Zimbabwe is sex discrimination. It is
thus appropriate to examine how the Zimbabwean courts have treated it and whether in so
doing they have sought guidance from international human rights standards.
I. Sex discrimination.
It is significant to note that, as in Botswana, Section 23 of the Constitution of
Zimbabwe does not include sex as a ground of discrimination. Sex appears only in Section
II. However, both the High Court and the Court of Appeal in Botswana in the Unity Dow
case conclusively held that Section 15 of the Constitution was not restrictive and definitive,
unless this was the intention of the Legislature. Rather, it is merely explanatory of the word
discrimination. It also outlaws sex discrimination. By analogy, Section 23 of the Constitution
of Zimbabwe also outlaws any discrimination or differential treatment of individuals on the
basis of sex.
Discrimination on the ground of sex has arisen mainly with respect to discrimination
against the female sector of the society, or rather women's equality with men. This is a
pivotal issue on discourses on sex discrimination in Zimbabwe. In this vein, according to
Article 18(3) of the ACHPR, Zimbabwe is legally obliged, as a State party to this
Convention, to ensure the elimination of every form of discrimination against women.
Discrimination against women arises in two senses. First, the customary law
perspective. Secondly, legislation which adversely affect the status of women. In both these
areas, there is a body of legal norms which discriminate against women.
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First, customary practices. One of the features of the dual legal system in Zimbabwe:
customary law and general law, is that there is an entire system of customary practices
interacting with general rules which discriminate against women in areas such as succession
and family law, property, finance and contracts. For instance, customary law of succession
does not recognise the rights of female children to succeed to their father's property on his
death. Similarly, where the father dies intestate, his property devolves only upon his eldest
son but not other children. Where there is no eldest son, the property devolves upon the
younger son even where he has older sisters. Moreover, unless the husband makes a specific
bequest to his wife, she does not inherit from his estate. The estate devolves upon the eldest
son.66 However, these practices are yet to be tested in Zimbabwean courts in order to
determine whether, in line with international human rights norms, they are permissible under
Zimbabwean municipal law.
It is submitted that on strict application of Article 18(3) of the ACHPR, these
customary practices constitute discrimination against women. They are incompatible with the
non-discrimination norms especially in so far as they accord women less favourable treatment
as compared to their male counterparts. They are not only unreasonable as the High Court of
Botswana observed in Unity Dow case but are also utterly discriminatory, in content and
effect. They need to be corrected and modernised to effectuate universal standards.
On the second question of national legislation and sex discrimination, there is a body
of laws which limits equality of women with men. Legislation according unequal status to
women in Zimbabwe continues to exist. Women married in community of property still
require their husband's consent to acquire, cede or dispose of immovable property. According
to Sections 5 and 6 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, the acquisition of Zimbabwean
citizenship by descent or birth depends on the status of the child's father whether he is a
247
citizen of or lawfully and ordinarily resident in Zimbabwe, but not on the mother's status
except where the child is illegitimate. Thus the child cannot assume its mother's citizenship.
Moreover, women married to citizens of Zimbabwe are entitled to be registered as citizens
but not vice versa.67
The Zimbabwean Parliament has, however, introduced reforms to ensure that the law
gives equal protection to women. The Legal Age of Majority Act, No. 15 of 1983 and
Matrimonial Causes Act, No. 33 of 1985 are examples. Both legislation aim at alleviating
inequality against, and unfavourable treatment of, women. The Legal Age of Majority Act
sets the legal age of majority at eighteen years and extends it to customary law. The
Matrimonial Causes Act gives married women the right to institute proceedings in Court
without the assistance of the husband where he is domiciled abroad. In essence, both Acts
give women the right to transact in their own names.68
The Zimbabwean Parliament approach towards discrimination against women has
been augmented by the courts. Sex discrimination was one of the issues to be resolved by the
Supreme Court in Rattigan and Others v. Chief Immigration Officer and Others.69 In
resolving this issue, the Court made reference to and relied upon international human rights
law and sources particularly the ECtHR and HRC judgments, and the ICCPR. The Court was
faced with three applicants all of whom were Zimbabwean citizens. Each of them was
married to a non-citizen who had been refused a permit by the Department of Immigration to
reside in Zimbabwe. In an application to the High Court of Zimbabwe to have the decision of
the Chief Immigration Officer refusing their husbands residence in Zimbabwe to be declared
unconstitutional, they relied on two clauses of the Constitution, viz, Section 11 on non¬
discrimination and Section 22(1) on freedom of movement. As regards the former, they
argued that the refusal by the Chief Immigration Officer to issue residents permit to their
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foreign husbands was discriminatory. In other words, the alien status of their husbands
constituted an impediment to enjoy their freedom of movement. They were discriminated
against purely on the basis of sex.
Relying on the ECtHR decisions in Abdulazia Cabales and Balkandali v. United
Kingdom (1995) 7 EHHR 471 and Berrehab v. Netherlands (1989) 11 EHHR 322
interpreting Article 8 of the ECHR on the right to family life,70 the Supreme Court held that
the constitutional right to freedom ofmovement of a female citizen is contravened if her alien
husband was not permitted to reside with her in Zimbabwe. A decision or law that forbids her
husband from residing with her while allowing wives ofZimbabwean men to reside with their
husbands in Zimbabwe is discriminatory. The Court concluded that Section 5 of the
Immigration Act allowing wives of Zimbabwean men to reside in Zimbabwe should also
apply to women. Their husbands should be allowed to reside with them in Zimbabwe.
Moreover, relying on these judgments, the Court emphasised that Section 11 is not
merely a guide to the intention of the framers or a preamble to the chapter on fundamental
human rights and freedoms. It confers substantive rights on individuals. According to the
Court, Section 11 is '"the key or umbrella provision' in the Declaration of Rights under
which the rights and freedoms are subsumed, and., it encapsulates the sum total of the
individual's rights and freedoms in general terms, which may be expanded upon in the
expository, elaborating or limiting ensuing ss 12-23."71 The Court allowed the application.
The above ECtHR judgments formed the basis of its decision. They influenced the Court to
adopt a liberal and broad construction of Section 11 thereby ensuring that the applicants be
accorded maximum protection in fundamental justice.
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f. Property rights.
Property rights in Zimbabwe are elaborately recognised and protected in two clauses
of the Constitution. In terms of Section 11(c), every person in Zimbabwe is entitled to the
"protection for the privacy of his home and other property and from the compulsory
acquisition of property without compensation." Section 16(1), which constitutes the main
property clause, provides that "No property of any description or interest or right therein shall
be compulsorily acquired except under the authority of a law.." These clauses are similar to
Article 17(1) of the UDHR which guarantees to everyone "the right to own property either
alone as well as in association with others." Paragraph (2) thereof prohibits arbitrary
deprivation of property. They also resemble Article 14 of the ACHPR according to which
"the right to property shall be guaranteed." They are analogous to Article 1 of the First
Protocol to the ECHR. These provisions constitute the legal basis for the protection of
property rights at international level.72
Flowever, the main Zimbabwean property clause, Section 16(1), does not employ the
language of the international human rights instruments and formulate the individual right to
property in positive prescriptive terms. It protects property in a negativist manner by merely
prohibiting its arbitrary deprivation or compulsory acquisition. Moreover, property rights
under this clause are not inherent in human beings. However, unlike the international human
rights instruments, this clause goes further and protect interest or right in property from
compulsory acquisition.
Nevertheless, in terms of substantive content, the Zimbabwean property clause is
largely in line with international human rights law. It protects any property from unlawful
deprivation whether owned under the common law or customary law. This clause recognises
everyone's right to own property or interests therein irrespective of the manner of acquisition.
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Under this clause, every person has the right to own or hold any property lawfully acquired
and to dispose of such property. It constitutes the legal basis for the protection of individuals'
right to property in the country.73
The term "property" in this context is all-encompassing. It covers both movable and
immovable property. Moreover, in Hewlett v. Minister ofFinance and Others74 it was held
that a debt or compensation provided under the Government scheme for the benefit of victims
of terrorism was property within the meaning of Section 16(1) of the Constitution.
Critical but controversial issues associated with the right to property in Zimbabwe are
expropriation and compensation. Both issues are inter-connected. These issues have
preoccupied the attention of the Zimbabwean courts since independence. It is significant to
examine whether in an attempt to resolve these issues, the Zimbabwean courts have made use
of international standards for the protection of the right to property.
1. Expropriation of property.
The general rule that States have a sovereign right in contemporary international law
to expropriate or compulsorily acquire property either of its citizens or foreigners75 is also
embraced by Zimbabwean municipal law. Section 16(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe
gives the government executive powers to compulsorily acquire property of any description
or interest or right in property. This clause constitutes the legal basis for expropriation of
property in Zimbabwe.
The enumerated purposes for which property may be expropriated are detailed in
Section 16(7)(1) (a) to (o) of the Constitution. This clause requires property or interest or
right therein to be expropriated if, for example, it is in a dangerous state or prejudicial to the
health or safety of human beings, animals or plants; to satisfy any tax or rate; by way of
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penalty for breach of the law whether under civil process or after conviction for a criminal
offence and to prevent removal or attempted removal of property out of or into the country in
contravention of any law and in the general public interest.
In addition, property may be expropriated for purposes of securing the development or
utilisation of mineral resources. This limitation broadens areas in which the authorities may
compulsorily acquire individual property in order to meet special economic needs of
Zimbabwe whose economy thrives partly on mineral resources. It is a reasonable exception to
the protection of the right to property. These exceptions serve an obvious, albeit significant,
societal need. They are in stark accord with general international law. States have a sovereign
right to acquire property for public purposes. This principle now forms part of customary
international law.76
The sovereign right of the government of Zimbabwe to acquire property for public
purposes should, however, be reconciled with the fundamental right of individuals to own
property.77 It must be balanced against the welfare and interest of individuals to own and be in
continued, undisturbed and peaceful enjoyment of their right to property. In this regard,
Section 16(1) of the Constitution requires that expropriation of property should be under the
authority of a law. It should not be discriminatory or arbitrary. This safeguard ensures legality
in expropriation of property.
An opportunity to test Zimbabwe's expropriation laws arose in the fore-cited Hewlett
v. Minister of Finance and Othersf The Court was asked to determine, inter alia, whether
compensation awarded to Mr Hewlett under the pre-independence Victims of Terrorism
(Compensation) Act, but not paid out, and later frozen by the new War Victims
Compensation Act No. 2 of 1980 was compulsorily acquired by the State for the purposes of
Section 16(1) of the Constitution.
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The Court interpreted Section 16(1) in order to find out whether freezing of
compensation by the State amounted to compulsory acquisition of property. In doing so, it
did not only seek guidance and inspiration from comparative national judicial decisions. In
the process, it also drew inspiration from the ECHR and UDHR. After referring to Minister of
Home Affairs (Bermuda) and Another v. Collins MacDonald Fisher and Another 1980 AC
319 at 328-329 dealing with principles governing the interpretation of the provisions of the
Constitution on the Bill of Rights, the Court said, "It is known that this chapter, as similar
portions of other constitutional instruments drafted in the post-colonial era, ...was greatly
influenced by the European Convention for the Protection ofHuman Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (1953) (Cmd 8969). That Convention was., applied to dependent territories
including Bermuda. It was in turn influenced by the United Nations' Universal Declaration of
Human Rights of 1948."79 According to the Court, per Fieldsend, C.J., as he then was, "These
antecedents, and the form of chap 1 itself, call for a generous interpretation avoiding what has
been called 'the austerity of tabulated legalism.'"80 However, the Court held that
jurisprudentially, the State did not acquire Mr Hewlett's property as contemplated by Section
16(1) although it had benefited from the debt owed to him. Notwithstanding this conclusion,
the significant point to emphasise is that the Court informed its decision with these human
rights instruments.
In Minister of Home Affairs v. Bickle and Others81 involving confiscation of Mr
Bickle's immovable property, who was in exile in South Africa, pursuant to the Emergency
Powers (Forfeiture of Enemy Property) Regulations, the State asked the Court to uphold the
confiscation order as a valid exercise of powers conferred under Section 16(8)(b) of the
Constitution. This clause provides for the vesting or administration of 'enemy' property. The
Court rejected the argument that the word "enemy" should be brought under Section 16(8)(b)
253
on the basis that Bickle was not an enemy of Zimbabwe. It held that no state of war existed
between Zimbabwe and South Africa despite their hostile relation. Thus Section 16(8)(b)
could not be a basis for confiscating Mr Bickle's property.
The Court interpreted the word "enemy" by relying, inter alia, on international law. It
said, per Georges, C.J., as he then was, that "None of the cases cited by Mr Blom-Cooper
casts any doubt on the general proposition that in public international law the term "enemy"
can only have meaning in the context of a declared state of war or of armed conflict of a
character which can be categorised as a state ofwar."82
The Court then proceeded to examine whether the State could confiscate the
applicant's property or derogate from the protection of his right to property assuming a state
of war existed between Zimbabwe and South Africa. The Court examined this issue by
referring to the ECHR and the judgments of the ECtHR in the Cyprus case and Lawless case
dealing with state of emergencies. It then held that there being no state of war between the
two countries which could justify the state of emergency necessitating expropriation of the
applicant's property, the Emergency Powers (Forfeiture of Enemy Property) Regulations
were unconstitutional and thus null and void.
By contrast, in May v. Reserve Bank Zimbabwe,83 the High Court of Zimbabwe held
that compulsory acquisition of external shares by the Government pursuant to Section 12A
(6) of the Exchange Control Regulations 399 of 1977 amounted to expropriation of property
in terms of Section 16(1) of the Constitution without making any specific and express
reference to international law sources or standards. However, the Court approvingly relied on
Hewlett v. Minister ofFinance and Others in which the ECHR and UDHR were consulted
when interpreting Section 16(1) to include compensation.84
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The determination of Zimbabwean courts to invoke and rely on international human
rights norms to construe national human rights law was amply demonstrated in Nyambirai v.
National Social Security Authority and Others.*5 The applicant, a professional assistant in a
firm of legal practitioners, challenged the National Social Security Authority (Pensions and
Other Benefits Scheme) Notice issued by the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social
Services compulsorily requiring employees and employers to contribute three percent of their
salaries and wages to a Pensions and Other Benefits Scheme aimed at providing benefits to
employees. Section 4(1) of the Notice provided that all working persons between sixteen and
sixty years of age were obliged to register and contribute as employees to the Scheme. The
applicant contended that Section 4(1) infringed his right not to have property of any
description compulsory acquired in terms of Section 16(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.
The respondents argued that the mandatory contributions were not unconstitutional. They
were reasonably justifiable in a democratic society and in satisfaction of a "tax" in terms of
16(7)(a) of the Constitution. Both instances justified derogation from the applicant's right to
property.
It was common cause between the parties that the contributions amounted to
compulsory acquisition of property in terms of Section 16(1). The contentious issues were
whether they were reasonably justifiable in a democratic society and in satisfaction of a "tax."
As regards the latter issue, the Court had to construe the word "tax" in order to determine
whether it covered the contributions in question. In doing so, it relied, inter alia, on the
ECtHR decision in James v. United Kingdom and the ECHR and ICESCR. The Court
discerned several features which designate a tax. One of these features, according to the
Court, is that the revenue from tax should be utilised to provide services for the general
public. The applicant disputed this feature arguing that the Notice provides for no direct
255
benefit to members of the public in general. The benefits under it derive only for employees.
In determining whether the scheme was aimed at the general public, the Court took into
account the social and economic policies which prompted the Government to design the
compulsory contribution scheme such as provision of adequate social security for employees
upon retirement and in old age.
Most significantly for the present study, the Court also took into account Zimbabwe's
international obligation under the ICESCR, as a state party, to set up a social security scheme.
Gubbay, C.J., as he then was, said that, "..it is of significance that Zimbabwe has acceded to
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966. By its
accession, the Government undertook an international commitment to establish and maintain
a system of social security for its people."86 Justice Gubbay concluded that the passing of the
National Social Security Act fulfils that obligation.
Furthermore, relying on the ECtHR decisions in James v. United Kingdom and
Mellacher v. Austria, the Court was of the view that the determination of whether or not a
particular service or programme promotes public interest is a matter for the national
authorities which should be respected by the courts. It observed that the courts "will not
intrude but will allow a wide margin of appreciation, unless convinced that the assessment is
manifestly without reasonable foundation. See James v. United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHHR
123 at para 46; Mellacher v. Austria (1989) 12 EHHR 391 at para 51.87 The Court further
noted that it had to respect the Ministers' assessment that the scheme provides a service in the
public interest and it is not manifestly without reasonable foundation. Accordingly, the Court
concluded that the contributions made payable under the authority of Section 4 of the
National Social Security Authority Notice were in satisfaction of a "tax."
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Respecting the question of whether the "tax" was reasonably justifiable in a
democratic society, Justice Gubbay's answer was "emphatically in the affirmative." He was
influenced not only by the fact that most developed and lesser developed countries operated
the social security scheme but by the fact that "the right to social security and social insurance
is embodied in several international instruments... especially art 22 of the Universal
Declaration of Human rights, 1948, and art 9 of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, 1966. In addition, there are about 20 International Labour
Organisation Conventions dealing variously with medical care, old age, invalidity, survivors,
employment injury and unemployment benefits. See, in particular art 57 of Convention 102
(27 April 1955) and Convention 157 (11 September 1986)."88 According to the Court, "the
internationally recognised right to social security in the wide sense and the extent to which
that obligation has been implemented throughout the world offers cogent evidence of the
Government's objective in establishing the Pensions and Other Benefits Scheme in 1993 as
one sufficiently important to justify the imposition of the tax."89 Finally, the Court dismissed
the application.
It is demonstrably clear that international human rights treaties and decisions of the
ECtHR played a central role in the Court's decision. It is important to observe that the
Court's reliance on international sources did not end with the UDHR and ICESCR, and
decisions of the ECtHR. It also drew inspiration from international instruments adopted
within the auspices of the International Labour Organisation (hereafter ILO) to further
reinforce its reasoning. Reliance on ILO conventions widens the scope of the Court's
utilisation of international human rights standards and sources. It constitutes a firm challenge
to Zimbabwe's classical dualist theory regarding the status and role of conventional
international law in its municipal law.
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The concept of expropriation of property in Zimbabwean municipal law has attracted
attention particularly in relation to land. In pursuit of its land reform policy due to the
problem of landlessness particularly among the African population in the post-colonial
context, the Zimbabwean Parliament amended the property clause to bring it into line with
the exigencies of land reform. It enacted the Land Acquisition Act of 1992 to implement the
National Land Policy (hereafter NLP).90 The Act aims at designating, declaring and acquiring
derelict immovable property and land compulsorily, and allocate it to landless people. Section
12 of the Act empowers the President to compulsorily acquire land, inter alia, for purpose
beneficial to the public generally or to any section of the public. In particular, Section 12(1)
authorises the Minister responsible for land to designate any area or piece of land as land to
be acquired for resettlement purposes. As a consequence, the Government has used this
clause to designate pieces of land for resettlement purposes.
The Government land designation action was challenged in Davies & Others v.
Minister ofLands, Agriculture and Water Development.9I In April 1993 the appellants, five
commercial farmers, were notified that their farms had been designated in terms of Section
12(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1992 by the Minister as rural land to be acquired by the
President, as the acquiring authority, for purpose of resettling persons. Their written
objections failed to persuade the Minister to revoke the designations of the farms in question.
They brought an application to the High Court for an order declaring the designations of the
six farms in violation of their constitutional rights to property or interest therein and,
consequently of no legal force and validity. Having lost the case, they appealed to the
Supreme Court. In the Supreme Court, the inquiry revolved around whether or not the act or
effect of designation amounted to compulsory acquisition of property or interest or right
therein in contravention of Section 16(1).
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Unlike in the previous cases, the Court did not expressly invoke international human
rights instruments and similar sources to interpret Sections 16(1) in relation to designation of
land. It, nonetheless, indirectly utilised these instruments by relying on its previous decision
in the Hewlett case92 wherein it referred to the ECHR and the UDHR in order to determine
whether or not 'designation' of land amounts to compulsory acquisition. On the basis of the
Hewlett case, the Court concluded that the word 'designation' of land does not amount to
compulsory acquisition of land. It means identifying specific tracts of land for intended
acquisition whose effect is to restrict the owner's power to dispose the land without divesting
him with the right of ownership. But compulsory acquisition, according to the Court, signifies
the transfer of property or interest therein to the State in the sense of parting with ownership
or possession. This occurs with or without the owner's consent. Finally, the Court held that
the designation of the six farms did not amount to compulsory acquisition or arbitrary
deprivation of property as contemplated by law. It further noted that, in any case, designation
was clearly in the public interest. It dismissed the appeal.
2. Compensation.
Once expropriation of property is determined to be lawful compensation follows.
However, compensation is the most controversial aspect of the right to property. The initial
Section 16(l)(c) of the Lancaster House Zimbabwean Constitution of 1980 required the
acquiring authority to effect "prompt payment" of "adequate compensation" for the
acquisition of property or interest in property. But the interaction between the Lancaster
House property clause and the demand for meaningful land reform necessitated the
reformulation of the standard of compensation. Section 16(a) of the new Land Acquisition
Act, 1992 only requires "fair compensation."93 By contrast, as observed elsewhere in this
259
study, the UDHR and the First Protocol to the ECHR neither mention compensation for
deprivation of property nor indicate the standard of measurement. Compensation is only
mentioned in Article 21(2) of the ACHPR in terms of which "dispossessed people shall have
the right to ..an adequate compensation."
As indicated earlier on, the traditional rule generally supported by Western countries
is that compensation for compulsory acquisition of property should be prompt, adequate and
effective. This rule effectively requires full compensation for expropriated property.94 It has,
however, been challenged by developing States as too rigid. They maintain that a less rigid
standard of adequate compensation be adopted.95
It is clear that the Zimbabwean compensation clause diverges from the prompt,
adequate and effective international standards of payment. It has relaxed the standard of
measurement to fair compensation. This dichotomy between Zimbabwean local and
international standards is aimed at reflecting the country's local conditions which demand the
adoption ofmuch lesser strict requirements of compensation assessment.
The question of compensation arose in Hewlett v. Minister ofFinance and Others.96
One of the issues to be decided by the Court was whether the debt or compensation owed to
the applicant under the War Victims Compensation Act was compensation in terms of
Section 16(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. In its construction of Section 16(1), the Court
relied on comparative national jurisprudence dealing with the interpretation of constitutional
provisions on declaration of human rights in which specific reference was made to the ECHR
and UDHR. In particular, it relied on the Privy Council decision in Minister ofHome Affairs
(Bermuda) and Another v. Collins MacDonald Fisher and Another 1980 AC 319 at 328-329
interpreting Section 11(5) of the declaration of human rights in the Constitution of Bermuda
dealing with the right of a person to live in Bermuda. This case relied on the ECHR and
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UDHR to interpret this provision. Finally, the Zimbabwean High Court, per Fieldsend, C.J.,
as he then was, relied on these authorities and held that the debt owed to the applicant was
compensation falling within the framework of Section 16(1) and was as such a
constitutionally enforceable property right. Clearly, the Court was influenced by the Privy
Council decision in which it utilised ECHR and UDHR to interpret the right of a person to
live in Bermuda under the Constitution of Bermuda. Through this decision, it indirectly used
both instruments to broadly and liberally interpret Section 16(1) and unambiguously held that
a debt owed to the applicant was compensation.
An opportunity to test the Zimbabwean compensation standard also arose in the fore-
cited Davies & Others v. Minister ofLands, Agriculture and Water Development,97 However,
the Court did not analyse the notion of fair compensation. Having held that the designation of
land did not amount to expropriation and hence not compensable, it was unnecessary for the
Court to examine what amounts to fair compensation. But had the issue been pursued actively
by the parties, it is entirely possible that in line with its emerging human rights proactiveness,
the Supreme Court could have examined the issue and gone further to enlighten its decision
with comparative international human rights normative standards.
One important aspect of the Zimbabwean property clause is that it sets a time limit for
the payment of compensation. Section 16(l)(c) of the Constitution requires compensation to
be made within a reasonable time. This requirement is in line with international law as
enunciated in Erkner & Hofauer v. Austria where the ECtHR found a violation of human
rights when land compensation proceedings had lasted an unreasonable time, more than
QO
sixteen years.
Moreover, in order to ensure legality, Section 16(1 )(d) of the Constitution of
Zimbabwe entitles any person who contests the acquisition of property or the amount of
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compensation payable to challenge it in court. The claimant may further apply to court for the
prompt return of the property if the court does not confirm the acquisition or to appeal to the
Supreme Court. It appears that this safeguard was included in the property clause with the
principal aim of assuring settler communities that property titles acquired by whatever means
during the colonial era would not be arbitrarily repossessed by the new breed of African
rulers. Significantly, this mechanism ensures that expropriation be carried out in strict accord
with the law. It ensures procedural fairness.
Clearly, the Zimbabwean right to property clause corresponds fully to international
standards. It is in line with international standards. Moreover, in practice, judicial
pronouncements demonstrate the extent to which the courts increasingly invoke and rely on
international human rights standards when interpreting the Zimbabwean right to property
clause. The courts in Zimbabwe recognise the sovereign right of the State to use its executive
powers to confiscate property but also seek to ensure that these powers are used in accordance
with international human rights standards. Thus the courts have relied upon international
sources especially the ECHR and judgments of the ECtHR to interpret the word property in
Section 16(1) widely and liberally to encompass shares and compensation. They have moved
away from the dualistic conception of international and national law in implementing
property rights in Zimbabwean domestic law.
g. Freedom of movement and its relation with protection of the family.
The right to freedom of movement enjoys express constitutional status and
recognition in Zimbabwe." Section 22(1) of the Constitution expressly declares that "no
person shall be deprived of his freedom ofmovement, that is to say, the right to move freely
throughout Zimbabwe, the right to reside in any part of Zimbabwe, the right to enter and to
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leave Zimbabwe and immunity from expulsion from Zimbabwe." On the international plane,
corresponding safeguards are articulated in Article 13(1) and (2) of the UDHR, Article 12(1)
to (4) of the ICCPR and Article 12(1) to (5) of the ACHPR. The latter, additionally includes
the right of every individual who is persecuted to seek and obtain asylum in accordance with
international conventions.100
Thus in line with international human rights instruments, the Zimbabwean clause
reflects international standards for the protection of freedom of movement. It enshrines the
individual liberty and freedom to move freely and unhindered within Zimbabwe. This
freedom includes the right to move unhindered and freely in and out of the country. The
clause constitutes the bedrock of the right to freedom of movement in Zimbabwe. It is the
fountain of Zimbabwe's legal obligation to protect freedom ofmovement of the individual. In
practice, State authorities recognise and respect individual freedom of movement. Thus this
freedom is generally implemented in Zimbabwe.
Several cases have, however, recently come before the Zimbabwean courts based on
Section 22(1) of the Constitution. These cases have mainly involved the mobility of women
citizens married to aliens. In resolving these cases, the Zimbabwean courts have drawn
heavily on international human rights norms and sources particularly the ECtHR judgments
and the ECHR. One such case is the fore-cited Rattigan and Others v. Chief Immigration
Officer and Others One of the issues to be resolved by the Supreme Court was whether the
refusal of the Chief Immigration Officer to grant the applicant's husbands residence in
Zimbabwe was unconstitutional in that it infringed Section 22(1) on freedom of movement.
The issue was premised on the fact that if their husbands could not stay in Zimbabwe it
effectively meant that each of the applicants had also to leave in order to maintain their
marital relationships. However, the State argued that freedom ofmovement of the applicants
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had not been infringed because they were still entitled to freely move in and out of
Zimbabwe. According to the State, the issue ofmarriage was of no relevance. Their choice to
accompany their husbands was unconnected with their freedom ofmovement.
Although the main issue concerned the infringement of the applicants' freedom of
movement, the decision of the Court centred mainly around married life. The Court described
marriage as a juristic act sui generis. It gives rise to a physical, moral and spiritual
community of life - a consortium omnis vitae. This analysis of the sanctity ofmarriage led the
Court to refer to international human rights standards particularly respective Articles 8(1) and
17 of the ECHR and ICCPR on the right to family life. The Court noted that "Decisions
concerning art 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and art 8(1) of
the European Convention on Human Rights, both provisions of which afford protection
against interference with family life, lay emphasis upon the importance of preserving well-
established family ties."102 The Court proceeded, relying on the HRC decision, to observe that
"In Aumeeruddy-Cziffra and Others v Mauritius (1981) 62 International Law Reports 255,
the United Nations Human Rights Committee examined the effect of the law passed by the
Government of Mauritius which removed the right of alien husbands of Mauritian women
citizens to the right of residence and immunity from deportation, and found that it had
infringed art 17 of the Covenant."103
The Court further referred to and relied on the decisions of the ECtHR, namely,
Abdulaziz Cabales and Balkandi v. United Kingdom, Berrehab v. Netherlands, Moustaquin v
Belgium and Beljoudi v. France all of which concerned the interpretation of Article 8(1) of
the ECHR on the right to the family and concluded, per Gubbay, C.J., as he then was, that
when Article 8(1) of the ECHR and Article 17 of the ICCPR are taken in conjunction with
Section 11 and 22(1) and interpreting all of them generously and liberally, "I reach the
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Conclusion that to prohibit the husbands from residing in Zimbabwe and so disable them
from living with their wives undermine and devalue the protection of freedom of movement
accorded to each of the wives as a member of a family unit."104 It then concluded that the
applicants' freedom of movement has been violated. The courts emphasised that it had the
duty to preserve family life in line with international human rights standards.
It is submitted that while the decision of the Court may be viewed as extreme judicial
activism in the sense that it compared two unrelated provisions of the Constitution,105 it
underscores the extent to which the Zimbabwean courts are prepared to go when invoking
and utilising international human rights standards to construe domestic legislation particularly
where it diverges from or falls short of meeting international standards. In a way, it
demonstrates the extent to which the court are drifting away from the perception that
international law and Zimbabwean national law are separate and govern different spheres of
conduct. It also underlines how the courts can use international law to complement national
law generally and national human rights standards in particular.
h. Freedom of expression.
According to Section 20(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, "Except with his own
consent or by way of parental discipline, no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his
freedom of expression, that is to say, freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart
ideas and information without interference, and freedom from interference with his
correspondence." This clause is similar to Article 19 of the UDHR, Article 19(1) to (3) of the
ICCPR, Article 10(1) and (2) of the ECHR and Article 9(1) and (2) of the ACHPR. These
clauses positively protect the right to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and
ideas without interference by public authorities and regardless of boundaries. They impose a
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duty on member-states and certainly Zimbabwe to respect and protect individuals freedom of
expression. Moreover, state authorities are obliged to respect this freedom.106
The Zimbabwean clause, in line with international human rights standards, fully
protects freedom of expression. It accords individuals the right to express their views freely
subject to the standard limitations ofpublic interest, the protection of the reputation of others,
maintenance of the authority and independence of the courts. This clause translates the
international normative standards on freedom of expression into Zimbabwean municipal law.
Freedom of expression is one of the fundamental human rights norms that have
attracted judicial activity in Zimbabwe. It was a point of contention in Woods and Others v.
Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs and Others107 concerning the
constitutionality of restricting access to receiving and sending personal letters and
correspondences of prisoners. The applicants, described as "Class D Maximum Security
Prisoners," were serving life sentences. They were restricted by prison regulations to writing
and receiving only one letter every month. They challenged the regulations on the ground that
they contravened their constitutional right to freedom of expression.
The Zimbabwean Supreme Court had no difficulty in holding that the regulation was
contrary to the Constitution and that it was not reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.
The judgments of the ECtHR in Golder v. United Kingdom and Silver v. United Kingdom
formed, in part, the basis of the Court's decision that a prisoner does not shed his fundamental
rights at the prison gate.
Recourse to international human rights norms and sources especially the jurisprudence
of the ECtHR was further had in In re Munhumeso.108 The applicants were charged with
contravening Section 6 of the Zimbabwean Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, (Cap. 65) in
that they staged a public procession notwithstanding refusal of permission by the police.
266
Section 6 gave the police general powers to sanction any public demonstration and to refuse
permission without giving reasons. In court, the applicants contended that Section 6 infringed
their freedom of expression and assembly. The Court construed Section 6 against Section
20(1) of the Constitution on freedom of expression. It concluded that indeed Section 6
infringed Section 20(1) of the Constitution. The Court did this by invoking and relying on
decisions of the ECtHR in Handyside v. United Kingdom interpreting the equivalent Article
10(1) of the ECHR. It then, per Gubbay, C.J., observed that "The importance attaching to the
exercise of the right of freedom of expression and assembly must never be underestimated.
They lie at the foundation of a democratic society and are 'one of the basic conditions for the
progress and development of every man', per European Court of Human Rights in Handyside
v. United Kingdom 1 EHHR 737 at para 49."109
According to the Court, this right is one of the most precious of all the guaranteed
freedoms. It serves four broad special purposes, viz., it helps an individual to obtain self-
fulfilment; it assists in the discovery of truth; it strengthens the capacity of an individual to
participate in decision-making and provides a mechanism by which it would be possible to
establish a reasonable balance between stability and social change. In addition, the Court
referred to the ECtHR pronouncement in Klass and Others v Federal Republic of Germany 2
EHHR 214 at para 48110 and emphasised that an interpretation of the law that favours the
liberty of the individual is to be preferred to the one that interferes with it. In the result, the
Court found in favour of the applicants and struck down the relevant provision of the Law
and Order (Maintenance) Act restricting public demonstrations.
Freedom of expression was also an issue in Retrofit Pvt Ltd v. Post and
Telecommunications.'" The applicant, Retrofit Pvt Ltd, invited the Supreme Court of
Zimbabwe to determine whether or not the Postal and Telecommunications Services Act of
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Zimbabwe abridged its right of freedom of expression by prohibiting it from operating a
mobile cellular telephone service. The Act vested in the Postal and Telecommunications
Corporation an exclusive monopoly to provide telecommunication services within, into and
from Zimbabwe, and so prohibited the establishment by a private company of a mobile
cellular telephone service for public use. The Court considered several points. Significantly,
in deciding these points, it relied extensively on international comparative judicial
pronouncements and international human rights treaties and instruments.
First, locus standi. In opposing the application, the respondent had argued that the
applicant, as a corporate body, lacked the necessary locus standi to challenge the Postal and
Telecommunications Services Act in the High Court. The Court held that the applicant had
locus standi to challenge the Act. It reached its decision by relying on the judgment of the
ECtHR in Autronic AG v. Switzerland in which the Court said that the fact that the Autronic
AG was a limited company and its activities were commercial could not deprive it of the
protection of Article 10 of the ECHR on freedom of expression.112 Freedom of expression is
conferred universally, on "everyone", individual and corporate personality alike.
As regards the second point whether the Postal and Telecommunications Services Act
breached Section 20(1) of the Constitution, the Court, again relying on international human
rights law and sources, concluded that it did. The Court emphasised the fact that the
fundamental freedom of expression is 'one always to be jealously guarded by the Courts.' It
retorted that, "This approach, which underscores the pre-eminence of freedom of expression
as an indispensable condition for a free and democratic society, conforms with what is
reflected in international human rights instruments, some of which Zimbabwe has
ratified/acceded to. See art 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; art 19 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; art 10 of the European Convention for
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the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; art 9 of the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights; art 4 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man; and art 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights."113 These instruments
formed, in part, the basis for the court decision that the Postal and Telecommunications
Services Act contravened Section 20(1) of the Constitution and was therefore
unconstitutional.
These judicial pronouncements clearly and amply demonstrate the readiness and the
extent to which the Zimbabwean courts especially the Supreme Court, as the custodian and
protector of fundamental human rights of individuals, invoke and rely on international human
rights law embodied in international sources to construe the national human rights norm of
expression. Admittedly, courts do not expressly say that the international human rights norms
are part of the municipal law of Zimbabwe and should be treated as such. They, however,
recognise the significant role that these norms can play in the domestic enforcement of human
rights law. The approach of the Zimbabwean courts does not only depart from the inherited
classical dualist theory but also has the beneficial effect of injecting international normative
standards on freedom of expression into the national law of Zimbabwe. It has an enriching
effect on national human rights standards and jurisprudence.
2. Conclusion.
It is abundantly clear from the fore-going discussion that, by and large, the various
human rights norms in the Zimbabwean Bill of Rights, as in Botswana and Namibia, are in
line with international human rights standards. The Bill incorporates, albeit implicitly,
international human rights standards embodied in major international human rights
instruments and treaties into the domestic law of Zimbabwe. The juridical content of the
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human rights norms in the Bill of Rights is almost similar to rights in international human
rights instruments. The derogation and claw-back clauses are also cast in the same terms. Put
differently, the Bill of Rights essentially reflects the influence of international human rights
standards. The difference pertains only to the formulation of these clauses. Thus most
Zimbabwean human rights clauses, unlike the international ones, do not protect these rights in
positive terms. Rather, they adopt a negativist approach. Moreover, most clauses do not give
the natural-law basis of these rights. They are granted on the basis of the standing of the
individual and thus lend themselves to a positivistic approach. Their recognition is dependent
upon the positive laws of the state.
Most significantly, the spirit of the Bill of Rights has been expressed and reinforced
by the judiciary. Judicial practice indicates that in enforcing national human rights law, the
Zimbabwean courts have began to drift away from the apparently dualistic approach inherited
from Britain in the way they treat international norms in domestic law. It is evidently clear
that when interpreting the various human rights norms in the Bill of Rights, the Zimbabwean
courts have actively referred to and relied upon similar provisions in international human
rights instruments. Their interpretation has not been solely based on national law particularly
the Constitution of Zimbabwe. They have drawn inspiration from international human rights
instruments such as the UDHR, ICCPR, ECHR and ACHPR as well as general international
human right law. For example, these sources have been relied upon to interpret concepts such
as trial within a reasonable time, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, the right to
property, freedom of expression and freedom of movement. The use of these instruments to
construe national human rights law has been consistent and uniform. It has not been merely
cursory and intermittent.
270
Moreover, the courts have not only referred to international human rights norms. They
have also invoked and relied actively on these norms to invalidate practices which adversely
affect the domestic enforcement of human rights norms. For instance, international human
rights norms have been relied on not only to challenge but also to outlaw practices such as
adult and juvenile corporal punishment and the "death row" phenomenon as inhuman and
degrading treatment and punishment. Courts have been prepared to use norms in international
sources such as judgments of the ECtHR and HRC to nullify these practices although their
activism has been frustrated by Parliament reversing their decisions, for instance, in juvenile
whipping. In other words, the courts have not yielded to national standards especially cultural
norms which sanction these practices. In sum, the courts have challenged or tempered with
the imposed classical dualistic approach and swayed towards a monistic approach. This
approach reinforces the domestic role of international law. It makes international human
rights law more effective in national law. It also accords this law a firm place in domestic
sphere and enriches national human rights normative standards with international standards.
Most significantly, this approach incorporates international human rights law into
Zimbabwean national law.
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Lessons on Monism and Dualism
In the preceding chapters, a number of observations and conclusions have already
been made. This chapter is not meant to repeat them but some salient points may be reiterated
and stressed, and some lessons, both general and specific, drawn from the classical theories of
monism and dualism with respect to the domestic incorporation and role of international
human rights law.
The central objective of this study is to examine the process and techniques of
incorporating international human rights law into the domestic laws of Botswana, Namibia
and Zimbabwe. It examines the status and role of international human rights law in the
national laws of these countries. The inquiry involves, in the main, a wider issue of the
relationship between international law especially international human rights law and the
municipal laws of the three countries. It finds out the extent to which the place and role of
international human rights law in these countries can adequately be examined with the aid of
the traditional theories of the relationship between international law and municipal law
commonly represented by monism on the one hand and dualism on the other. In essence, the
study examines the relevance of these theories in the domestic application of international
human rights law.
The monist theory, sometimes called the automatic incorporation principle, is based
on the natural-law assumption that international law and national law compose of a single
normative system. It thus assumes that international law is automatically applicable in
internal law. It does not require any act of incorporation to be part of national law. The dualist
theory, is, on the other hand, predicated on the positivist notion that the two legal regimes are
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independent of each other and cannot purport to conflict. For international law to have
internal effect, it needs a specific act of incorporation. Philosophically, these theories provide
clarity and a backdrop of the assessment of the place and role of international law (including
international human rights law) in municipal legal order. Also, adherence to or adoption of
either of these theories may, by and large, assist in determining the impact and role of
international law in municipal law.
1. General lessons.
Two main general lessons can be drawn from an examination of the incorporation and
role of international law (including international human rights law) in national law on the
basis of monism and dualism. The first general and main lesson is that these theories only
serve as part of the solution to the major debate on the interaction between the international
legal regime and municipal normative orders. At a practical level, generally speaking, State
practice does not always accord neatly with this theoretical distinction. In some countries, the
national Constitution or statutory enactment may assign international law a role in municipal
law without necessarily conforming to either the classical dualist or monist theory. In other
countries, both or either of these theories may be adopted in the Constitution or statutory
enactment. Yet, in other countries the relationship may not even be regulated either by the
national Constitution or primary legislation. This diversity of practice is exemplified by the
countries under consideration. The three countries have variously embraced different theories
on the relationship between international law, customary and conventional, and their national
legal systems.
As regards Namibia, it is clear that it has radically departed from the imposed colonial
legacy. Under the pre-existing legal order, customary international law (including customary
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international human rights law) was treated as part of municipal law of Namibia. It was
governed by the monistic theory. International agreements or treaties (including human rights
treaties) did not have automatic and direct application in national law. They required
legislative transformation to be part ofmunicipal law and confer rights and impose duties on
individuals. They were governed by the dualist theory. This legal position has been
fundamentally altered by the independence Constitution. The Constitution makes both
customary international law and treaty law part ofmunicipal law of Namibia. Customary and
treaty rules are directly applicable in municipal law. Significantly, these rules are not only
assigned statute-like effect in municipal law, they are also accorded a constitutional status.
Conceptually, the approach adopted by Namibia effectively makes it a monist country. Both
customary and treaty rules are governed by the monistic theory. The gravamen of this theory
is to make international law and Namibian legal order part of a single normative system. It
creates unity between the international legal order and national law ofNamibia. The two legal
orders complement each other.
The Namibian monist approach is further reinforced by the fact that the substantive
and juridical content of most of the various human rights norms contained in the Bill of
Rights are largely fashioned along similar rights in international human rights treaties and
instruments. They reflect the influence of, and are indeed in line with, international human
rights standards. Put differently, the Bill incorporates, albeit implicitly, international human
rights standards into national law ofNamibia.
The Namibian monist strategy has several advantages. In the first instance, it makes
the task ofNamibian courts relatively easier. If and when the Namibian courts are faced with
questions involving rules of international law, and international human rights law for that
matter, they do not have to undertake the arduous task of inquiring into whether or not these
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rules are part of municipal law. In other words, faced with rules of international law,
customary or conventional, the Namibian courts do not have to investigate whether the rules
in question are governed by classical dualism or monism. According to the Namibian monist
strategy, these rules are directly and automatically applicable in national law. Municipal
judges can directly invoke and use these rules in domestic legal proceedings. Moreover,
individuals are directly accorded rights and obligations recognised and protected by
international law. They can directly claim international legal rights embodied in human rights
treaties and customary international law since these rights have been integrated into the
national legal system. Individuals are rights-holders. This approach further assigns
international law a firm and secure place in municipal legal sphere.
In sharp contrast, Botswana and Zimbabwe have left the imposed colonial heritage
unaffected. The independence legal order of both countries has not changed the pre-existing
legal position of both customary and conventional international law in national law. As
regards Zimbabwe, judicial practice, based on the superimposed Roman-Dutch common law
approach, established that international agreements were governed by the dualist theory. In
terms of this theory, international agreements required specific legislative transformation in
order to be integrated into municipal law. Customary international law, on the other hand,
was governed by monist theory according to which existing rules of customary international
law had automatic and direct application into municipal law. This rule, unlike the one
governing treaties, was not established by the courts. Rather, it was discerned, and thus based
on, the imposed Roman-Dutch common law.
Significantly, the Roman-Dutch common law has been retained by the Independence
Constitution of Zimbabwe. According to this law, the place of international agreements in
Zimbabwean municipal law is governed by classical dualism and customary international law
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by monism. This legal position has been authoritatively confirmed by the Zimbabwean
judiciary. Thus the colonial legacy continues to operate in the extant municipal law of
Zimbabwe.
In Botswana, the pre-existing domestic legal position of international law, customary
and conventional, never received any judicial confirmation. Moreover, the various
proclamations decreed for the territory were silent on the matter. The legal position was, as in
Zimbabwe, based on the superimposed Roman-Dutch common law approach. According to
this approach, the status of treaties in the pre-existing municipal law of Botswana was
governed by dualist theory. Treaties required legislation to make them part of national law.
The legal position of customary international law in municipal law was, on the other hand,
governed by monist theory. This law was directly applicable in municipal law. As in
Zimbabwe, this position was not altered at independence. It continues to operate in the
present municipal law of Botswana. It has been confirmed not by the independence
Constitution but by the judiciary. However, the judiciary has not vigorously, consistently and
uniformly acted upon this legal position in order to make it more clear and certain, and define
its parameters.
It essentially means, therefore, that Zimbabwe and Botswana have adopted the same
approach towards international law. They adhere to the same theories in the way they treat
international law in general in municipal law. In both countries, the domestic status of treaties
is governed by classical dualism and customary international law is regulated by monism.
The monist approach to customary international law (including customary
international human rights law) in both countries has also been underscored by the fact that
the content ofmost of the various human rights norms embodied in the Bills of Rights of both
countries largely reflect the influence of international human rights standards. They are in line
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with similar rights in the main international human rights treaties and instruments. The Bills
replicate the standard human rights norms enshrined in these treaties and instruments. As with
international human rights instruments, the Bills of Rights protect most human rights norms
in a positive and mandatory language. The difference relates mainly to form. For instance, the
human rights clauses in the national Bills of Rights are drafted in negativist terms. Further,
most of these clauses do not give expression to the natural-law foundation of human rights
norms as reflected in the international instruments. They make the protection of these rights
depended mainly on the positive laws of the State. But, by and large, these clauses translate
the substantive content of international human rights norms into national law. They make
these norms easily available to municipal courts and individuals in municipal legal
proceedings.
The adoption of the classical dualist theory in Zimbabwe and Botswana with respect
to international treaties, on the other hand, essentially means that, in theory, international
human rights standards contained in these treaties do not have direct application in municipal
law in the absence of an express and specific incorporation by legislation. The internal
operation of these standards depends on the positive action of the State. Clearly, the dualist
theory limits the domestic operation and role of international law. It minimises the influence
of international law in national sphere. This positivistic approach to international law does
not embed fully this regime in national law. It reduces the effectiveness of international
human rights law in national law. This is especially true with regard to international human
rights law. It means that this law is unavailable to the judge in national law unless the
national legislature accords it internal status. In principle, national courts may not invoke and
utilise this law. Moreover, individual can only derive rights and incur obligations from treaty
standards after parliament has legislated them into law.
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The second significant general lesson to be learnt from dualism and monism is that,
even in situations where States are prepared to assign international law a place and role in
municipal law, they do it cautiously. States do not permit international law an unregulated
predominance in municipal legal sphere. They ensure that the domestic operation of rules of
international law should give way to internal rules under certain specified and prescribed
circumstances in line with the principle of sovereignty. There are some matters that the
national legislatures should be able to exclude from the general domain of international law.
The approaches adopted by the countries under consideration seek to take account of this
practical reality.
In Namibia, the international law clause does not allow international legal norms to
operate unsupervised in municipal law of Namibia. The operation of these norms in domestic
law is not absolute and unlimited. The Constitution recognises that rules of both customary
and conventional international law may be excluded from operating directly and
automatically in municipal law by the Constitution or legislation. Thus the Namibian monist
approach is subject to constitutional supremacy and legislative sovereignty. A clear and
unequivocal constitutional provision supersedes a rule of international law. Further, an
unambiguous posterior legislation clearly manifesting the intention of the legislature to
disregard international law prevails over a rule of international law.
As regards, Botswana and Zimbabwe, judicial practice also reveals that domestic
application of international law particularly the automatic operation of customary
international law (including customary international human rights law) is not absolute. It is
subject to three main exceptions. Firstly, it may be excluded by the stare decisis rule. Second,
legislation enacted subsequent to a rule of customary international human rights law may
exclude customary international human rights law from operating in national law. Thirdly, the
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act of state doctrine. Executive actions may operate to exclude automatic operation of
customary international human rights law. These are the only three recognised exceptions to
the automatic operation of customary international human rights law in municipal law of
Botswana and Zimbabwe. These exceptions minimise the role of international law and
certainly of international human rights law in domestic law.
But, at the same time these exceptions underline the fact that international law cannot
be accorded unlimited and absolute status in national law. National authorities particularly the
legislature have residual powers to exclude its operation in national legal sphere. This
scenario casts a burden on the national courts to enhance the role of international law in
national law by construing a constitutional provision or legislation, case law and executive
actions designed to disregard international law in a manner that is consistent with and gives
effect to international obligations of these countries. Phrased differently, in applying national
legal rules, the courts should ensure that they act in conformity with, and not contrary to, the
obligations assumed by these countries in international law. This is in direct accord with the
principle that a state cannot invoke its national law as an excuse for failure to carry out its
international responsibility.
2. Specific lessons.
The determination of the incorporation and role of international law (including
international human rights law) in national law purely on the basis of these theories also has
specific lessons. These lessons become self-evident with respect to the enforcement of human
rights law in general and particularly in the countries presently under consideration. These
lessons are not mutually exclusive. They are inter-related and cover a wide spectrum of
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human rights issues. They have a bearing on the actual application of these theories in
national legal order.
1. The first lesson relates to divergence of State practice from monism and dualism. The
actual practice of States shows that in the specific sphere of the enforcement of human rights
norms national courts often diverge from the specific theory embraced by their country. In
monist countries, for instance Namibia, courts may sometimes fail to actively give effect to
the automatic incorporation theory in interpreting national law. Conversely, in dualist
countries such as Botswana and Zimbabwe, national courts may under certain circumstances
refer to and draw inspiration from international standards even where there is no express and
categorical provision assigning international law a place and role in national law. Practice in
dualist countries also varies. In some countries, courts may hold firmly to the classical dualist
theory while in others, through judicial activism, they may directly and actively invoke
international law and sources to construe national law thereby challenging the traditional
dualist theory. This divergence of practice has evidently been exhibited by courts in the
countries in question when interpreting a variety of human rights issues.
The divergence has revealed itself with respect to the death penalty in Botswana and
Zimbabwe. The death penalty is a permissible sentence under the municipal laws of both
countries and has been carried out in practice even in recent years. Although in Zimbabwe it
is yet to be actively challenged in courts, the view of the judiciary is that its constitutionality
is unquestionable. This view was expressed by the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe following an
enactment of the law by parliament debarring its challenge, that is, the death penalty, in a
court of law on the basis that it is unconstitutional.
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However, in Botswana, the constitutionality of the death penalty has already been
challenged in courts. It has been challenged not only on the basis that it is contrary to the
constitutional clause protecting the right to life. International human rights standards have
also been utilised and relied upon to challenge it. However, the courts of Botswana have
constrained themselves to utilise these standards to determine its constitutionality. Similarly,
the courts have been unable to determine the constitutionality of hanging, as a mode of
executing the death penalty, on the basis of international human rights standards. In fact, the
courts have relied on national law, the Constitution, to hold that they cannot declare both
practices unconstitutional because their functions are not legislative but purely adjudicatory.
This judicial attitude has reinforced the dualist heritage ofBotswana.
In Namibia, the total abolition of the death penalty by the Constitution has meant that
the challenge has been directed against life imprisonment. It has been argued that life
imprisonment in itself amounts to the death penalty. However, the courts have
unambiguously ruled that life imprisonment does not amount to the death penalty. This
decision was made on the basis of national law and not international law notwithstanding
Namibia's monist approach.
Divergence of practice from these theories has also occurred with respect to the
enforcement of fair trial guarantees. Generally, courts in the three countries have
implemented fair trial safeguards. They have given life and substance to the constitutional
protection of fair trial. However, the extent to which the courts have drawn inspiration from
international human rights law has not been strictly in accordance with the theory observed in
each country. In Namibia, fair trial attributes which have been the subject of judicial activity
include trial within a reasonable time, judicial independence, the right to legal counsel and
public trial. In examining these principles, the Namibian courts have mainly relied on the
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Constitution, national law and jurisprudence as well as judicial decisions from other
jurisdictions especially South Africa, United kingdom and the United States of America.
They have not actively informed their decisions with international human rights law and
standards. Reference to these standards has been made in few and isolated cases. Even in
these cases, recourse to international standards has not been very consistent and uniform.
Thus the Namibian courts have neglected to internally effectuate the Namibian monist, or
rather the automatic incorporation theory when enforcing the right to fair trial.
In Botswana, judicial interpretation and subsequent enforcement of fair trial
guarantees in the Constitution has reinforced the inherited dualist theory. This has occurred
notwithstanding the fact that the Interpretation Act of Botswana authorises the courts of
Botswana to have regard to treaties when interpreting domestic law. International human
rights standards have been referred to in few instances such as in cases dealing with trial
within a reasonable time. However, most safeguards such as the right of the accused to have
trial conducted in the language that he/she understands, judicial independence and
impartiality, the right to legal counsel and public trial have predominantly been construed on
the basis of national law and jurisprudence. The courts have not demonstrated any inclination
to seek guidance and assistance from international human rights instruments and sources
when interpreting these guarantees.
This picture contrasts sharply with the situation in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean
courts have demonstrated a readiness to invoke and rely on the international human rights
standards and sources to construe fair trial clauses of the Constitution notwithstanding
Zimbabwe's dualist legacy. This approach has been adopted, for instance, in the interpretation
of the content and scope of the right to trial within a reasonable time. Reliance on
international human rights sources especially the jurisprudence of the ECtHR to interpret this
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right is ample demonstration of the preparedness of the Zimbabwean courts to depart from the
dualist conception concerning Zimbabwean municipal law and conventional international
law. This approach enriches Zimbabwe's national law with international standards.
A radical departure from classical monism and dualism has especially been
demonstrated with respect to the enforcement of the prohibition against torture, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment. This issue has arisen mainly in relation to the institution
of corporal punishment. It should be underlined that this is an area where the Namibian courts
have given effect to the country's monist theory. The Namibian Supreme Court, in particular,
has invoked and relied heavily on international human rights law especially Article 3 of the
ECHR on the prohibition of torture and similar conducts and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR
to declare unconstitutional corporal punishment of whatever form and irrespective of
whomsoever is inflicted. This notwithstanding the fact that Namibia is not, and cannot, be a
party to the ECHR due to its geographical limitation. Consequently, corporal punishment of
whatever form is unlawful under municipal law of Namibia. Significantly, international
human rights standards played a major part in its total abolition.
In Zimbabwe, despite the fact that the country adheres to the classical dualist theory in
relation to the treatment of treaties in its municipal law, the Zimbabwean courts have actively
relied on international human rights treaties especially Article 3 of the ECHR and the
jurisprudence of the ECtHR to declare unconstitutional whipping of both adults and juvenile
offenders. Relying on these sources, the courts have stressed that whipping is not only
dehumanising and degrading. It is also repugnant to contemporary international civilised
standards. But, with respect to juvenile offenders, the Zimbabwean parliament has frustrated
the progressiveness of the courts. Parliament has reversed the pronouncements of the courts
and made juvenile whipping lawful and barred its challenge on the basis that it is inhuman
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and degrading. Moreover, the Zimbabwean courts have drawn inspiration from international
human rights law to declare that the "death row" practice in Zimbabwe is an inhuman and
degrading treatment.
In stark contrast, judicial practice in Botswana has reinforced the dualist approach
with respect to the enforcement of prohibition against torture and related conducts. These
concepts have arisen mainly in relation to corporal punishment. International human rights
standards have been invoked to challenge this punishment. The courts have, however, refused
to utilise these standards to declare it unconstitutional. As a consequence, corporal
punishment has remained a lawful and permissible punishment in Botswana. The objection of
the Botswana courts has mainly been directed against the mode of its execution in a delayed
and repeated manner and its combination with other equally severe sentences such as a long
term of imprisonment. As an institution, both under traditional customary law and general
law, corporal punishment is legally permissible in Botswana. The courts have exercised
extreme judicial restraint with respect to pronouncing on its constitutionality. Moreover,
Botswana's dualist theory has been enforced in relation to hanging as a mode of carrying out
the death penalty. Hanging continues to constitute the only mode of execution despite the fact
that both the constitution and international human rights law have been invoked to challenge
it as being an inhuman and degrading treatment. Botswana courts have been unable to declare
it unconstitutional.
Divergence of practice from these theories has further been demonstrated in relation
to discrimination especially sex discrimination. Discrimination against women has for a long
period of time been a feature of both traditional law and general law in the countries under
consideration. In challenging it before national courts, reliance has been placed not only on
the non-discrimination provisions of the Constitution but also on international human rights
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law particularly human rights treaties. Significantly, the courts have also been proactive in
invoking international human rights law and sources to outlaw it. This has been a positive
approach especially in Botswana and Zimbabwe despite their adherence to the dualist theory.
International human rights law has constituted the basis for removing legal impediments
against women resulting in the improvement and enhancement of their legal and social status.
It is important note that the Namibian government has complemented the
proactiveness of the Namibian courts in domestically effectuating the monist theory in the
general area of sex discrimination. The realisation of the disadvantageous position that
women find themselves in the country has prevailed on the Namibian parliament to outlaw
any form of discrimination. Moreover, the government has adopted a policy of affirmative
action, or rather positive discrimination in order to address the problem of sex discrimination.
However, sex discrimination is still prevalent in Botswana and Zimbabwe. Women, in
particular, continue to be discriminated against under both customary law and formal
statutory and common law in areas such as acquisition of property, succession and inheritance
in both countries. International human rights law has yet to play a part in enhancing the status
of women in this area. It is submitted that these laws should be reviewed and repealed in
order to effectuate internally the principle of equality and non-discrimination and bring them
in line with current international human rights standards.
2. The other specific lesson concerns consistency, regularity and uniformity in the application
of monism and dualism in national law. Judicial practice in the countries in question
evidently demonstrates that there is lack of consistency, regularity and uniformity in the
application of these theories. For instance, in Namibia, since the adoption of the national
Constitution, the courts have not consistently and uniformly invoked and utilised
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international human rights law, in line with the classical monist theory, when interpreting
national human rights law. Human rights issues have basically been resolved by reference to
national law and jurisprudence as well as comparative national jurisprudence at the expense
of international human rights standards. Quite often, international standards are referred to
incidentally and intermittently where constitutional issues touch upon international law. As a
result, Namibia's monist theory has been compromised.
Botswana's dualist approach has also not been applied and implemented with any
degree of consistency and uniformity. Thus although the courts have outlawed sex
discrimination in the country by having recourse to international human rights standards, they
have not used the same standards to outlaw corporal punishment. Moreover, inordinate delays
in trying the accused have been held to be unconstitutional by relying upon human rights
treaty provisions protecting trial within a reasonable time. However, despite recourse having
been had to these standards to challenge the death penalty and hanging, Botswana courts have
exercised extreme restraints to declare both practices unconstitutional.
It is also evident that despite Zimbabwe's adherence to dualist theory in relation to
conventional international law, the courts have been ready to utilise international human
rights treaties to declare unconstitutional some national law and practices. For instance, these
sources have been relied on to interpret the concept of trial within a reasonable, freedom of
movement and freedom of expression. This approach has, however, not been applied
consistently and in all cases. There are still instances where the courts exercise some
restraints to interpret national human rights law on the basis of international sources. For
instance, in interpreting the constitutional clause on personal liberty, the Zimbabwean
Supreme Court has relied on national law and not international law to hold that it is not in
every case that failure to accord individuals the right to liberty should be held to be
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unconstitutional. National law can be relied on to disregard this protection even where
international normative standards would be compromised. Consequently, the enforcement of
individuals right to personal liberty has been adversely affected especially in relation to
preventive detentions which have occurred during state of emergencies.
3. Closely connected with consistency and uniformity is the question of the preparedness of
national courts to invoke international normative standards to invalidate practices infringing
national human rights norms. The question is, do courts actually or as a matter of fact rely on
international human rights standards to invalidate these practices? Judicial practice various
from one jurisdiction to another. Again, corporal punishment offers the best example. Whilst
in Namibia and Zimbabwe international human rights standards have constituted the basis for
outlawing corporal punishment, this has not been the case in Botswana. The courts in
Botswana have restrained themselves from invoking and relying on these norms to invalidate
corporal punishment despite reliance having been placed on these norms to challenge this
practice. Likewise, courts in Botswana have been reluctant to invoke and rely on international
human rights norms and sources to declare the death penalty unconstitutional. Courts have
adhered strictly to Botswana dualist theory. Thus it is one thing to refer to international law
and sources in construing national human rights norms and quite the other to actually rely on
and utilise these norms to declare unconstitutional any practice, act or omission that
contravenes these norms.
4. Effectiveness of international human rights law in national law. This relates to the extent
to which adoption of the monist and dualist theories ensure and enhance the effectiveness of
international human rights norms in the enforcement of national human rights norms. It is
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clear that adherence to classical dualist theory limits and reduces the effectiveness of
international human rights law in national law. This is particularly the case where the national
courts, as judicial practice in Botswana amply demonstrates, stick to the letter and spirit of
this theory. This means that national courts are not able to draw inspiration from international
standards to enrich and cross-pollinate national law especially human rights law where it falls
below or diverges from international standards.
It is also demonstrably clear that although monism empowers national institutions
particularly courts to rely upon international rules when construing national law, its
effectiveness in municipal law is lessened and as such compromised if courts do not
rigorously act upon it. This is abundantly illustrated by the Namibian situation. The Namibian
courts have not rigorously acted on the monist theory so as to firmly confirm its place and
effective role in municipal law. The relevance of this theory in the protection of human rights
has been minimised.
Thus both instances, that is, strict adherence to classical dualism and lack of judicial
activity on monism, have a limiting effect on the role of international law in the domestic
protection of human rights. They do not enhance the effectiveness of international human
rights norms in the enforcement of human rights at the national level.
5. Last but not least, is the role of the judiciary in the application of monism and dualism in
enforcing national human rights law. The judiciary has an immense and pivotal role to play in
the internal application and effectuation of these theories. The judicial role divides itself into
two major kinds. First, judicial activism. Secondly, is judicial restraint. The latter approach
has been exemplified by the judiciary in Botswana and to a lesser degree in Namibia. The
courts in both countries have relied extensively on national rules when enforcing human
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rights law at the expense of international human rights law and sources. They have
demonstrated their inclination to maintaining the status quo and have not actively invoked
international human rights standards in enforcing national human rights law and, if need be,
used these standards to invalidate practices that minimise the domestic protection of human
rights. Thus, in Botswana, this form of extreme judicial restraint has led the courts to
reinforce the inherited dualist theory. Similarly, in Namibia, judicial restraint has
compromised Namibia's monist theory. As a consequence, the role of international law in
general and international human rights law in particular in the enforcement of national human
rights laws ofboth countries has been limited.
The Zimbabwean courts have, on the other hand, shown a certain degree of judicial
activism notwithstanding Zimbabwe's dualist legacy and approach to international law. The
Zimbabwean courts have actively invoked international human rights law and sources not
only to interpret national human rights law but also to invalidate national practices that
frustrate the full implementation and enforcement of human rights law. In a great majority of
cases, they have disregarded dualism which enjoins the court to apply national, and not
international, law in enforcing national law. They increasingly have recourse to international
human rights standards in interpreting national human rights law. This approach has enabled
the courts to harmonise national legal norms with international norms. It has enabled national
courts to depart from the rigid and dogmatic monist-dualist perception and controversy. This
approach gives practical effects to international human rights standards in national law.
This approach attracts several advantages. First, it is a positive, pragmatic and
progressive approach to the application of international human rights law in municipal law. It
is an approach that municipal courts in Botswana and Namibia, and indeed many countries
should adopt in order to firmly assign international legal rules both formal and substantive
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role and validity in the national legal arena. Secondly, this approach does not amount to
effectuation of cultural imperialism of universal norms into national law. It is also not judicial
legislation on international legal rules by fiat or back-door. Rather, it is a recognition of the
vital role that international normative rules can play in the protection of individual human
rights in national law particularly where the national rules fall below or diverge from
universally recognised standards. Thirdly, in adopting this approach, the courts are effectively
fulfilling the international obligations of these countries assumed under existing international
human rights law.
Fourthly and most importantly, provided it is done within legally permissible limits
and reasonably, this form of judicial activism injects, even for classical dualist jurisdictions,
universally recognised norms into municipal law. It reinforces the domestic protection of
human rights by international standards and gives practical effect to the human rights
rhetoric. It also has an incorporative effect of international human rights law into domestic
law. It thus makes municipal law international law friendly.
It is demonstrably clear from these lessons that the countries under consideration do
not adhere strictly to classical monism and dualism. The courts, in particular, increasingly
depart from these theories. Significantly, there is an fledgling judicial trend, which, of course,
varies from country to country, of relying on and drawing inspiration from both customary
and conventional international law especially international human rights law in interpreting
and enforcing national law even in the absence of any specific and express authority. This
approach demonstrates the courts' preparedness to make the legal position of international
human rights law in particular in national law more home-grown. It also indicates that there is
indeed a great potential for the courts in the three countries to integrate international
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normative standards into national law so that national human rights law and jurisprudence
develops in tandem with international law.
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Recommendations
The fore-going discussion, particularly the lessons on classical monist and dualist
theories, clearly lends support for the need especially of Botswana and Zimbabwe, to
establish a firm foundation for the operation of rules of international law, customary and
conventional, in national law. In this vein, several recommendations and suggestions are in
order. These recommendations and suggestions are inter-related and complement each other.
1. First and foremost, Botswana and Zimbabwe, like Namibia, should incorporate
international law in general into their national legal systems. They should assign international
law (including international human rights law) an explicit and categorical place and role in
their respective national laws. This mechanism underscores the willingness of both countries
to abide by the commitments and indeed legal obligations they have assumed at international
level. In particular, it serves as clear demonstration of both countries to implement the
obligations they have undertaken under relevant international human rights treaties to which
they are signatories to respect and protect the rights of individuals in their respective
territories.
The reform of this kind can be done in several ways. It can be achieved by primary
legislation. The national legislatures of both countries should enact legislation assigning both
customary and conventional international law (including international human rights law) a
precise place and function in municipal law. They should enact a specific legislation, as the
United Kingdom has done with the Human Rights Act 1998,1 directly incorporating rules of
both customary and conventional international law into national law. These rules should be
incorporated in the main body of the legislation and schedules providing additional detail
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annexed thereto. Alternatively, and preferably, international law can be incorporated into
municipal laws of both countries by a constitutional mechanism. A clause in the national
Constitution is a preferable mode of incorporating international law in national law. As a
compact that enshrines the wishes and aspirations of the people, a national Constitution
commands universal respect of the people. Most crucially, a national Constitution may not be
easily alterable so as to advance the whims and narrow interests of the rulers. Consequently, a
constitutional clause translating rules of international law in domestic law has the potential of
enjoying universal respect from the general public and rulers alike.
A constitutional provision or legislative enactment translating international law into
municipal law should be precise as to which rules of international law are being incorporated
into municipal law. As regards international treaties, this device needs to be exact with
respect to the kinds of treaties or international agreements that are transplanted into national
law. Obviously, no country will accept a blanket provision. But, a provision that domestically
incorporates any international agreement subject to reasonable exceptions would be
acceptable. The legal position of custom in municipal law should also be more precise. For
instance, a provision to the effect that customary international law shall subject to precisely
defined exceptions be part of municipal law is a preferred one.2 This approach incorporates
rules of customary international law into national law in their entirety be they general,
regional or local.
A reform of this nature offers several advantages. An embodiment of international law
in the Constitution or legislation gives this law a firm footing in national law. It also accords
rules of international law a statute-like effect in national law so that individuals can directly
claim rights and incur responsibilities regulated by this law. Moreover, national courts can
directly invoke and rely upon this law in national legal proceedings. This mechanism further
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ensures that the position of international law in national law is clear, certain and predictable.
Furthermore, since international law, especially international human rights law, will continue
to play pivotal role in the national legal sphere of both countries, it makes it all the more
necessary to accord it a clear and categorical place and role in municipal law.
2. In view of the fact that countries, and certainly those under examination, are not prepared
to allow rules of international law to operate unsupervised in their municipal legal systems, it
is recommended that exceptions to, or limitations of, direct incorporation and application of
international law in municipal law should be clearly and expressly defined. The
circumstances under which rules of international law may be excluded from operating in
national law should be made absolutely clear and be drafted with utmost precision. This
enables the various national actors, particularly the courts, to be in no doubt whether or not a
particular rule of international law is excluded from operating in national law. For instance,
exclusion of the domestic operation of a rule of international law, customary and
conventional, by primary legislation should clearly indicate that the exception relates to
posterior but not anterior legislation. Most importantly, exceptions to direct operation of
international law in municipal law should be narrowed in order to further enhance the
influence and operation of international law in national law.
3. It is further recommended that national courts in the countries under consideration should
play a major role in injecting international human rights standards into municipal law. The
courts should be more proactive, as the Zimbabwean courts have started to become, in
extensively relying upon and drawing inspiration from international law, especially
international human rights law and sources, in interpreting national human rights law.
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Moreover, they should also use these sources to outlaw practices which infringe upon and
undermine human rights standards. In other words, it would not be enough for the courts to
rely on international human rights standards and sources to interpret a national practice, act or
omission that infringes human rights norms and standards or limits the enjoyment of human
rights, say, for instance, adult whipping or sex discrimination, but the courts should also
utilise these standards and sources especially customary international law to actually
invalidate any such practice, act or omission. These norms should form the basis for the
protection of individual human rights. They should not just be another form of judicial
embellishment. Of course, this form of judicial activism challenges classical dualism
especially in Botswana and Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, it helps to interlace national law with
international human rights standards. It also complements any constitutional or legislative
measures of incorporation suggested above and reinforces the domestic enforcement of
human rights law.
4. In order to ensure that the above-mentioned recommendation is effective particularly in
the specific area of the protection and enforcement of human rights law, a provision in the
Constitutions of these countries or a duly enacted statute enjoining national institutions
especially the courts and tribunals with similar trappings to take international law in general
and international human rights law in particular into consideration when interpreting national
human rights law is recommended. Such a provision should specifically enjoin national
institutions to take into account any sources of international human rights law such as
decisions of international law tribunals, treaties and custom when determining human rights
related issues.3 This device ensures that the courts and these bodies not only invoke and rely
on international human rights law but also adopt a reasonable interpretation that is consistent
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and compatible with international human rights standards. This device further ensures that
national law standards develop alongside international human rights standards. This
mechanism provides a legal basis for the judiciary to develop and internalise a culture of
utilising international human rights norms in construing national legal rules.
5. It is further recommended that reliance upon international law (including international
human rights law) by national courts to construe national human rights law, say, for
unreasonableness or ambiguity should be regular, uniform and consistent. International law in
general and international human rights law in particular should not be referred to in few and
isolated instances, and incidentally in cases touching upon international interests. It should be
relied upon more regularly and consistently in order to demonstrate that the judiciary is
internalising the function and significance of this law in the domestic protection and
enforcement of national human rights law. This approach has the beneficial effect of
enriching and cross-pollinating national law and jurisprudence with international human
rights standards. Significantly, it drifts away from classical dualist approach to international
law in favour of an approach that forges harmony and unity between international law and
national law.
Cap. 42. The preamble to this Act, inter alia, states thus: "An Act to give further effect to rights and
freedoms guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights.." Section 1 thereof entitled
"Introduction" incorporates the Convention Rights into United Kingdom municipal law.
2 This formula has been adopted in Malawi. See the Constitution of Malawi, Section 211(3).
3 Cf the 1996 Constitution of South Africa, Section 39. Paragraph 1(b) thereof states that "when interpreting
the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum must consider international law." See also the Constitution of
Malawi, Section 11 (2)(c) which provides that "In interpreting the provisions of this Constitution a court of law
shall, where applicable, have regard to the current norms of public international law and comparative foreign
case law." Further, see United Kingdom Human Rights Act 1998, Sections 2 and 3. Both provisions enjoin the
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